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Abstract 
Collaboration via partnership in a consortium and in outsourcing are common aspects in building 
and maintaining a trusted digital repository. Such collaboration is overlooked in most digital 
preservation auditing metrics. This not only prevents the possibility of formal certification, but 
not including third-party participation in the standards implies that there are no standards for 
negotiating contracts and delineating the roles of partners. This thesis examines the ongoing 
project Digital Safe, a project in development at Oxford that aims to be a service for storing 
confidential information. In two case studies, the author employs the Trustworthy Repositories 
Audit & Certification (TRAC) and the Data Seal of Approval (DSA) to inform the development 
of Digital Safe and its relationships with third-party vendors. The major goal is to examine how 
various roles between an institution and third-parties can be delegated based on the necessary 
standards. This is useful first for helping develop contracts with vendors and understanding exact 
responsibilities in partnerships. Second, it facilitates a better understanding of the limitations of 
current auditing metrics.  
The case studies reveal that both TRAC and DSA can provide a means for defining roles in 
partnerships, TRAC being more complex and DSA being more theoretical. Second, the 
documentation for audit standards is reliant on OAIS reference model, which limits their use in 
consortia, dark archives, and other specific repositories. The case studies also clarify the type of 
evidence most appropriate to have and develop in the planning stages for a digital repository. 
These findings point to future work in a revision of how audit standards are used, specifically 
indicating their use-value as development tools in addition to assessment tools. The addition of 
third-party support to these standards could facilitate a better guide to interacting with third 
parties during planning stages, and ultimately improve digital preservation standards and the 
trustworthiness of repositories. 
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Introduction 
Building a trusted digital repository is no easy task. In a nutshell, it requires juggling governance 
and infrastructure, assessing needs, prioritizing preservation activities, developing and 
implementing a preservation plan, and all the while securing the funding and staff to support the 
project. Many institutions and organizations can provide some but not all of these aspects. It is 
not surprising, then, that most institutions are outsourcing to third-parties or forming consortia in 
order to support large digital repository projects. For example, organizations like CLOCKSS1 
contracts-out their operations to Stanford University, and contracts storage spaces at Rice, 
Indiana, and Stanford Universities (Rosenthal, 2014); the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign contracts out file and data storage2 to Amazon Glacier’s cloud storage (Engineering 
IT) which also acts as support for their Medusa Core3 repository; the University of Virginia’s 
institutional repository Libra is built on Hydra technology, which is accessible to them as 
partners in Hydra4. Further, organizations like APTrust,5 Digital Preservation Network (DPN),6 
Hydra,7 Preservica,8 and AVPreserve9 exist to provide a range services for digital preservation 
activities. 
However, the benefit of having partners in digital repositories also hinders any repository aiming 
to be formally certified as a trusted digital repository. In examining documentation for the digital 
preservation auditing metrics Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification (TRAC) and the 
Data Seal of Approval (DSA), it is evident that consortia, outsource partners, and other 
collaborative activities have been largely excluded from these standards. Though the newest 
2017-2019 DSA Guidelines now incorporate Outsource Partners as an expectation for current 
digital repositories, previous versions and additional metrics do not.  
                                                          
1 See CLOCKSS’ homepage for additional information: https://www.clockss.org/  
2 Additional contracts held by UIUC Engineering IT Services: https://it.engineering.illinois.edu/services/file-and-
data-storage  
3 Additional information on Medusa Core and its contract: 
http://cms.library.illinois.edu/export/it/helpdesk/service/medusa.html  
4 More information on University of Virginia’s partnership and other Hydra partners: 
https://projecthydra.org/community-2-2/partners-and-more/university-of-virginia-2/  
5 APTrust homepage & mission statement: http://aptrust.org/about  
6 DPN homepage & mission statement: http://dpn.org/  
7 Hyrda’s homepage: https://projecthydra.org  
8 Preservica overview: http://preservica.com/preservica-2/  
9 AVPreserve homepage & mission statement: https://www.avpreserve.com/  
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Digital preservation auditing metrics are built to audit and assess existing digital repositories 
based on institutionally agreed upon standards for the purpose of certifying trusted digital 
repositories. They are not built for developing digital repositories or for assessing consortia and 
vendor partnerships. The first issue is that there are more audit standards than there are 
development tools, so developers must rely either on collections of preservation planning 
resources or use audit standards for uses other than their purpose. The second issue is that there 
are no standards in the digital preservation community for developing contracts between partners 
and vendors. 
Despite their assessment purpose, auditing metrics can serve as scoping tools for designing and 
negotiating contracts with vendors, and for delegating responsibilities between consortium 
members. In two case studies that examine the ongoing partnership-based project Digital Safe10 
at the University of Oxford using TRAC Criteria (CRL & OCLC, 2007) and DSA Guidelines 
(2016), three aspects are explored. First, TRAC and DSA are compared for use as general 
scoping tools. Second, the metrics are further evaluated for development and evidence collection. 
Finally, this thesis investigates how audit standards can help guide institutions to work with 
vendors and partners. 
 
  
                                                          
10 See the Digital Safe blog: Digital Safe website https://digitalsafe.wordpress.com/  
3 
 
Literature Review 
A Review of Digital Preservation Auditing Metrics 
At its core, the purpose of a standard for trusted digital repositories is to provide evidence that a 
digital repository is sustainable, that its scope is documented and understood, and that its 
managerial and technical infrastructure are intact.  
Digital preservation auditing metrics provide the structure for assessing and certifying 
trustworthy digital repositories. Standards such as Audit and Certification of trustworthy digital 
repositories (TDR/ISO 16363:2012), Trusted Repositories Audit & Certification (TRAC), Data 
Seal of Approval (DSA), the nestor Seal, and the Digital Repository Audit Method Based on 
Risk Assessment (DRAMBORA) are all tools for maintaining trusted digital repositories. TDR, 
TRAC, and the DSA are certifiable metrics that can be awarded to digital repositories, and the 
nestor Seal and DRAMBORA are utilized primarily as self-assessment tools in preparation for a 
formal audit or internal redesign. These five standards are currently the most utilized of the 
various audits and tools that exist for measuring digital repositories based on their universality of 
use and relevance to the digital preservation community. This is also corroborated by lists of 
certifications provided by digital preservation organizations such as the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at Michigan (ICPSR, 2017), the metrics 
listed by the Center for Research Libraries (CRL), and the “Audit and certification” section in 
the Digital Preservation Handbook maintained by the Digital Preservation Coalition (DPC, 
2017), among other similar organizations. 
 The two case studies included in this research focus on TRAC and DSA, though the influence of 
the nestory Seal, TDR, and DRAMBORA is relevant to understanding the chosen metrics for the 
Digital Safe case studies. The following is a brief overview of the development of these metrics, 
any related metrics, and the establishment of relevant digital preservation organizations for 
context: 
 1999: The Open Archival Information System (OAIS) reference model is 
developed by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) in 
the US, and then passed to the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) for approval and control (Lavoie, 2000). 
 2000: ISO 17799 Information Security Policy is added to ISO from the existing 
British standard BS 7799. ISO 17799 evolves into ISO 27002. 
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 2002: Digital Preservation Coalition is established in the UK. 
 2003: OAIS reference model for long-term preservation is officially released by 
ISO. 
 2004: The Digital Curation Centre is established in the UK. 
 2005: ISO 17799-2 becomes ISO 27001 and the ISO 27000 series develops 
further from ISO 27001 and ISO 27002. 
 2006: Center for Research Libraries (CRL) is established in the US. 
 2006-2007: DRAMBORA is developed by the Data Curation Centre (DCC) and 
DigitalPreservationEurope (DPE) for self-assessed risk management. 
 2007: TRAC is developed by OCLC and is implemented by CRL auditors. 
 2007: Ten Principles developed by four digital preservation organizations and 
published by CRL. 
 2008: DSA is developed by Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) at 
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (DSA About). 
 2009: Control of DSA is transferred to an international Board of external auditors 
(DSA About). 
 2012: ISO 16363 (TDR) is developed as an expanded, better organized version of 
TRAC and is currently the ultimate certification standard.   
 2012: DIN 31644 Information and Documentation – Criteria for Trustworthy 
Digital Archives, which is the expansion of the Ten Principles, is also officially 
released in Germany. 
 2013: nestor Seal is developed by the nestor Certification Working Group as 
verification for DIN 31644 compliance for the purposes of extended certification. 
 2013: National Digital Stewardship Alliance (NDSA) develops the NDSA Levels 
of Preservation. 
 2014: ISO 16919 “Space data and information transfer systems—Requirements 
for bodies providing audit and certification of candidate trustworthy digital 
repositories” is created, which is a prerequisite for ISO 16363 certification. 
Though the process of digital preservation collaboration and development extends far beyond 
this timeline, the relevant technologies and organizations still reveal several themes. The 
incremental building of these tools indicates first, that there are various types of audits that 
measure different aspects of repositories. DSA and DIN 31644, for example, are primarily for 
research data and focus on how to preserve for continuous access, whereas DRAMBORA 
assesses the range of criteria for what level of risk a repository has based on their current 
technologies and workflows. ISO 16363 and TRAC are the ultimate criteria for digital 
preservation goals overall, particularly given their relationship to additional ISO certifications, 
and are therefore the most complex and universally applicable. Second, the timeline 
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demonstrates how these metrics are built on one another and are therefore still evolving. Finally, 
though obvious, international collaboration is a major factor in standardizing digital preservation. 
Environmental Scan  
Metrics as Assessment Tools 
Though digital preservation auditing metrics are built to audit repositories, utilizing these metrics 
for self and peer assessment is not a new concept. Often self-assessments are conducted as 
preparation for a formal certification, or just for internal use. The purpose of standards is to 
eventually become universally used as a means of connecting information, streamlining the 
digital preservation process, and to ensure that data is maintained and usable in the future. 
Consequently, there are many resources for assisting self-assessments from both digital 
preservation organizations, and from individual institutions from groups that report to the 
community on their experiences. Outside of the documentation for the metrics themselves, there 
are various resources from the major digital preservation institutions that provide basic guides, 
aides for choosing a metric, guides on how to plan an assessment, and various case studies for 
the most prevalent auditing metrics. The Digital Preservation Coalition (DPC),11 the Center for 
Research Libraries (CRL),12 the National Digital Stewardship Alliance (NDSA),13 and the 
Digital Curation Centre (DCC)14 are four of the primary organizations for standardized digital 
preservation practices and guides on using their resources.  
Basic tools to guide self-assessments exist both officially and as produced by smaller 
universities, such as the Ten Principles compiled by the CRL versus the created by the Northeast 
Document Conservation Center (NDCC).15 The Ten Principles were officially released in 2007 
by the CRL after consulting with three other digital preservation organizations and provide the 
ten most basic criteria that a digital repository must possess to be a trusted digital repository 
(2007). Comparatively, organizations like the NDCC have developed short project-structuring 
documents like “Planning for Digital Preservation: A Self-Assessment Tool” that consists of a 
four-page list of considerations for developing a repository (2007). More developed resources 
                                                          
11 DPC: http://www.dpconline.org  
12 Center for Research Libraries: https://www.crl.edu/  
13 National Digital Stewardship Alliance homepage: http://www.digitalpreservation.gov:8081/ndsa/index.html  
14 Data Curation Centre homepage: http://www.dcc.ac.uk/  
15 Northeast Document Conservation Center homepage: https://www.nedcc.org/  
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are also freely available, such as the Digital Preservation Handbook created and maintained by 
the DPC. More detailed sources like the POWRR Tool Grid,16 a comprehensive chart listing 
digital preservation tools and their attributes against the six aspects of the OAIS reference model, 
are also useful for evaluating tools based on a standard. In short, the planning and 
implementation of digital repository self-assessments is manageable based on the larger number 
of trusted resources that provide the fundamentals. 
A notable resource for designing preservation plans are the NDSA Levels of Digital 
Preservation. The levels are intended to “offer clear, baseline instructions on preserving digital 
content at four progressive levels of sophistication across five different functional areas” 
(Phillips, Bailey, Goethals, & Owens, 2013). The levels are described simply and expressed in a 
succinct table. They are also intended for various institution sizes, resource levels, and without 
limiting the content type or technologies (Phillips et al. 2013). A specific example of applied 
archive-building against a standard is Priscilla Caplan’s talk outlining the process of creating the 
software application Dark Archive in the Sunshine State (DAITSS)17 at the Florida Center for 
Library Automation (FCLA). Not only does she summarize the timeline for the project, she 
describes the four theories behind development that included preservation strategies, the OAIS 
reference model, risk management, and file formats. More discussion on this talk is in the 
Limitations section.  
Beyond basic tools, many libraries also create their own informal audits that are available on 
their respective websites as examples for references. While these resources are not collected in a 
single online location, several institutions include a preservation plan for their content that might 
include an internal assessment. For example, the self-assessment report from the Northern 
Arizona University’s Cline Library in Spring 2014 (Welch & Phillips) is particularly useful for 
their demonstration of understanding the OAIS reference model, the description for collecting 
their documentation, and their own internal recommendations for improvement. Other such 
contributions to the general digital preservation community are continuously created as standards 
are being tested by users and auditors. 
                                                          
16 See the POWRR Tool Grid as of 2013: http://digitalpowrr.niu.edu/tool-grid/  
17 DAITSS Digital Preservation Repository Software homepage: http://daitss.fcla.edu/  
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On the level of formal certification from metrics like ISO 16363, TRAC, DIN 31644, 
DRAMBORA, and DSA there is official documentation, published reports and certifications, and 
additional tools from digital preservation organizations. This study focuses on TRAC and DSA, 
both of which have several published certification reports and resources that are publicly 
available online. The HathiTrust Audit Report 2011 and corresponding elements included on the 
HathiTrust website (2011), and the CLOCKSS Audit Report 2014 (CRL) and corresponding 
blog record from David Rosenthal (2014) are primary examples of TRAC implemented. The 
HathiTrust report includes further steps for compliance to maintain TRAC certification and 
includes additional elements for further documentation, offering a useful example. The 
Controlled Lots Of Copies Keeps Stuff Safe (CLOCKSS) report is also unique in that the 
LOCKSS creator David Rosenthal also documented the TRAC Audit process on his blog in a 
three-post series that described the process and lessons learned (Rosenthal 2014). Comparatively, 
DSA provides a list of every DSA-certified repository coupled with their official certification 
reports (Seals). From this list, three relevant reports described in the Methodology section were 
the basis of comparison for the Digital Safe case study. Case studies for DSA are also published, 
notably the “ADS and the Data Seal of Approval – case study for the DCC” (Mitchan & 
Hardman, 2011), which offers an outline the process and timeline for attaining DSA certification. 
Metrics as Development Tools 
Digital preservation auditing metrics are built to assess existing repositories, not as development 
or scoping tools for ongoing projects. The issue is that there are more auditing metrics than there 
are development tools, so developers must sort through the multitude of preservation planning 
guides to find what they need. While preservation planning resources are ubiquitous, there are 
simply too many options that have not yet been filtered into a comprehensive document that 
provides the same project planning and designing standards as it does for auditing existing 
projects. Thus, few resources exist documenting projects that used an auditing metric as a 
development tool, but many resources exist illustrating the process of an assessment on an 
existing repository. 
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Third Parties in Digital Repositories 
Outsourcing  
Limited resources plague most digital preservation initiatives and outsourcing is a reasonable 
option for institutions lacking in funding, staff, and IT services. Adopting open-source software 
for infrastructure or outsourcing storage are common and extensive lists of tools exist from 
multiple digital preservation organizations. Larger institutions also outsource, one example being 
the UK Data Archive which lists its tools in its documentation.18 There are hundreds of tools 
currently used for digital preservation activities, and this section of the Literature Review is only 
meant to establish that outsourcing is common. 
Though not an exhaustive list, the following are examples of organizations that provide updated 
resources for digital preservation tools; DCC: Tools and applications,19 DPC: Technical solutions 
and tools,20 and Community Owned digital Preservation Tool Registry (COPTR).21 Platforms 
like Fedora, Hydra, Preservica, Digital Commons, and many other resources that are unnecessary 
to list exist for use by digital repositories. Other organizations provide services rather than tools, 
which benefits institutions lacking in expertise rather than budget. AVPreserve,22 for example, is 
a data management consulting and software development firm that offers recommendation on 
assessments, planning, software choices, and other aspects in digital preservation activities. 
Further, APTrust is a consortium where annual fee-paying members have access to long-term 
storage and preservation (Sites, M., 2013). Cloud services like Amazon Glacier provide basic 
storage, and organizations like Arkivum offer high-security storage, among many others. 
Consortia 
Joining a consortium is common and economical decision for digital repositories, especially for 
smaller institutions, as it alleviates the constant battle for sustaining funds and staffing (Wu, M., 
2015). Consortia also increase content resources and allow for a more extensive and 
customizable technical infrastructure. David Rosenthal even posits that “serious digital archives 
like CLOCKSS require a distributed implementation, if only to achieve geographic redundancy” 
                                                          
18 UK Data Archive tools: http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/curate/standards-tools/tools  
19 See DCC: http://www.dcc.ac.uk/resources/tools-and-applications  
20 http://dpconline.org/handbook/technical-solutions-and-tools/tools  
21 COPTR: http://coptr.digipres.org/Main_Page  
22 AVPreserve Services: https://www.avpreserve.com/services/  
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(2015) even if there is also a central organization leading the consortium. The issue is that 
TRAC, nestor Seal, and ISO 16363 all stipulate that a consortium cannot be certified as a whole, 
but each partner can be certified separately in a culminating certification for the consortium 
(Schwab, F., Tunnat, Y., & Gerdes, T., 2017). The stipulation here is that the DSA 2017-2019 
Guidelines can certify repositories with Outsource Partners, which extends to consortia. The 
previous lack of consortia and their roles in complying with auditing metrics, however, has not 
prevented some consortia from seeking and achieving DSA certification.  
The Digital Repository of Ireland (DRI), for example, is a research consortium compiled of six 
partners who all contribute to the management and implementation of the repositories policies, 
guidelines, and training.23 The DRI is also DSA 2014-2017 certified as of 2015. This is possible 
because in their Implementation of the Data Seal of Approval report, they state in section 0. 
Repository Context that the DRI is “built by a research consortium,” emphasis on the words 
‘build by’ rather than ‘is,’ and then later in Requirement 5. that the DRI is “an unincorporated 
association of six partners” (DSA Board, 2015). Further, rather than list the roles of each partner, 
the DRI infrastructure relied on a “distributed development team with responsibilities for 
different Work Packages shared among multiple consortium partners” (DRI, 2015), effectively 
acting as a single entity rather than six different entities.  
In contrast, the Goportis Digital Archive,24 which is a consortium of three libraries with various 
roles in contributing to the function of the consortium. The consortium successfully achieved 
2014-2017 DSA certification for Goportis by certifying all three of their libraries individually 
over the course of approximately six months (Schwab, et al., 2017). Their method was to 
establish the German National Library of Science and Technology (TIB) as the leader of the 
consortium as it “hosts, operates and administers the Digital Preservation system, and provides 
Goportis partners with access to the system” (DSA Board, 2015) so that their documentation 
could be the primary reference. The partners then created their applications simultaneously and 
collaboratively, referencing each library’s policy often to illustrate the interdependence of their 
roles. This approach is more manageable for three partners, but not necessarily for a larger 
consortium of more partners. 
                                                          
23 See the DRI website for additional information: http://www.dri.ie/about  
24 See the Goportis homepage for additional information: http://www.goportis.de/en/home.html  
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The CLOCKSS Archive is another interesting example of formal certification for a joint archive. 
While CLOCKSS does not identify as a consortium, it does rely on Stanford University for its 
technological infrastructure, is a “geographically distributed dark archive,” and is supported by 
its partnership with various other libraries and publishers (CRL, 2014). CLOCKSS’ TRAC 
certification is discussed further in the Limitations section and the Discussion section. 
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Context 
The ultimate purpose of the two case studies is to examine how auditing metrics can provide a 
framework to aid developing repositories as they negotiate contracts with vendors and delineate 
the responsibilities of each party. Given that most digital repositories outsource aspects of their 
digital preservation workflow to some extent, this evaluation could prove useful to both 
developing projects and established repositories looking to outsource. This initial impetus of the 
TRAC case study was to provide a general scoping assessment for the ongoing project Digital 
Safe, described in the following section. The data collected ultimately pointed to the need to 
explore how the duties of multiple partners are delegated, and ideally audited, in a collaborative 
project.  
Project Development 
The original application of a digital preservation auditing metric to a non-traditional repository 
occurred in the context of the Oxford-Illinois Digital Library Placement Program (OIDLPP) as a 
short-term project The OIDLPP collaborators chose Digital Safe because there was an increased 
interest in resuming the project from the Bodleian Library, the Weston Library, and members of 
the University of Oxford who originally provided feedback in the project’s development phase. 
The goal of the OIDLPP project was to assist in resuming the paused Digital Safe initiative by 
informally assessing the approach as a whole, the chosen technologies, and the current 
documentation to ensure that Digital Safe will develop into a trustworthy dark archive. The 
short-term project highlighted the strengths and areas of improvement for Digital Safe, but also 
revealed additional purposes for an auditing metric for scoping and planning incomplete and new 
digital preservation projects. 
The Trustworthy Repository Audit & Certification (TRAC) was the original metric chosen to 
evaluate Digital Safe. In consulting with Michael Popham, Head of Digital Collection and 
Preservation Services for BDLSS; Neil Jefferies, Research & Development Project Manager for 
BDLSS and project leader for Digital Safe; and the Center for Research Libraries’ assessment 
tools, TRAC was the agreed upon metric to compare to the plan for building Digital Safe. TRAC 
is significantly more detailed than the Data Seal of Approval or the Ten Principles, but is less 
complicated than ISO 16363. This allowed for a compromise between thoroughness and 
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timeliness. This level of thoroughness was needed to refresh the project team and stakeholders 
on Digital Safe after an official hiatus of nearly two years.  
In order to understand how the use of the metrics can be applied to the proposed plan for Digital 
Safe, the following is a detailed review of Digital Safe, its evolution and current state, and a 
review of the technologies chosen for storage and digital preservation workflow. 
Background for Digital Safe  
The University of Oxford does not yet provide a service for the storage of high-security 
information. Additionally, among the independent colleges, departments, and universities within 
the University of Oxford there is no shared infrastructure, technology platform, or methodology 
for long-term storage. Student records, financial records, patient records, non-anonymized data, 
and other data with any personally identifiable information is considered high-security and high-
priority, and increases every day. Digital Safe is the Bodleian Digital Library Systems & 
Services’ (BDLSS) proposed solution for a universal, long-term, high-security digital 
preservation workflow and storage system. Originally called the Electronic Archives Pilot 
Project (EAPP), Digital Safe was initiated in 2012 and has completed two of the three planned 
phases that have been developed thus far. The ultimate goal of Digital Safe is to “deliver a 
secure, long-term records archiving service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost 
recovery basis” (Jefferies, Hicks, & Rendell, 2016) The purpose is to have a single infrastructure 
that is managed locally and customizable by individual colleges and departments that is also 
economical and easily managed.  
Phase 1 (2012-2013) focused on defining the scope of the project. The primary purpose was to 
determine if there was a need or want for a digital preservation service for the storage of 
administrative material at the University of Oxford. The project team interviewed various staff 
members in the colleges, IT Services, the Oxford Colleges Librarians Group, Oxford Archivists 
Consortium, and other related groups, committees, and departments. Phase 1 established a desire 
for such a service and gathered information on the range of technical, security, and infrastructure 
requirements that these institutions might need. Phase 1 also verified that most of the University 
is relying on the library to provide a solution, which the BDLSS supports. 
Phase 2 (January 2013-June 2014) investigated service and infrastructure models for a long-term 
digital preservation service. The project team examined the infrastructure that the Bodleian 
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Electronic Archives and Manuscripts (BEAM)25 currently uses, Oxford’s Data Archiving 
infrastructure for Oxford-produced research (ORA-Data)26, and services such as DataBank27  for 
possible reuse or outsourcing. BEAM infrastructure, developed in 2005, is held on a stand-alone 
server that has recently not been able to keep up with the increase in acquisitions and the level of 
organization and security that the BEAM would prefer (Thomas, S. Personal communication, 
2016, July 19). ORA-Data was found incompatible for the type and amount of security measures 
that would need to be implemented. Building an entirely new infrastructure was also investigated 
but would not have been time or cost-efficient. DataBank was also ruled out for not including all 
the aspects necessary for the project in one platform, requiring additional outsourcing or 
increased time and money for the BDLSS.  
Phase 2 determined that the Designated Community would likely be the following: College 
Archivists; University Archive; Central Administrative Records Management; Departmental 
Research Records Management; and Personal Material held by BEAM (Jefferies, et al., 2016). 
This will not limit the type data that can be added. Given that these users may not be advanced 
technical users, the interface design will need to be user-friendly and technical support is 
necessary. The ultimate decision was to outsource the technologies to third-party vendors and 
manage the service on a local interface designed at the BDLSS. The name of the project also 
changed in Phase 2 from Electronic Archives Pilot Project to Digital Safe. The technologies 
chosen were Arkivum for long-term, high-security storage, and Archivematica for digital 
preservation activities. A Digital Safe blog28 was also developed in 2013 by David Tomkins and 
provides public information on Phases 1 and 2. The blog will be continued in Phase 3 (Jefferies, 
N., Personal communication, 2016, July 19). 
Phase 3 is in development but has not yet received funding to continue, hence the project hiatus. 
Funding is requested for three major activities. First, to further investigate and fully develop an 
ideal contract with the outsourced technologies, Arkivum and Archivematica. Second, to design 
and implement the business and service models within IT Services. Finally, to cover the start-up, 
training, and storage costs of one year of operating the service. Once the service is deployed to 
                                                          
25 BEAM homepage: http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/beam  
26 ORA-Data homepage: http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/bdlss/digital-services/data-archiving  
27 DataBank Homepage: http://www.databank.com/  
28 See the Digital Safe blog for additional information: https://digitalsafe.wordpress.com  
14 
 
early adopters, the project team will track user feedback and service function for one year before 
deciding to launch a service available to the entire University (Jefferies, et al., 2016). A 
successful Phase 3 will result in a test-run for a service providing long-term, largescale, high-
security storage for data produced and held by the University of Oxford. This service is planned 
to provide training sessions and materials available between training sessions. The Oxford brand 
and the large number of clients that the University will potentially be bringing to Arkivum is a 
motivation for Arkivum to work with Digital Safe and develop less expensive start-up and 
training fees (Jefferies, N. Personal communication, 2016, July 19). Additionally, Archivematica 
is a built-in tool in Arkivum. In signing with Arkivum the University will only need to purchase 
a single Archivematica license fee rather than over forty individual fees. Finally, the success of 
Digital Safe would will also ease the burden of data managers at the University of Oxford as the 
service is designed to be user-friendly, the technology will be supported by their developers, and 
minimal stress will be put on the IT Services and the future Steering Committee by handling 
small issues and outsourcing larger issues. 
Outsourced Technologies 
In brief, Arkivum is a “long-term, large-scale managed data storage” (Arkivum, 2017) that 
provides high-security processing and storage with strict accessibility processes. As of July 2016, 
they have two products that may be utilized by Digital Safe: Arkivum/1+1 and Arkivum/100. 
Arkivum/1+1 (2015) has one digital copy of the data held in a secure location, and one physical 
copy held on LTO data tape held in Escrow at a separate location. Arkivum/100 (2015) has two 
digital copies of the data held in two geographically separate, secure locations, and one physical 
copy held on LTO data tape held in Escrow at a third separate location. Arkivum/100 also offers 
the 100% integrity guarantee by ensuring three copies are being managed and preserved. 
Arkivum services are dictated by the number of pipes being used. Pipes are ingest workflows 
that can host multiple archives by one client or multiple archives from multiple clients. Each 
client login can have customized workflows, though only one login can be active at one time. 
Audit trails are available, and data is only accessible by the administrator login for that specific 
archive via an encryption key. Without the master encryption key the data cannot be retrieved, 
even by University staff or IT Services, which ensures the security of the data. Arkivum also 
contains both digital and physical copies, a contingency plan for lost data, and is ISO 27001 
Information security management certified (Arkivum, 2017). 
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Archivematica is an open source digital preservation workflow tool developed by Artefactual, a 
company that develops open-source tools for libraries and archives, that has recently been built 
in to Arkivum (Stanbridge, N., 2016). Arkivum specifically only “provides safe and secure data 
archiving,” (Arkivum, 2014) not digital preservation activities. Archivematica can offer a 
customizable digital workflow tool, including SIP creation, normalization, AIP packaging, and 
DIP uploading. This is then ingested into Arkivum.  
Finally, the interface for integrating these technologies is planned to be filtered through a local 
website managed by the Digital Safe Steering Committee and eventually transferred to BDLSS 
as a provided service. The purpose is to ensure that there is both customization and local 
technical support. See Figure 1 below for a visualization of the technologies and interface 
combined. 
 
Figure 1: Visualization of the ideal workflow between the local interface, Archivematica preservation activities, and Arkivum 
storage. 
Rationale 
In addition to Digital Safe being the focus in the OIDLPP project, it also serves as an example of 
an ongoing project, meaning that the project requires assessment for the purposes of 
development and planning rather than for certification. Further, Digital Safe must become a dark 
archive because its aim is to store confidential information. This in and of itself means the 
project will eventually produce a non-traditional archive: audit metrics by and large define 
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digital repositories in terms of requirements for transparency and accessibility to users, while 
dark archives, by definition, have very limited transparency and access mechanisms. Further, 
Digital Safe is ongoing and is designed around the culmination of three different technologies.  
These facets of Digital Safe create a unique subject for non-traditional auditing and the potential 
use of metrics as a scoping technique. These case studies point to future research into how 
standards handle dark archives that are not meant to be fully transparent and an investigation into 
the idea of certifying a body without a body. This thesis focuses on the more immediate concern 
of how audit metrics provide frameworks for developing services built upon multiple partners 
and delineating their roles in the service. 
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Methodology 
Evidence Collection 
Before any internal or external assessment can occur, the appropriate documentation and other 
evidence need to be collected. Digital Safe as a project, the two Digital Safe technologies, and 
resources on the chosen auditing metrics all required time dedicated to collecting comprehensive 
documents and guides. 
Digital Safe 
Data for evaluating the Digital Safe project according to audit criteria are collected from multiple 
sources. First, Digital Safe consisted of various unorganized documents that lacked a single 
storage space. These documents included: meetings minutes from the Steering Committee and 
the Oxford Colleges Librarians Group; Project Initiation Documents; letters of support from 
various Oxford Colleges; Programme and Project Highlight Reports; conference presentation 
materials; Project Request Forms; Request for Change forms; End Project Reports; various 
newsletters and copies of email communications; and various other presentation and 
documentation materials. These materials were provided by David Tomkins, the Curator of 
Digital Research Data for the BDLSS and Project Manager for Phase 2 of Digital Safe. David 
Tomkins also developed the blog to publicly track the progress of Digital Safe and has presented 
the project at multiple conferences. These documents are not publicly available, with the 
exception of the published newsletters and blog posts in the Digital Safe blog.29 
Given that the project has been conducted in phases with different project members, the 
documentation proved to be a challenge to compile. Individuals often maintained various 
documents that were not necessarily related to each other. Some information was stored in a 
Google Drive, and other information is hosted on the blog. This lack of cohesive documentation 
hindered a comprehensive perspective on Digital Safe, which further complicated the application 
of the metric. Documentation collection is a common challenge even for established repositories 
and can take months of preparation just to begin a formal audit process. In the case of Digital 
Safe and other ongoing projects, organizing documentation in the development stages was 
                                                          
29 See the Digital Safe blog for additional information: https://digitalsafe.wordpress.com 
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challenging but will be useful once the project reaches the point where it could be formally 
audited and searching for documentation becomes less of a challenge. 
Furthermore, interviews with various stakeholders were conducted to compile a background on 
Digital Safe to both gauge interest in continuing the project and to establish how stable the 
governance and infrastructure is for the project. In addition to David Tomkins, who provided 
futher explanation and context on the EAPP documents, Susan Thomas and Neil Jefferies were 
informally interviewed. Susan Thomas, Head of Archives & Modern Manuscripts for the Weston 
Library in Oxford and previously the Project Manager/Digital Archivist for Bodleian Electronic 
Archives and Manuscripts (BEAM), is also a stakeholder in Digital Safe. Because BEAM 
contained a possible infrastructure for Digital Safe to be modeled, Susan Thomas was the 
primary contact for providing information on BEAM and relaying the needs of BEAM to the 
Steering Committee. Specifically, she was asked to describe the status of BEAM, to retrieve 
some background information on Digital Safe, and to review BEAM’s current needs from the 
proposed Digital Safe service. 
The second primary interview was with Neil Jefferies, the head of Innovation and a Phase 3 
Digital Safe project lead. Neil Jefferies had been involved with Digital Safe since Phase 2, 
working with David Tomkins in creating presentation materials and acting as the primary 
investigator into the technologies chosen for Digital Safe. In addition to creating the Project 
Initiation Document for Phase 3 and having in-depth information on what benchmarks needed to 
be reached to establish funding for Phase 3, Neil Jefferies also offered information on Arkivum’s 
contract with the University of Oxford, the status of Phase 3, and other information that was not 
publicly available. 
Given that the OIDLPP project was conducted in July of 2016, many current and previous 
members of the project and stakeholders were not available as they were traveling. This limited 
the extent of personal information that could be incorporated. 
Digital Safe Outsource Technologies: Arkivum & Archivematica 
Arkivum and Archivematica both contain extensive documentation illustrating their services. 
Arkivum provides program documentation in the form of webpages, a detailed Frequently Asked 
Questions document, and information brochures for each available storage product. Specific 
contract information with the University of Oxford was provided by Neil Jefferies. 
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Archivematica also included program documentation in the form of webpages, Storage Service 
documentation illustrating how Archivematica is built into Arkivum, a Wiki page, and a Format 
Policy Registry. Both services also provide user training materials and courses for reference. 
TRAC & DSA 
Further sources for TRAC were also consulted for examples of acceptable evidence for meeting 
their respective criteria. In addition to the most current official TRAC criteria, the 2011 
HathiTrust Trustworthy Repository Audit and Certification was the primary example. The full 
report (CRL, 2011) was accessed on the Center for Research Libraries (CRL) website, and 
additional elements were published on the HathiTrust website (2011) Additional CRL metric 
materials and sources were also examined. DSA Guidelines were accessed from their website 
and additional published certification reports, community-created records of working with DSA, 
and previous guideline versions were used for reference. 
The TRAC Assessment 
The informal assessment originally took place in July 2016 for the BDLSS at the University of 
Oxford based on the 2007 Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification: Criteria and Checklist 
(CRL & OCLC). The results were presented as a formal report to the Oxford e-Research Center 
(OeRC) in August 2016 and organized per the TRAC Criteria structure. Each response includes 
the criteria, the response, and the example evidence provided by TRAC. A full version of this 
can be found in Appendix B and is referenced in the Results section of this thesis. The 
responsibilities of Digital Safe as a service, Arkivum as a storage platform, and Archivematica as 
a digital preservation workflow are all considered for each criterion. If they do not have a 
responsibility for the criteria it is acknowledged as such. An example of this is criteria B2.2 
“Repository has a definition of each AIP (or class) that is adequate to fit long-term preservation 
needs,” in which Digital Safe would rely on the technologies, and Arkivum “provides safe and 
secure data archiving” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014), not digital preservation activities, and therefore 
responsibility is solely on Archivematica.  
As an added measure for the BDLSS, the audit also includes a rating system that indicates the 
completeness of each criteria and section. Nancy McGovern of MIT Libraries developed a 
TRAC review tool in Drupal that allows institutions to self-review themselves. The tool was 
built in 2013 but is currently only hosted on Archivematica, also requires a DRUPAL 
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installation, and does not currently have an independent functioning website. This installation 
and the lack of documentation or examples of the tool omitted its use in the evidence collection 
and methodology. However, one of the features is a rating system for TRAC compliance, which 
is utilized in this informal audit. These ratings were also added up and averaged for the 
completeness of the three major TRAC sections. 
The rating system is as follows (McGovern, N., 2013):  
 4 = fully compliant - the repository can demonstrate that has comprehensively addressed 
the requirement 
  3 = mostly compliant - the repository can demonstrate that it has mostly addressed the 
requirement and is on working on full compliance 
 2 = half compliant - the repository has partially addressed the requirement and has 
significant work remaining to fully address the requirement 
 1 = slightly compliant - the repository has something in place, but has a lot of work to do 
in addressing the requirement 
 0 = non-compliant or not started - the repository has not yet addressed the requirement or 
has not started the review of the requirement 
The DSA Assessment 
The DSA assessment took place in March 2017 using the Core Trustworthy Data Repository 
Requirements per the 2017-2019 Data Seal of Approval Guidelines released in November 2016. 
Rather than treating the DSA assessment as a formal report like the TRAC assessment needed to 
be, the assessment criteria is listed as succinctly as possible to demonstrate the level of 
implementation or theory development and mention any existing documentation. A more 
complete report can be found in Appendix C, which is also referenced in the Results section of 
this thesis. This assessment is meant to indicate if it is possible to assess an ongoing project with 
multiple partners using the DSA requirements, and if so, its effectiveness. Further analysis will 
determine which sections, if any, are most useful in the design phase for a digital project.  
In addition to the 16 requirements there is a section for Context that is also mandatory but not 
measured on the following Statement of Compliance scale. The Context section includes 
information on designated communities, repository type, level of curation, and any information 
on outsource partners. This section is included in the results to ensure the full scope of the DSA 
guidelines are applied to the limited developmental documentation for Digital Safe.  
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DSA also provides a Statement of Compliance on a scale from 0 to 4 that is mandatory for each 
guideline. Similarly to TRAC’s rating system, this scale also indicates the level of completeness 
and is included in the results with a brief statement of explanation that is further explored in the 
response to the guidelines. The Statement of Compliance scale, as per the 2017-2019 DSA 
guidelines (2016), are as follows: 
Statement of 
Compliance 
Means Comments and/or URLs 
0 N/A: Not Applicable Provide an explanation. 
1 No: We have not considered this 
yet. 
Provide an explanation. 
2 Theoretical: We have a theoretical 
concept 
Provide a URL for the 
initiation document. 
3 In progress: We are in the 
implementation phase 
Provide a URL for the 
supporting document. 
4 Implemented: This guideline has 
been fully implemented for the 
needs of our repository. 
Provide a URL for the 
supporting document. 
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Results 
Case Study I: TRAC 
TRAC provided both obvious and understated successes and gaps in the current stability and 
development of Digital Safe. For the purpose of organization these results are paralleled with 
TRAC structure. In order to avoid repetition and otherwise excessive results, the following 
constitutes a consolidated response for each subsection of criteria. Several subsections have been 
combined because the same evidence applies to both criteria and the results are a condensed 
version of the initial informal audit. The full report given to the OeRC with each criterion can be 
referenced in Appendix B.   
A. Organizational Infrastructure 
A.1 Governance and organizational viability 
TRAC revealed that the governance for the service is not yet in place and policy building will 
require the most attention during Phase 3. The rating system averaged a 1.45/4 completeness 
overall. As Digital Safe becomes more cohesive its project goals have altered through each 
phase. It is anticipated that once it is complete, a mission statement will be derived from the 
combination of the Electronic Archive Pilot Project’s project goal (Wilson, J., 2012) and the 
statement in the Phase 3 Project Initiation Document to “deliver a secure, long-term records 
archiving service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis once in 
production” (Jefferies, Hicks, & Rendell, 2016). The project team identifies Digital Safe as a 
service, which also indicates that the mission statement will likely be service-oriented rather than 
describing repository goals. There is no additional policy formally produced that describes the 
current state and goals of the project outside of the Phase 3 Project Initiation Document. 
A.2 Structure and Staffing 
Currently there is a project group and Steering Committee leading the movement to resuscitate 
the Digital Safe initiative. The hope is that the Steering Committee will continue, or develop into 
a similar governance committee (Jefferies, N. Personal communication, 2016, July 19). The 
primary responsibilities for such a committee include reviewing the contracts, funding, and any 
updates from IT Services and the technologies as needed. IT Services play a vital role in Digital 
Safe, as the ultimate goal is to develop and business and service model so that Digital Safe will 
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be integrated with IT Services. This model will better determine staffing needs and training. IT 
Services will update the University web space for Digital Safe and assist in training, 
troubleshooting, and communicating with the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee will 
review and update the service as needed. Because the technologies are outsourced there is little 
technical training needed to maintain the interface, and the University will rely on Arkivum and 
Archivematica for maintaining their product. Arkivum provides training virtually, on-site, and in 
workshops. The plan is to bring Arkivum in for training and to use and develop their training 
materials to do local training in the University. These materials will be broad, as it is up to the 
client to determine how much they want out of the service, and will be added to the Bodleian 
Library’s current collection of training materials. These materials will then be reviewed an 
updated on a 4-5 year cycle by the governance committee. 
A.3 Procedural accountability & policy framework (documentation) 
Digital Safe does not yet articulate the key users, basic policy, and contact information. The 
nature of a dark archive is not transparency and much information cannot be made public, 
however as a service provided to the University, general information and documentation is 
necessary.  
Phase 2 determined that the key users for this service have been identified as: College Archivists; 
University Archive; Central Administrative Records Management; Departmental Research 
Records Management; and Bodleian Electronic Archives and Manuscripts (Jefferies, et al., 2016) 
These users have materials that require high-security and low-accessibility, including 
administrative records, student records, financial records, personal communication, medical 
reports, non-anonymized case studies, and other material that has personal, identifiable 
information. Users are not limited to only these categories, however, as the service is open to all 
who want to use the service and are affiliated with the University of Oxford. As described above, 
policies have not yet been developed. The Steering Committee is currently directing the project, 
but much of the policy will be directed by the contract agreements between the University and 
Arkivum before they can be documented. Policies for the technologies, however, are well-
detailed and located on their respective websites. 
Legal permissions will largely be the responsibility of the client as much of the content will be 
produced by the client. Other materials that have been acquisitioned by the library may require 
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additional policy measurements, but this is also primarily up to the library and BEAM to 
maintain. The contract between the University and Arkivum may need to determine if there is a 
need to build in a deposit agreement concerning the permissions for migration copies. It should 
be noted that Arkivum employees do not have access to any material as it is only accessible with 
an encryption key held by the client.  
Outside of Digital Safe, the technologies have extensive documentation and are responsible for 
maintaining their certification and upholding their own policies. Arkivum has automated annual 
data integrity checks, five-year hardware and software migration, and developed an LTO road 
map to prevent technology and data obsolescence. More information is on their website. 
Arkivum also maintains ISO 27001 certification, is audited every six months, and welcomes 
client audits. 
A.4 Financial sustainability 
Digital Safe does not have a full cost model developed for the long-term. Phase 3 has outlined 
the short-term business plan that includes University staff training, Arkivum training costs, 
startup costs, 1 year of Arkivum service and storage space, and 1 year of maintenance fees. All 
are outlined in the Phase 3 PID (Jefferies, et al., 2016). Developing this model is a priority for 
Phase 3 and will ultimately determine what funding is provided after the first year of service to 
maintain the website and any license and storage fees. Once the service is launched and the 
clients choose the service they prefer, they will be responsible for their own funding. Phase 3 
will help determine the payment method agreed upon between the University and Arkivum. If 
Arkivum handles the billing, they do direct invoicing for each client. If the University handles 
the billing it will be managed as a library service, similarly to the process for handling services 
like catalog use, access to electronic journals, and IT Services. The Steering Committee will be 
responsible for reviewing and securing funding once it is determined if Phase 3 has been 
successful. 
A.5 Contracts, Licenses, & Liabilities 
Digital Safe and Arkivum have been contact since 2014 and are still in discussion over contract 
specifications. Once funding has been secured for Phase 3, this will be developed on a beta level 
for the first year of early adopters, and then re-evaluated after the first year is completed. Deposit 
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agreements and copyright issues will need to be evaluated to ensure legal inclusion of any 
acquisitioned material that might be included, such as from BEAM.  
Section A5 was not completed in this audit because there is no existing documentation yet. 
However, this does raise several questions how Digital Safe will develop their contracts and 
licenses between its users and the outsource technologies because this section can be useful in 
informing how Digital Safe’s vendor contracts are written, which is further explored in the 
Discussion section. 
B. Digital Object Management 
Digital object management is the most developed section for Digital Safe per TRAC metrics, 
likely because the majority of the documentation is contributed by the outsourced technologies 
rather than developed by the Digital Safe Steering Committee. On average, this section is rated 
3.5/4. 
B.1 Ingest: acquisition of content 
All materials that are ingested into Arkivum will be provided by the client. Digital Safe will not 
be providing any content, only suggesting the type of content that might be ingested. Digital Safe 
also has recommendations on what metadata properties might be preserved, file format choices, 
and digital preservation workflow activities, but the content is strictly the responsibility of the 
client. Arkivum only requires a file to ingest, and depending on the complexity of the digital 
preservation workflow the client chooses, it can also ingest additional associated files. 
B2 Ingest: creation of the archival package & B.3 Preservation Planning  
Archivematica offers a customizable workflow tool to clients wanting to digitally preserve in 
addition to secure storage. Should the client require an OAIS model, Archivematica can create 
SIPs, normalize data, package AIPs, and normalize data, among other activities. A wide 
spectrum of processes is available, but ultimately up to the client to choose. Digital Safe may 
also be able to offer recommendations on best practices. 
B.4 Archival storage & preservation/maintenance of AIPs & B.5 Information Management 
Arkivum offers multi-location, high-security storage within their own data centers and at an 
additional Escrow location. During the ingest process, the client can follow the process of ingest 
and is given a green light once the data is fully ingested and secure so that the client may delete 
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their own copies. Arkivum also offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and 
specified by the client upon contract agreement. Audit trails will log every event affecting the 
content, such as an integrity check or migration, and the employee, time, reason, and any 
changes made. More information can be found on Arkivum’s Audit Trails page. 
C. Technology, Technologies Infrastructure, and Security 
This final section meets most TRAC criteria in theory, again because the documentation for the 
technologies is extensive. Once the three entities are integrated with each other into a working 
service it will be more efficient for testing the functionality of the service and this section would 
need to be re-evaluated.  
C.1 System infrastructure & C.2 Appropriate technologies 
Arkivum and Archivematica were chosen because they built for institutions without the technical 
abilities, time, or funding to develop their own infrastructure for digital preservation and storage, 
and with needs for high-security and low-access. Their systems can be operated from standard 
operating systems and do not require high levels of technical ability, fitting the needs of potential 
users identified in Phase 1.  
The decision to utilize these technologies was determined after several years of investigation by 
the Steering Committee. However, the success of combining these technologies will only be 
made evident by live testing of the service as a whole and therefore cannot be officially 
established as a success or otherwise. 
C.3 Security 
Although a mock interface has been created, the system combining Digital Safe, Arkivum, and 
Archivematica has not yet been completed. Once the service is deployed to early adopters, the 
security will be tested and become more concrete. The technologies, infrastructure, and security 
for Digital Safe are largely provided by and well-documented by Arkivum. The service that the 
University will receive will vary based on client choices and any specific agreements made 
between the University and Arkivum, and by the client and Arkivum. 
Case Study II: DSA 
The results for the DSA assessment are organized by each Requirement. The Requirements are 
related to each other so there is some overlap, such as between 15. “Technical infrastructure,” 
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16. “Security,” and 9. “Documented storage procedures.” However, the documentation states that 
“all Requirements are mandatory and are equally weighted, standalone items” (DSA, 2016) so 
none of the Requirements are consolidated. Rather their responses are condensed and the full 
version of the DSA assessment can be referenced in Appendix C.  
0. Context 
Repository type: Institutional repository, (Other: Dark archive still in development) 
It should be noted that DSA provides a set list for Repository types and a write-in option, so both 
are included here. 
Brief Description of the Repository’s Designated Community: 
The key users for this service have been identified in the Electronic Archives Pilot Project 
(renamed Digital Safe) Phase 1 as: College Archivists; University Archive; Central 
Administrative Records Management; Departmental Research Records Management; and 
Bodleian Electronic Archives and Manuscripts. This community is part of the larger University 
of Oxford community. These users have materials that require high-security and low-
accessibility, including administrative records, student records, financial records, personal 
communication, medical reports, non-anonymized case studies, and other material that has 
personal, identifiable information. These users were identified after interviewing various colleges 
and departments on campus and determining a need for a universal storage system (Jefferies, 
Hicks, & Rendell, 2016) and are internally documented with letters of support from various 
colleges. Users are not limited to only these categories, however, as the service is open to all who 
want to use the service and are affiliated with the University of Oxford. 
Level of Curation Performed 
A. Content distributed as deposited  
B. B. Basic curation – e.g., brief checking, addition of basic metadata or documentation  
C. Enhanced curation – e.g., conversion to new formats, enhancement of documentation  
D. Data-level curation – as in C above, but with additional editing of deposited data for 
accuracy 
Digital Safe as a service is being designed to provide a wide range of digital preservation 
activities that suit the needs of the Designated Communities. Digital Safe itself will not offer 
curatorial services, therefore the lowest possible level of curation ingested by Digital Safe will 
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fall under “A. Content distributed as deposited.” As discussed in Requirement 7. “Data integrity 
and authenticity” and in Requirement 8. “Appraisal,” the storage platform Arkivum can ingest 
any file and will disseminate the file in the exact same condition it was in upon ingestion. 
Additional digital preservation workflows are customized by the client, who will also determine 
the relevance and authenticity of any content they opt to store in Digital Safe. 
Outsource Partners 
Arkivum is a proposed contractual partner that will provide the means of digital storage in the 
form of ingest pipes for users of the Digital Safe service. According to their website, “Our 
operations at all sites, including our business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information 
security standards” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Arkivum is also audited every six months and 
welcomes client audits (Arkivum Ltd., 2014).  In regards to service agreements between 
Arkivum and clients, there will be a basic contract between the University of Oxford and 
Arkivum, and individual client preferences will build upon that contract and articulate the 
clients’ product choice, workflow preferences, and additional storage space options (Jefferies, 
N., Personal communication, 2016, July 19). 
Archivematica is a proposed contractual partner that is built into Arkivum and will provide the 
digital preservation workflows for users of the Digital Safe service. Ideally the University of 
Oxford will be able to purchase one license for Archivematica via their contract with Arkivum, 
rather than each individual client purchasing a license (Jefferies, N., Personal communication, 
2016, July 19), though these discussions with Arkivum are ongoing. Archivematica does not as 
yet hold any previous certifications. 
1. Mission/Scope 
Statement of Compliance: 2 The scope has been determined by the designated community but 
the mission statement is still in development as the project evolves. The chosen outsource 
technologies have fully developed and implemented mission statements. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The original Electronic Archive Pilot Project’s mission statement is as follows: “The Electronic 
Archive Pilot Project will establish the feasibility of a working electronic archive for the use of 
the whole of the Collegiate University. The archive will support the safe and secure storage of all 
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classifications of non-public record data that individual departments, colleges and associated 
units are required to keep legally or would like to keep for historic reasons. The pilot project 
aims to develop a cost recovered service” (Wilson, J., 2012). The Digital Safe service will likely 
draw on the phrase from the Phase 3 Project Initiation Document to “deliver a secure, long-term 
records archiving service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis once 
in production” (Jefferies, et al., 2016).  
2. Licenses 
Statement of Compliance: 1 This section is designed in theory and implementation has begun, 
and is the focus of the next project phase. 
Self-assessment statement: 
This entire section relies on a fully developed contract with Arkivum. A priority of Phase 3 of 
Digital Safe is finalizing the contract with Arkivum and in determining any preservation rights 
and copyrights. In regards to transferring control of data from a client to Arkivum, any services 
that are part of the library may come under the Heritage Institution exception for the right to 
change objects and make copies, which would occur in the regular migration of data in Arkivum 
and in any Archivematica workflow the data is pushed through. (Jefferies, N., Personal 
communication, 2016, July 19). Other licenses will be at the discretion of the clients. 
3. Continuity of access 
Statement of Compliance: 2 This is a theoretical concept that will be developed should Digital 
Safe regain funding. As an Outsource Partner, Arkivum will be responsible for maintaining 
continuity of access as per their mission statement. 
Self-assessment statement: 
As any future contract with Arkivum will dictate, Digital Safe will rely on the technologies to 
remain updated on and implement any evolving best practices in the field. Arkivum has policies 
and automated processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, software, and 
hardware. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums. 
Arkivum’s policy is that data is migrated to new media following the LTO roadmap. The LTO 
data tapes in Escrow are also migrated every 5 years.  
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Digital Safe is labeled as a service by the project team, and therefore its only responsibility is to 
maintain the service and contracts with technologies, and has no influence on the amount of time 
the data is held. Ultimately those using the Digital Safe service will be responsible for 
maintaining their encryption key, restricting or releasing access to materials, and providing their 
own funding to ensure their space and digital preservation workflows are maintained. There is no 
formal documentation on policies in place for changes in circumstances from Digital Safe. 
Ideally the Steering Committee will develop these policies in Phase 3 and eventually transfer 
responsibility to technical support. 
4. Confidentiality/Ethics 
Statement of Compliance: 2 As per the goal of Digital Safe to “deliver a secure, long-term 
records archiving service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis once 
in production,” Digital Safe will store confidential information and will need to consider their 
documentation carefully. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe will need to be a dark archive because its purpose is to store confidential 
information. First, Digital Safe has four different levels of access described in their Phase 3 
Project Initiation Document that also corresponds to features offered by Arkivum. See Appendix 
C for a detailed description of the access model. 
Arkivum employees do not have access to any client data. Additionally, “there is no direct 
customer access to data in the Arkivum data centres, e.g. through a web interface or cloud API. 
This ensures all ingest and access is properly managed through Arkivum appliances” (Arkivum 
Ltd., 2014) Arkivum is build on ingest pipes that are matched with an encryption key that is 
unique to each client. Without the encryption key there is no access to any of the data in its 
original form or a copy. Arkivum does have a detailed contingency plan described in 
Requirement 16 (Arkivum Ltd.). Arkivum also adheres to UK Government Information Levels 
IL2 and IL3.  
Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool to which only the client has access. For 
Digital Safe, content is not stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process 
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to complete before it is stored in Arkivum. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via 
Arkivum’s A-Stor, which will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum. 
5. Organizational infrastructure 
Statement of Compliance: 2 As Digital Safe project team members investigate contracts with 
Arkivum they are also in the process of developing a stable organization infrastructure. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe is currently in the process of acquiring funding for Phase 3. There is a cost model 
and projected expense report developed. The projected expense report includes: IT Services 
internal staff, Non-IT Services staff, Hardware, software, training and equipment/storage 
(Arkivum), and included a .5% charge for Prime Minister’s Office charge, an 85% charge for 
contingency per the Monte Carlo Simulation, and a forecast on on-going charges per year 
(Jefferies, et al., 2016). See Appendix C for more information on the proposed expense reports 
for Digital Safe. 
The project team for Phase 3 of Digital Safe is established, but the ultimate short and long-term 
staffing duties will rely on the contract with Arkivum and collaboration with the IT department. 
The plan is that the service will be built into the University of Oxford’s IT department. Further, a 
business and service model is a priority for Phase 3 of Digital Safe (Jefferies, N., Personal 
communication, 2016, July 19).  
Digital Safe will on the technologies to maintain their own staffing. According to Arkivum, “In 
addition to technical change in the archive system, managing staff transitions of those who run 
the system, for example support staff and administrators, is required”30 Archivematica is created 
and staffed by Artefactual Inc. 
Digital Safe will update any announcements and training material for the service, and the local 
governance committee will have little public documentation aside from the aspects described 
above that will need regularly updated due to the sensitive information and privacy of the dark 
archives Digital Safe is providing.  
6. Expert guidance 
                                                          
30 Arkivum “Data Integrity:” http://arkivum.com/data_integrity/  
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Statement of Compliance: 3 The decision to outsource the technologies for Digital Safe 
indicates that the project team wants the expertise of established digital preservation 
organizations, with which contract development is ongoing. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe is the result of feedback collected during Phase 1 and will be built based on 
designated community needs. In the future, the Digital Safe service will be built into the 
University of Oxford’s IT department. Ideally the webpage would have contact information for 
the governance committee or other local managing team who can assist in troubleshooting 
smaller issues and directing to training and Arkivum and Archivematica help pages (Jefferies, 
N., Personal communication, 2016, July 19).  
Arkivum seeks feedback from their users.31 Expertise sources for Arkivum are not in public 
documentation, but their transparent and detailed descriptions of their preservation workflows 
and storage methods, additional case studies32 on their website, and list of current clients offered 
under the Industries tab on their website offer community support and proof of successful 
methods. 
Archivematica was originally a project use case for OAIS to “process analysis to synthesize the 
specific, concrete steps that must be carried out to comply with the OAIS functional model from 
Ingest to Access.” This project expanded beyond OAIS into its current state as an open-source 
digital preservation workflow tool based on user feedback (Artefactual Inc.).  
7. Data integrity and authenticity 
Statement of Compliance: 3 Arkivum and Archivematica both maintain detailed 
documentation, which will be absorbed into Digital Safe documentation by the contract between 
Arkivum and Digital Safe. 
Self-assessment statement: 
                                                          
31 Arkivum Chain of Custody: http://arkivum.com/chain-custody-audit-trails/  
32 Arkivum Case Studies: http://arkivum.com/resources/#  
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Digital Safe is a service. Authentication of the original data will be the entire responsibility of 
the client, and each client may also have their own policies on permissions and permissions 
workflows.  
In regards to service agreements between Arkivum and clients, there will be a contract between 
individual clients and Arkivum that articulate the clients’ product choice, workflow preferences, 
and additional storage space options. Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be 
turned on and specified by the client upon contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in 
machine-readable XML format through Arkivum REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-
folder basis. Audit trails are also accessible in human readable PDF/A format through the 
Arkivum Service web interface or through an API call. For data integrity Archivematica utilizes 
fixity checks before AIP storage by generating and verifying checksums using a separate 
command-line app developed by Artefactual called Fixity (Artefactual Systems Inc.). 
8. Appraisal 
Statement of Compliance: 3 Digital Safe as a service is planned to offer both basic and 
extensive digital preservation activities in addition to storage, though the specific workflows are 
the responsibility of the client. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The Designated Communities that were identified after interviewing various colleges and 
departments on campus determined a need for a universal storage system (Jefferies, et al., 2016). 
The Designated Communities determine what information is included and will have their own 
documentation dictating the appropriate data. Digital Safe, Arkivum, and Archivematica have no 
influence over what data is considered appropriate by the Designated Communities. Arkivum 
can ingest any file format, but does not record their representation information. If the client 
chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica can determine file formats and normalize using 
their Format Policy Registry, as well as creating SIPs and AIPs for record this process. 
9. Documented storage procedures 
Statement of Compliance: 3 Arkivum’s long term-preservation strategies are publicly 
documented and will be absorbed into Digital Safe documentation upon the completion of a 
contract. 
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Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe will rely on the technologies for storage and documented storage procedures as is 
outlined in their future contract. 
Arkivum’s documentation is publicly available on their website and specific client preferences 
are dictated in the final contract. Each file is encrypted with a unique symmetric key using 
AES256 encryption. The symmetric key for the file is then encrypted using a public key from a 
public-private key pair using RSA2048 encryption. Both AES256 and RSA2048 are industry 
standard encryption algorithms and widely used in high security applications, e.g. electronic 
commerce and for sensitive government information” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Many Arkivum 
clients have strict compliance policies and government documents and require an even higher 
level of security. Arkivum adheres to UK Government Information Levels by maintaining ISO 
27001 certification. 
Arkivum has policies and automated processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, 
software, and hardware. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on 
checksums. Arkivum’s policy is that data is migrated to new media following the LTO roadmap. 
The LTO data tapes in Escrow are also migrated every 5 years.33 
Arkivum maintains at least two copies of the data, one in a secure data center and one on LTO 
data tape held in Escrow. The Escrow copy is the backup for any data loss or corruption. If the 
digital copies are corrupted or the clients need to remove content, the LTO tapes are delivered to 
the client. If there is complete data loss, Arkivum provides a “financial guarantee underwritten 
by an Information and Communication Technology Professional Liability Insurance Policy,” 
which provides coverage for direct loss relating to data loss (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Arkivum also 
provides multiple client sites, so if one site is compromised the data may be retrieved at another 
site (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Archivematica is the digital preservation workflow that occurs before ingest into Arkivum 
storage and therefore does not have data back-up. Clients are notified of any failed actions and 
are responsible for managing these issues.  
                                                          
33 Arkivum Data Integrity: http://arkivum.com/data_integrity/  
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10. Preservation plan 
Statement of Compliance: 2 Arkivum’s long term-preservation strategies are publicly 
documented and Archivematica’s options are publicly documented, and individual contracts 
between clients and Arkivum will dictate specific preservation plans. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The preservation plan for each user of the service Digital Safe will be unique to their context. 
They will specify their preferences for storage and transfer custody to Arkivum in the contract 
with Arkivum, and they will design their own digital preservation workflow in Archivematica 
based on recommendations from both Digital Safe and Archivematica. They will determine their 
own preservation level and length of time the data is to be held, and communicate with Arkivum 
directly. Arkivum follows a strict chain of custody that allows for minimal contact with client 
data. According to their chain of custody authenticity begins “ with the customer to ensure data 
has been correctly copied into the service. Once ingested, files become read only and cannot be 
updated or overwritten. Deletion of files is through a strictly controlled process that requires a 
request to be made to Arkivum. The default is that once a file is in the service then it remains in 
the service and does not change when it is within the service.”34 Any access to ingested data is 
restricted to individuals with the encryption key.  
Digital preservation activities are solely the responsibility of the client, who will design them 
using Archivematica. Archivematica allows users to do various archival activities, including 
adding metadata in Dublin Core, adding rights in PREMIS, data normalization, AIP storage, DIP 
storage, communication with other tools (e.g. Archivist’s Toolkit, ArchiveSpace, Arkivum), 
among other options. A SIP begins as a transfer. “In Archivematica, Transfer is the process of 
transforming any set of digital objects and/or directories into a SIP. Transformation may include 
appraisal, arrangement, description and identification of donor restricted, private or confidential 
contents.”35 A transfer can be created with submission documentation, existing checksums, or an 
existing METS structmap. The transfer will be processed through several micro-services. This is 
then ingested into Archivematica after the green light is given to the client. The completion of all 
                                                          
34 Arkivum Chain of Custody: http://arkivum.com/chain-custody-audit-trails/  
35 Archivematica Transfer: https://www.archivematica.org/en/docs/archivematica-1.5/user-
manual/transfer/transfer/#transfer-checksums  
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processes in Archivematica are indicated either green to indicate that a process has been 
completed successfully, and red to indicate that the process has not been completed successfully. 
A client can search for content by its name. Archivematica’s naming system will retain the 
original name of the transfer unless a new name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation. This 
name will be combined with a Universal Unique Identifier that is generated and assigned during 
SIP formation. 
11. Data quality 
Statement of Compliance: 2 Arkivum and Archivematica maintain best practices, and Digital 
Safe intends to provide recommendations, but it will be the responsibility of the client to 
determine what level of quality their data maintains. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The metadata fields that Digital Safe recommends the clients’ preserve are: Title, Description, 
Creator(s), ID Type, ID Value, Retention review date, Retention rationale, Resource type, 
Technical description(s), Covering date(s), Finding aid(s), Rights & Licensing information 
(Jefferies & Tomkins, 2014). It is ultimately the client’s decision what properties are preserved. 
Arkivum only requires a file for anything to be ingested. Arkivum has no responsibility for 
anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to upload any additional 
information. Arkivum can ingest any file format and will maintain a copy of the original file 
alongside a normalized file.  
12. Workflows 
Statement of Compliance: 1 While extensive documentation for Arkivum is well-established, 
the integration into Digital Safe documentation is still in progress and are a major focus for 
Phase 3. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The ongoing nature of Digital Safe means that documentation of processes is also developing. 
Project member Neil Jefferies has begun developing a contract with Arkivum, though this is not 
yet available (Jefferies, N. Personal communication, 2016, July 19). Contracts with Arkivum will 
37 
 
also help Digital Safe to establish documentation on deposits, security, and best practices for 
digital preservation workflow.  
Digital Safe has also determined their Designated Community and a corresponding access 
matrix, seen in detail in Appendix C, Requirement 4. “Confidentiality/Ethics,” will guide 
documentation evolution. 
Arkivum and Archivematica both maintain extensive documentation that is publicly available. 
See the response to Requirement 9. “Documented storage procedures” for more specific 
information.  
13. Data discovery and identification 
Statement of Compliance: 2 The Designated Communities will only have access to their own 
data, for which they will have provided the identifier that will be maintained by Arkivum. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Files ingested into Arkivum as the storage platform Digital Safe will retain its original filename, 
and checksums are provided for incorporation in the Preservation Description Information (PDI) 
for the AIP, which Arkivum can maintain. The service follows the OAIS model for Archive 
Storage through use of replication, fixity monitoring and repair, disaster recovery, migration, and 
tiered storage to deliver a specified level of performance, availability and integrity of storage.”36 
If the client decides to utilize the Archivematica tool they may choose to create and package an 
AIP. The client must determine the processing configuration, which can be left at 
Archivematica’s default setting, or can be created by the client. 
After configuring the process as desired, the SIP can be normalized and stored in an AIP. AIP 
reingest is also an option if the client wishes to add information (e.g. metadata and data 
normalization) after the SIP process, which could include producing different identifiers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Arkivum Integration with other systems: http://arkivum.com/integration-with-other-systems/  
38 
 
14. Data reuse 
Statement of Compliance: 1 While documentation for Arkivum is well-established, the 
projected Digital Safe Designated Communities complicate the process of establishing licenses 
with vendors. 
Self-assessment statement:  
Digital Safe is designed to hold confidential data with high access restrictions. The Digital Safe 
Steering Committee has opted to utilize Arkivum as the storage technology and will rely on 
Arkivum to implement their responsibilities in data reuse that is outlined in their contract.  
Ideally, Digital Safe will offer best practices based on recommendations from their Outsource 
Partners and other experts in the BDLSS based on Designated Community needs. Based on 
feedback from the Designated Communities, Digital Safe recommends basic metadata that is 
described in Requirement 9. It is ultimately the client’s decision what properties are preserved. 
Arkivum only requires a file for anything to be ingested. Arkivum has no responsibility for 
producing anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to upload any 
additional information. Arkivum can ingest any file format and will maintain a copy of the 
original file alongside a normalized file. Digital preservation activities are solely the 
responsibility of the client, who will design them using Archivematica. Archivematica allows 
users to do various archival activities, including adding metadata in Dublin Core, which is also 
ingestible by Arkivum, and further explained in Requirement 10. “Preservation plan.” 
15. Technical infrastructure 
Statement of Compliance: 2 Outsourcing the technologies allows Digital Safe to customize 
their infrastructure based on pre-existing infrastructure, rather than building their own, which is 
being developed between the project team and Arkivum. 
Self-assessment statement: 
During Phase 2 of the Digital Safe project, the team investigated service and infrastructure 
models that included BEAM and ORA-Data systems at the University of Oxford, and also 
investigated DataBank as an Outsource Partner. All were abandoned, as explained in Appendix 
C, Requirement 15. “Technical infrastructure.” Additionally, given that the Designated 
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Communities span across a range of departments, colleges, and expertise, the interface design 
will need to be user-friendly and technical support is necessary. This investigation lead the 
project team to opt for outsourcing storage to Arkivum, outsourcing optional digital preservation 
activities to Archivematica as a built-in tool in Arkivum, and create a local interface to be 
maintained long-term by the University IT Services. The process of considering multiple options 
and choosing Arkivum is evidence that Digital Safe is maintaining its mission statement to 
deliver a secure, long-term records archiving service for the University and Colleges operating 
on a cost recovery basis once in production” even in the development stages. This does not fulfill 
this infrastructure, but it establishes a record of effort to build stable technical infrastructure. 
Arkivum adheres to UK Government Information Levels by maintaining ISO 27001 
“Information security standards” certification and can maintain IL2 and IL3 UK Government 
Information Levels. Should Digital Safe be built on a contract with Arkivum, it would allow 
Digital Safe to absorb their certification and partially fulfill this Requirement. Arkivum and its 
applications is also constructed to be used from most common operating systems (Arkivum Ltd., 
2014). Additional technical support is available for unique operating systems. Updates are 
automatically provided to clients as they develop (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
16. Security 
Statement of Compliance: 3 The decision to outsource to Arkivum is heavily influenced by the 
security levels maintained by Arkivum, which will be absorbed into Digital Safe documentation 
upon the completion of a contract.  
Self-assessment statement: 
If Digital Safe were to establish a contract with Arkivum, security would largely be the 
responsibility of Arkivum. According to project member Neil Jefferies, a primary reason 
Arkivum is the choice for building Digital Safe is their contingency plan (Personal 
communication, 2016 July 19). First, the data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test 
based on checksums and preventative data migrations where “each copy has its integrity actively 
monitored and managed and any corruption or loss is automatically repaired to make the system 
self-healing” (Arkivum Ltd.). Arkivum’s procedures, hardware, and locations are all certified to 
ISO 27001 standards and are audited every six months. “[Arkivum’s] secure storage locations 
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are based in highly secure facilities, with our operations at all sites certified to ISO 27001 
standards. Our locations are manned at all hours and access is strictly restricted to a list of 
named, trained and vetted members of the Arkivum Operations team. Each site is protected by 
best of breed firewall technology ensuring that our locations are protected from the latest 
advanced evasion techniques utilised by sophisticated hackers and intelligence organisations” 
(Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Data is secured based on “the ability to separately encrypt each file stored 
in our service. Only encrypted data is ever stored in [Arkivum’s] service. Each file is encrypted 
with a unique symmetric key using AES256 encryption. The symmetric key for the file is then 
encrypted using a public key from a public-private key pair using RSA2048 encryption. Both 
AES256 and RSA2048 are industry standard encryption algorithms and widely used in high 
security applications, e.g. electronic commerce and for sensitive government information,” 
(Arkivum Ltd., 2014).  
Arkivum contains a strict chain-of-custody system, audit trails, and a highly detailed security 
model. “The security and audit model has been developed in partnership with Arkivum 
customers who have confirmed that the model meets their regulatory requirements as part of a 
due-diligence/audit process that they have conducted on Arkivum. This includes due-diligence 
by customers in clinical and financial sectors where regulation is strict” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Finally, Arkivum provides a workflow and safety measures for integrity checks, including a 
secure data center and LTO tape in Escrow. If there is complete data loss, Arkivum provides a 
“financial guarantee underwritten by an Information and Communication Technology 
Professional Liability Insurance Policy,” which provides coverage for direct loss relating to data 
loss (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Arkivum also provides multiple client sites, so if one site is 
compromised the data may be retrieved at another site (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool to which only the client has access. For 
Digital Safe, content is not stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process 
to complete before it is stored in Arkivum. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via 
Arkivum’s A-Stor, which will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum, 
and is therefore protected by the security measures of Arkivum. 
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Limitations 
Implementing the case studies highlighted several limitations of this thesis that range from 
documentational to time limits. The reliance on previously developed standards, the auditing 
metric’s documentation, and the lack of time to conduct additional case studies are all considered 
in the Discussion section. 
Reliance on OAIS Reference Model 
An immediate limitation of these case studies is that both of the audit models are built on the 
previously-established standards described in the Open Archival Information System (OAIS) 
reference model. The OAIS reference model, also known as ISO 14721:2012 was originally 
developed in the 1990’s by NASA’s CCSDS and provides a “conceptual framework for an 
archival system dedicated to preserving and maintaining access to digital information over the 
long term” for purpose of developing standards (Lavoie, 2000). It later became an ISO Standard 
in 2011. In brief, the reference model emphasizes understanding the Designated Community and 
its needs, controlling the data, and ensuring its availability and future use. A major function 
OAIS serves is to define universal digital preservation terms, which include but are not limited to 
the concepts of “digital archive,” “Designated Community,” “transparency,” and “digital 
repository.” Despite the universal purpose of the OAIS reference model, it is well-established 
that the reference model is “one built on OAIS concepts, not an OAIS suite of standards” 
(Lavoie, 2014) which has caused some issue with determining what “OAIS-compliant” actually 
means.  
Though it is widely used, the question of relying so heavily on OAIS has been addressed by 
digital preservation community members. Priscilla Caplan, Director of the FCLA, articulated this 
issue in her talk on the process of building the dark archive DAITSS. She states:  
“It isn’t easy to find a preservation repository that doesn’t claim to be compliant with the 
OAIS reference model. This is a big of a bugaboo of mine because I haven’t really seen 
too many OAIS-compliant applications. Part of the problem may be that OAIS itself 
doesn’t provide much help in defining compliance” (2004).  
The context for her presentation is an outline of how the structure of DAITSS is based on OAIS 
and the process by which DAITSS was designed to do so. Even so, the fact that she provides a 
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step-by-step description of OAIS compared to DAITSS and still recognizes that OAIS can blur 
its own responsibilities is enough to encourage developers to consider the language of audit 
metrics carefully, especially in the context of their own goals in comparison.  
From a more critical perspective, David Rosenthal wrote “The case for a revision of OAIS” 
(2014) after the CLOCKSS Archive was audited per TRAC metrics by the CRL. Rosenthal 
briefly touched on several issues, the three most relevant here being that CLOCKSS is a dark 
archive and therefore cannot establish a future Designated Community; second, that CLOCKSS 
has a “distributed implementation,” which OAIS fails to address; and finally that CLOCKSS 
“contracts-out its operations,” which is also not covered at all by OAIS (2014). Without 
undermining the usefulness and impact of the OAIS reference model, the reliance on other 
standards does limit how dark archives, consortia, and project developers approach the use of 
existing metrics.  
Reinforcing Caplan’s comment above, TRAC and DSA both establish OAIS as their source for 
terminology and framework. TRAC more heavily relies on OAIS than DSA, and directly states 
that “key terms in this document have been adopted from the OAIS Reference Model” (CRL & 
OCLC 2007). The entire section B. Digital Object Management is grouped based on “well-
known OAIS functional entities” and is cited throughout the section’s criteria descriptions as a 
resource. DSA references OAIS noticeably less and offers it as a resource for guideline 9. 
“Documented storage procedures,” and in guideline 15. “Technical infrastructure.”  
Documentation & Definitions 
Building on the issue of primary reliance on the OAIS reference model is the issue of how 
terminology is defined in auditing metric documentation. Defining major digital preservation 
concepts is useful both for providing a foundation for developing projects, but also to evolve 
these concepts so that they align with what developers need and with how existing repositories 
define them based on their purpose. This does not imply that such definitions do not exist, but 
they are not included in the documentation of leading digital preservation standards.  
For example, basic auditing metric documentation like TRAC and DSA tend to outline the 
foundations and process of developing the metric and then define the key terms and concepts. 
Though audit criteria are the bulk of a metric’s documentation, the section describing the 
purpose and scope of the metric contains definitions for concepts such as “digital preservation,” 
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“digital repository,” and other key terms in digital preservation. As previously discussed, most of 
these definitions are based on the OAIS reference model. However, most of the terms are often 
only defined in the context of the metric’s documentation so that they are understood when 
reading the metric’s documentation. The issue is that only defining a term in the context of that 
particular documentation limits the metric as a planning tool because it is not all-inclusive. An 
example of a problematic term in the context of audit standard documentation is “Service.” This 
is a concept that could appear obvious in terms of the purpose of a digital repository, but metric 
documentation often overlooks the term. Neither DSA or TRAC directly define a “service” and it 
is only partially defined by nestor and ISO.  
Arguably, the definition of a service could be implied by the existence of a mission statement 
that is supported by establishing a designated community. Both a mission statement and the 
designated community(ies) are required by TRAC and DSA, but there is a disconnect between 
the two because they provide paradoxical support to one another. TRAC and DSA requires 
evidence of mission statements similarly. TRAC states in criterion A1.1 “Repository has a 
mission statement that reflects a commitment to the long-term retention of, management of, and 
access to digital information” (CRL & OCLC, 2007). DSA Requirement 1. “Mission/Scope” 
states, “The repository has an explicit mission to provide access to and preserve data in its 
domain” (DSA, 2016). Neither definition include providing a service to a designated community, 
and neither cite a description of the designated community as evidence of a mission statement. 
Similarly, TRAC section A3.1 “Repository has defined its designated community(ies) and 
associated knowledge base(s) and has publicly accessible definitions and policies in place to 
dictate how its preservation service requirements will be met” (CRL & OCLC, 2007), which 
implies that the designated community dictates the service but does not explicitly define a 
service. DSA only refers to the concept when implying, and in some ways confirming, that the 
repository is providing a service.  
The discussion of “service” as a concept is relevant here because the project team for Digital 
Safe refer to it in terms of becoming a service, rather than a repository. This identification has 
evolved, as originally the Electronic Archives Pilot Project mission statement was to “establish 
the feasibility of a working electronic archive for the use of the whole of the Collegiate 
University” (Wilson, J., 2012). When the project named the itself and the final product “Digital 
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Safe,” the mission statement changed to a project goal to “deliver a secure, long-term records 
archiving service” (Jefferies, et al., 2016). This service-oriented goal raises a question on the 
difference between a repository and a digital preservation service, and is further discussed in the 
Future Work section. 
The notion of a service is just one example of how metric standards only provide partial 
definitions for common terms, particularly those that are newer and that lack universal use. 
Digital Safe will need to be a dark archive in order to maintain restricted access and high 
security, and dark archives are neither defined nor explicitly included in metric documentation. 
While conducting these case studies it was necessary to overlook the definition discrepancies and 
rely on provided terminology.  
Recent Updates 
Arkivum and DSA both issued updates after the first case study in July 2016 and before the 
second case study in March 2017. Arkivum altered their documentation and available products in 
January of 2017. For consistency between each case study the previous products and 
documentation are referred to in this assessment with the understanding that it does not represent 
Arkivum’s current products. DSA also released their newest 2017-2019 version in November 
2016. Assessing based on the previous version when the newest version is available would not be 
an accurate representation of DSA, thus the current Requirements are utilized in this assessment. 
Due to the recentness of these guidelines, all of the published certifications are in the format of 
the previous 2014-2017 guidelines. Responses in published certifications are valuable as 
references, but the newest version has regrouped and renamed the guidelines so that matching up 
the previous and current guidelines is difficult. 
Additional Metrics 
Extending the case studies to additional metrics is not possible with the given timeframe and 
manpower. Building on the DSA assessment with nestor guidelines would have been useful and 
provided more insight on trending metrics and their incremental relationship with one another. It 
would also be useful to test a simple metric like the Ten Principles developed by the Center for 
Research Libraries (2007) as a preliminary assessment for scoping and planning. Conversely, 
applying an ISO to a non-traditional repository would also yield valuable results. ISO 16363 is 
ideal, but even assessing Digital Safe based on the ISO 27000 series on information security 
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would be useful for dark archives that are low-access and high-security. See the Discussion 
section for brief comparison of TRAC criteria and the ISO 27000-series. Also see the Future 
Work section for additional discussion on potential case studies. 
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Discussion 
TRAC vs. DSA 
General Use 
In a general context, using TRAC and DSA provide different experiences. First, TRAC and DSA 
are clearly delineated by their complexity. TRAC contains 84 guidelines whereas DSA contains 
16 guidelines. Both have the potential to be repetitive, though TRAC is more so given its tiered 
structure. A tiered structure in this case refers primarily to the relationships between subsections 
of TRAC section B. Digital Object Management. The first grouping is B1 and B2, where B1 
describes the acquisition of ingests and B2 describes the actual ingest process. Similarly in the 
second grouping, B3 describes the documentation of preservation strategies, B4 and B5 describes 
the “minimal conditions for performing long-term preservation” and the metadata necessary for 
performing the preservation strategies, and B6 describes the documentation and evidence of 
disseminating information (CRL & OCLC, 2007). The relationships here are the similar evidence 
needed for each subsection in their respective groupings. Documentation is necessary for the 
subsections requiring a description, but is also considered partial evidence for subsections 
requiring evidence of successful implementation. 
Furthermore, there are several reasons why DSA is currently more popular, and thus has been 
used to certify more repositories, than TRAC; some are obvious just by the definitions provided 
in each audit metric. According to the European Framework for Audit and Certification of 
Digital Repositories, there are three levels of audit certification: Basic Certification is a self-
assessment; Extended Certification is an externally peer-reviewed self-assessment that is more 
comprehensive and builds on the Basic Certification, such as the nestor Seal;, and Formal 
Certification is an official certification from ISO 16363, DIN 31644, TRAC, or other equivalent 
audit (2008). That the levels build upon themselves is enough to understand that formal 
certification begins with basic DSA certification and advances as the repository evolves. At the 
time of the original TRAC report for OIDLPP for the purpose of assessment, TRAC appeared to 
be the optimal metric because it provides a thorough checklist for what exactly Digital Safe has 
implemented, has in development, and what is essential to prioritize in the next project phase. 
Given the limitations previously described in the Methodology section, DSA Requirements 
would have been a more suitable place to begin assessing a project that is in-progress and has 
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restricted documentation like Digital Safe. The current DSA guidelines provide a straightforward 
method for tracking the level of documentation development, the level of implementation 
strategies and their development, and what guidelines are theoretical versus in progress or 
already established. 
Time is also an obvious factor. Usually a basic DSA certification requires approximately six 
months to complete internally. Conversely, in his blog series recording the TRAC Audit of 
CLOCKSS, David Rosenthal recorded that though the official audit was conducted from 
September 2013 to May 2014, they actually signed the contract in July 2013 and began 
collecting documentation six month previous in January 2013 (Rosenthal, 2014). Further, the 
HathiTrust Audit required 11 months of official audit time to complete, though as a condition of 
certification, HathiTrust agreed to address any issues revealed by the audit after the official 
report was released. Additional time spent remediating TRAC’s issues was not documented, but 
would have pushed audit completion and certification to over a year. Internal audits can also 
consume several months from a project group, as noted by informal audit report generated by the 
Northern Arizona University’s Cline Library, which indicated that it took the full spring and 
summer semesters of 2014 to complete an internal report (Welch & Phillips, 2014). 
Use as Development Tools 
Because the current standards for digital preservation exist only as assessment and audit tools 
rather than scoping and development tools, employing them as development tools offers a 
different user experience. Digital Safe is an ongoing project with three different entities 
contributing to the final service that need to be considered. TRAC was especially useful in 
delineating the responsibilities of the Digital Safe Steering Committee, Arkivum, and 
Archivematica. All the entities were included in each subsection regardless of whether they had a 
direct responsibility. In general, section A. Organizational Infrastructure is largely the 
responsibility of the Digital Safe Steering Committee to develop, especially in terms of finalizing 
a cost model and business plan for themselves as a guide for the Designated Communities, and in 
developing internal policies, as well as further in the future as they plan to transfer control of 
Digital Safe from the Steering Committee to BDLSS IT Services. Further, Archivematica is 
primarily responsible for section B. Digital Object Management because any preservation 
strategies that are not simple ingest and dissemination will take place in Archivematica interface, 
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though Arkivum does provide some support in this section in regards to DIPs and fixity checks. 
Finally, Arkivum is almost exclusively responsible for section C. Technologies, Technical 
Infrastructure, & Security as they provide the storage space, security measures, and contingency 
plan. The justification for choosing these technologies is determined by the Steering Committee, 
but even this decision is reinforced by Arkivum’s services and documentation, and eventually 
will be evident in the final contract. See Appendix B for more detail on the specific 
responsibilities in each subsection.  
TRAC also has the benefit of extreme detail. The 3 major sections have 14 topics and 84 
subsections between them that all contain a description of and evidence for each subsection. The 
example evidence is invaluable because it informs Digital Safe what types of documentation they 
will need to consider creating, as well as how extensive the documentation will need to be. 
TRAC documentation also contains more information on additional ISO certifications that are 
related or can also act as evidence for TRAC criteria that might be starting points for future 
TRAC assessment plans. 
Where TRAC provides a structure for delineating specific responsibilities for each aspect of 
Digital Safe and describing types of evidence and documentation, DSA provides a theoretical 
structure of digital preservation aspects, an official compliance scale, and flexibility for 
outsource partners and their responsibilities. DSA requirements are more descriptive and inform 
the user exactly what the requirement is while also including any related requirements. Each 
section contains a short description, long description, evidence, and the statement of compliance. 
DSA as a scoping tool is comparable to the NDSA Levels of Preservation (Phillips, Bailey, 
Goethals, & Owens, 2013) in that the guidelines offers broad categories without specific 
subsections and with a level of completion. This explanatory approach is useful for Digital Safe 
as an ongoing effort in that it ensures the Steering Committee is considering all of the major 
areas of digital preservation. 
The added benefit of requiring the statement of compliance for each guideline is also useful for 
scoping and development in that it offers a means for creating a brief overview. In addition to 
stating the level of compliance from 0-4, it also requires a sentence for rationale. If a guideline is 
fully or partially implemented (levels 3 and 4), then DSA asks for a URL to documentation or 
other evidence. If a guideline is theoretically designed, not designed yet, or not applicable (levels 
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2, 1, and 0, respectively), DSA asks for a brief explanation (DSA, 2016). A brief overview of 
each requirement produced by the statements of compliance is extremely useful for presenting to 
funders and stakeholders and can serve as future documentation. 
Consortia, Third-Parties, & Metrics 
Metric Documentation 
The impact of multiple collaborators on a single repository has, up until recently, been omitted 
from the leading digital preservation auditing metrics. However, the newest 2017-2019 DSA 
Guidelines are significantly more flexible, explicitly allowing for the inclusion of outsource 
partners and other third-parties. The Guidelines state: “If part of a requirement is ‘Outsourced’ to 
a third party (where applicable) identify the partner and provide evidence for the parts of the 
process you are responsible for and for those the Outsource Partner is responsible for” (DSA, 
2016). This is a recent addition to the DSA Guidelines. The previous 2014-2015 Guidelines 
included a short section describing the stipulations for Outsourcing. The Outsourcing section 
states: 
 “In the original version of the DSA outsourcing to third parties was permitted for 
Guidelines 4, 6, 7, 8 and 13 as long as the outsource partner had a DSA or better level of 
trust certification. To take account of the increasingly distributed and service-based 
nature of modern repositories, the DSA Board expanded the possibility of outsourcing to 
all Guidelines. This decision will be monitored over time and may be amended in future 
in cooperation with the DSA community. Applicant information relevant to outsourcing 
is requested in the ‘Repository Context’ section and must form part of the evidence for 
each applicable Guideline” (DSA 2014). 
The newest guidelines have expanded on the original guidelines to include Outsource Partners as 
a section in the repository’s Context section. In brief, this section asks for a list of any Partners, a 
description of the Partner’s services, and copies of contracts and agreements. The newest caveat 
is that while the guidelines ask for a list of any certifications maintained by the Partner, the 
guidelines do not require that the Partners are certified to provide sufficient evidence. The 2017-
2019 Guidelines state:  
“Because outsourcing will almost always be partial, you will still need to provide 
appropriate evidence for certification requirements that are not outsourced and for the 
parts of the data lifecycle that you control. […] We understand that this can be a complex 
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area to define and describe, but such details are essential to ensure a comprehensive 
review process” (DSA 2016).  
This is a significant move forward in the realm of auditing metrics. The inclusion of Outsource 
Partners’ roles as acceptable evidence indicate that governing institutions that maintain digital 
preservation standards are acknowledging how most digital preservation initiatives need to 
outsource. In general, this opens the door for standardizing the audit and assessment of consortia. 
Including Partners’ responsibilities forces the repository to fully understand their relationship 
with a vendor, and also allows the repository to absorb any certifications the Partner maintains. 
For Digital Safe and similar ongoing projects, it first encourages developers to not be hesitant to 
outsource when necessary, and second, it offers a framework for how to develop contracts with 
third parties. This framework is further described below.  
Structure of the Results Section 
In the case studies, the description for Outsource Partners provided in the DSA Guidelines 
proves more helpful than TRAC in establishing the roles of the vendors simply because DSA 
outlines how to describe a Partner and their role. Thus, in the above Results section there is a 
noticeable difference in how the assessment summaries are formatted. In the original TRAC 
Assessment report (see Appendix B), each criterion response is separated by the three potential 
partners Digital Safe, Arkivum, and Archivematica. There is nothing in the TRAC 
documentation or guidelines that indicates Outsource Partners or other third parties contributing 
to the building of a repository is acceptable as evidence, which makes it necessary to include all 
of the potential Digital Safe partners in the Results. As seen in Appendix B, it is clear which 
partners have a responsibility for each separate criterion, but each section and subsection as a 
whole vary in balance between each potential partner. This means that it is difficult to summarize 
each subsection of TRAC by each partner responsibility. Consequently, the results are first, 
described under the assumption that Digital Safe will be a single entity with three partners, and 
second, in terms of what Digital Safe as a single entity has and what it would need to meet 
TRAC criteria. Conversely, DSA requirements are all “equally weighted, standalone items” to 
prevent “duplication of evidence” where possible (DSA Board, 2016). Therefore, condensing the 
Requirements would not be accurate or balanced the way in which they were meant. This left a 
little more space for describing the roles of each partner on a broader level without the detail of 
TRAC. This is beneficial because it is both more exhaustive of different aspects of digital 
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repository management, such as the separation of “Documented storage procedures” 
(requirement 9) from “Preservation plan” (requirement 10) and the inclusion of where 
“Expertise” (requirement 6) is derived, but not so exhaustive that it is repetitive. 
Auditing Parts or the Whole? 
The culmination of this discussion about the case study results, metric documentation, and the 
role of third parties leads to the ultimate question of what the end goal is: should each respective 
partner of a repository be audited, as in the case for Goportis (Schwab, et al., 2017), or should 
the entire entity as a consortium or collaborative repository, such as CLOCKSS or the DRI, be 
audited? Given the results and previous discussion, the answer points to auditing the entity as a 
whole for several reasons. First, it is unreasonable to audit the entirety of a partner institution or 
organization when they only a play a role in some criteria. For example, Arkivum would not 
comply with criteria involving digital preservation workflow activities because its purpose is 
storage and long-term preservation, not in creating Archival Information Packages. On a 
different level, even if a third party does comply with certain criteria but in a way that is not 
relevant to the main repository being audited, then it has no place in the audit. Further, auditing 
each partner and ensuring compliance for every criteria only makes sense if each partner is 
involved with every aspect of the creation and management of the audited repository. This is not 
common even in a consortium environment because the purpose of a consortium is to increase 
access to resources by sharing, and as DSA Guidelines state, “outsourcing will almost always be 
partial” (DSA Board, 2016). Finally, the parts are intended to make a whole, meaning that the 
combined resources and services of several partners create a single repository, not multiple parts 
of a repository.  
The purpose of an audit is to ensure a repository is trusted based on agreed upon standards and 
will remain trusted based on the repository’s governance, policy, digital object management, 
combination of technologies, access to data, storage, and security. Standards exist to enforce best 
practices. If combining resources from multiple parties creates the optimum possible repository 
based on those standards, then the repository itself is of primary importance and the contribution 
of the third parties should be considered part of that repository and not a separate entity. The 
questions then change from how a collaborative repository should be audited, to where is line in 
utilizing a service, such as downloading and implementing the Fedora infrastructure, versus 
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outsourcing storage space, such as UIUC’s contract with Amazon Glacier. This is an area that 
requires further exploration to determine, but the issues are apparent and will increase and more 
repositories outsource. 
Use in Building Contracts 
The argument against third parties in building and maintaining digital repositories is that relying 
on outside resources can increase the risk of losing sustainability should one or many of the third 
parties become an issue. Sharing control of a single repository with other institutions or relying 
on outsourced services is not a decision to be taken lightly by developers. This is the point where 
auditing metrics becomes invaluable because they dictate what documentation is necessary and 
what minimal expectations are in place for maintaining a trusted digital repository. Take TRAC 
section A5. “Contracts, licenses, & liabilities,” where the subsections cover contracts and deposit 
agreement with the Designated Community that also include maintenance, access, withdrawal, 
and ownership rights. The evidence examples provided for this section are the basics features of 
building contracts. They include obvious documentation, such as copies of license and deposit 
agreements, copies of any contracts, and more specific documentations, such as “examples of 
legal advice sought and received,” definitions of service levels, “citations for relevant laws and 
requirements,” “policy on responding to challenges,” among others (CRL & OCLC, 2007). This 
provides the framework for developing contracts and negotiating with vendors.  
Comparably in DSA is their new section on Outsource Partners (see the Discussion subsection 
above on TRAC versus DSA) which directly asks the repository to “list the certification 
requirements for which the Partner provides all, or part of, the relevant functionality/service, 
including any contracts or Service Level Agreements in place” (DSA Board, 2016). This requires 
existing repositories to fully understand their relationship with any Partners, and also forces 
developing projects to decide exactly what they want from a third party. 
Documentation & Testimony as Evidence 
Without evidence, compliance to any metric cannot be proven. In the case of an on-going project 
or a project working towards maintaining confidential information like Digital Safe, evidence in 
the form of test cases and public policy has not yet occurred. However, documentation of various 
strategies and descriptions can serve as sufficient documentation, which is especially useful for 
dark archives, but also useful for communicating needs from vendors. A project undertaken by 
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Seamus Ross and Andrew McHugh at the Digital Curation Centre conducted six pilot audits on 
various types of archives using TRAC identified the various forms of evidence that are 
acceptable for meeting audit criteria, which included primary and secondary documentation. 
They state that “there are very few examples of check-list criteria compliance that can’t be 
demonstrated at least to some extent with the provision of primary documentation” because it is 
broad and can cover physical and digital records as well as object metadata (2006). Ross and 
McHugh describe documentation, commitments, capacity, resource, and planning information 
can all be described to a certain extent in written documentation, which could include areas such 
as accounting documentation, infrastructure descriptions, various preservation and governance 
policies, and business plans can all be recorded in documentation and provide partial to full 
compliance (2006). Documentation is clearly limited by the lack of demonstration; describing 
the process does not guarantee success in practice, but it does offer insight into the level of 
planning and implementation that has been reached by the repository. For TRAC and DSA’s 0-4 
compliance scales, most documentation can provide enough evidence for criteria compliance to 
meet a 2, which indicates that a criterion has been theoretically designed (DSA, 2016). 
In the case of Digital Safe, documentation was the primary evidence. Various project reports, 
projected business plans, standard license contracts, and a public blog are currently all that exist 
as stable evidence of Digital Safe as a whole, and all but the blog are still private. Additional 
documentation for the technologies Arkivum and Archivematica provided the entirety of 
evidence for criteria dedicated to digital object management, and partial evidence for criteria on 
governance and infrastructure, and for security and technologies. Without the technologies’ 
public documentation, Digital Safe would not be able to meet most criteria of any audit at any 
level. 
Further, Ross and McHugh also posit that stakeholder testimony can also provide a level of audit 
compliance, particularly if it is corroborated by other stakeholders because it offers both a 
“degree of credibility” when it also is reflected in the documentation (2006). Much of the 
contractual information with Arkivum, background on the project, and stakeholder interest was 
collected for Digital Safe through the interviews with current Phase 2 Project Lead Neil Jefferies, 
stakeholder Susan Thomas, and Phase 2 Project Manager David Tomkins, as described in the 
Methodology section. Jefferies and Tomkins have both produced documentation for Digital Safe, 
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and Susan Thomas has participated in several recorded meetings, which granted them credibility 
and full knowledge of the project. Jefferies is also the primary contact for Arkivum and was in 
the process of developing a customized contract with Arkvium that provided enhanced 
understanding of the relationship between Arkivum, and eventually University of Oxford, clients 
(N. Jefferies, personal communication, July 25, 2016). 
Documentation and testimony cannot replace a supervised practical demonstration or interaction 
with an auditor, but in the case of the Digital Safe project, they are the primary tools for 
understanding the project’s goals and how those goals influence their contract with Arkivum.  
TRAC & the ISO 27000-series 
One interesting result of examining Arkivum as an outsource partner is how to handle their ISO 
27001 certification. In TRAC, an example of evidence for complying with the security criteria 
found in section C. Technologies, Technical Infrastructure, & Security, is to also maintain ISO 
17799 “Information Technology – Code of practice for information security management” 
certification (CRL 2007). ISO 17799 was revised in 2007 and became ISO 27002:2013 as part of 
the ISO 27000 series on information security (ISO 27000 Directory, 2008). ISO 27002 provides 
the options for implementing the requirements in ISO 27001 and are meant to complement each 
other. Each subsection in TRAC section C3. Security can be met with ISO 27000 certifications. 
TRAC documentation also indicates that subsections C1. System infrastructure and C2. 
Appropriate technologies are also likely to meet compliance with partial support from ISO 27000 
certification (OCLC, 2007). Because Arkivum maintains ISO 27001 certification, Digital Safe 
will have less to consider for section C3. 
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Future Work 
Continuation & Follow-up 
Two case studies assessing a single project is just a starting point for work in how digital 
preservation standards can also be used as scoping tools for outlining responsibilities. Applying 
other oft-used standards and guidelines to Digital Safe as an ongoing project is the clear next 
step. Beginning with guidelines like the Ten Principles (CRL) and the NDSA Levels of 
Preservation (2013) would establish a broad theoretical foundation. Once basic standards were 
examined, building on the DSA assessment to assess nestor’s 37 guidelines for extended self-
assessment would follow the European Framework for Audit and Certification of Digital 
Repositories’ levels of certification (2008, July 8), and eventually lead to scoping based on ISO 
16363:2012. Including all of these metrics offers a range of scoping experiences with the same 
data. 
In the context of the Digital Safe project, the two case studies and their results all lead up to the 
point where Digital Safe is live and functioning and capable of being assessed or audited for 
certification. Reviewing the documentation from these cases studies will raise new questions: 
Did scoping out the project help develop a contract with Arkivum? How did the projected 
responsibilities of each party reflect the actual contract? How did the project evolve after 
examining the strengths and gaps revealed by the case studies? Are the case studies referred to in 
official documentation? Did the formal certification process (or self-assessment) draw from these 
case studies? The same questions may be raised by other projects documenting their use of 
standards for planning. Community efforts will likely be key as institutions and organizations 
report on their experiences planning repositories, working with vendors, conducting self-
assessments, and undergoing formal certification processes.  
On another level, communicating with vendors on their experiences in developing contracts with 
institutional repositories would provide insight on their perspective. Collecting information on 
their process and what they expect from clients could offer potential standards to incorporate into 
digital preservation metrics. Comparatively, interviewing consortia partners on their process for 
communicating with each other and with vendors would offer similar insight. This is relevant 
because while DSA requires contracts and licenses to be included for any Outsource Partner, the 
extent of how those contracts are created based on standards is not illustrated.  
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Inclusion of Outsource Partners 
Given how common outsourcing and consortial collaboration is in building and maintaining 
digital preservation repositories, digital preservation metrics must adapt to include them. As 
previously discussed, the newest 2017-2019 DSA Guidelines are the only current metric that 
include outsource partners as expected for digital repositories, and view their roles and support 
as acceptable evidence. Other metrics do not include collaborators, partially due to the reliance 
on OAIS as discussed in the Limitations section, and partially because digital preservation 
standards are still evolving. Examining the next two year’s DSA certifications will provide 
evidence supporting the inclusion of collaborators and third-parties into other metrics. As of 
April 2017 there have been no case studies or certifications per DSA 2017-2019 guidelines. 
However, adapting the three individual applications from the Goportis Digital Archive DSA 
certification into a single application based on the 2017-2019 Guidelines would be an interesting 
starting point for comparison. Additional certifications and re-certifications will also provide a 
collection of examples to offer support for other metrics to evolve. 
Repository versus Service 
An interesting aspect of the Digital Safe project is that it is consistently identified by the project 
team as a proposed service (Jefferies, et al., 2016). The discussion on what defines the notion of 
a service in the realm of digital repositories in the Limitation section introduces this, but further 
exploration into documentation for metrics and into the line between service and repository, if 
any exist, are necessary. The issue is that not all collaborative projects identify or should be 
identified as services. Europeana37, for example, is a digital platform for cultural heritage 
focused on access, but it does not control the data; is it a repository because it holds over 3,000 
institutions’ material, or a service because its mission statement is that “We transform the world 
with culture! We want to build on Europe’s rich heritage and make it easier for people to use, 
whether for work, for learning or just for fun,” which makes its primary service discovery and 
access? In the context of Digital Safe, is it proposed to become a service because it is 
outsourcing its major technical infrastructure to third-party technologies and therefore not in 
complete control of the data, or is it a service because that is what motivated the project to 
initially develop? Further, does it matter that it is proposed to be a service and not a repository 
                                                          
37 For more information on Eurpoeana’s vision, see their About us page: http://pro.europeana.eu/about-us/  
57 
 
since it could be argued that a repository provides services? The only certainty here is that the 
Digital Safe project began because the University of Oxford needs universal storage 
infrastructure for confidential records, and the project team is working to produce a solution that 
works best for their allocation of resources. This does not mean that they should have to develop 
without standards for guidance. This also broaches on the question of whether new standards are 
needed to fully expand on the impact of Outsource Partners or consortium members on a digital 
repository, or if the current standards can be updated to include them. DSA has already 
incorporated them, but future certifications will determine if it was successful and what issue 
may arise. 
Documentation Revision 
In addition to incorporating collaborators as an equal partner in maintaining a repository, the 
observations on definition discrepancies in the Discussion section call for a revision of the 
language in digital preservation metrics. As a potential dark archive, the Digital Safe project 
already does not completely comply with digital repository metrics. For example, a digital 
repository, also commonly interchanged with digital archive, is broadly defined an 
“infrastructure through which to store, manage, re-use and curate digital materials” in which the 
primary responsibility is to provide “easy, simultaneous and remote access to deposits” (Semple, 
2006). While current auditing metrics tend to focus on transparency in documentation and direct 
access to data, they overlook other types of repositories, namely dark archives and consortia. As 
defined by the Digital Preservation Coalition, a dark archive is an archive that cannot be 
accessed by any current users but may be accessible at future dates subject to the occurrence of 
specific pre-defined events. Access to the data is either limited to a few set individuals or 
completely restricted to all” (DCC). By definition, the storage infrastructure, access to deposits, 
and even access to documentation for an existing dark archive is not open-access and 
complicates certification. Further, as discussed, a consortium as an entity cannot achieve 
certification, but members of a consortium can be audited and certified individually (Schwab, 
Tunnat, & Gerdes, 2017). These gaps in digital preservation auditing metrics hinder the 
progression of digital preservation and require a revision of current standards. Providing 
definitions for additional repository types would also motivate revision of digital repository 
concepts, continue the evolution of standards. 
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Conclusion 
The realm of digital repositories is complex. In the words of Dr. Sandra Collins, Director of the 
Digital Repository of Ireland, “a digital repository is a living, growing organism, that will face 
new challenges as the huge quantities of data grow even faster, as the complexity of the data 
increases, and as the requirements for sophisticated data visualisation, open data and research 
data management grow” (DRI, Grant, O’Neill, & Webbs, 2013). The Digital Safe case studies 
exemplify this complexity, but also help to offer a solution towards that complexity. The use of 
digital preservation auditing metrics can be used for scoping and development of digital 
repository projects and should not be limited to only certification of existing repositories. 
Building a repository based on established standards can help produce the most relevant 
documentation, inform projects on how to write contracts with vendors, and better prepare the 
future repository for formal audits. The growing number of collaborative digital repositories calls 
for a update in standards on how to negotiate contracts with vendors and third parties, and to 
delineate roles and responsibilities within consortia. Collaboration is key to development, and 
our digital preservation standards need to reflect that collaboration in order for digital 
repositories to evolve. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Acronym Dictionary 
AIP: Archival Information Package 
APTrust: Academic Preservation Trust 
BDLSS: Bodleian Digital Library Systems & Services 
BEAM: Bodleian Electronic Archives and Manuscripts 
CCSDS: Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 
CLOCKSS: Closed Lots of Copies Keeps Stuff Safe 
CRL: Center for Research Libraries 
COPTR:  Community Owned digital Preservation Tool Registry 
DAITSS: Dark Archive in the Sunshine State 
DHOxSS: Digital Humanities Oxford Summer School 
DANS: Data Archiving and Networked Services 
DCC: Data Curation Centre 
DIN: Deutsches Institut für Normung (trans. German Institute for Standardization) 
DIP: Dissemination Information Package 
DPC: Digital Preservation Coalition 
DPE: DigitalPreservationEurope 
DPN: Digital Preservation Network 
DRAMBORA: Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk Assessment 
DRI: Digital Repository of Ireland 
DSA: Data Seal of Approval 
FCLA: Florida Center for Library Automation 
HTRC: HathiTrust Research Center 
ICSPR: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
ISO: International Standards Organization 
NDCC: Northeast Document Conservation Center 
NDSA: National Digital Stewardship Alliance 
OAIS: Open Archival Information System 
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OCLC: Online Computer Library Center 
OeRC: Oxford e-Research Center 
OIDLPP: Oxford-Illinois Digital Libraries Placement Program 
ORA-Data: Oxford Research Archive Data 
PID: Project Initiation Documentation (UK) 
POWRR: Preserving (Digital) Objects With Restricted Resources 
SIP: Submission Information Package 
TDR: Trusted Digital Repository 
TIB: German National Library of Science and Technology 
TRAC: Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification 
UIUC: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
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Appendix B: An Informal TRAC Audit of Digital Safe at the 
University of Oxford 
August 2016, Version 1.0  
The following is the full official report submitted to the OeRC in August 2016. This appendix is included 
to serve as evidence of observations on TRAC and as a reference to any specific points made. The report 
includes the original abstract, background and methodology, TRAC assessment results, and 
recommendations. The TRAC assessment itself includes a response to each criterion of the TRAC 
checklist, recommendations based on those responses, and is based on the documentation that was 
available as of August 2016. It has not been further edited since the original report was submitted and 
does not include updated information from any new documentation from Digital Safe or the technologies. 
The References listed at the end are the original references for the original OIDLPP project and are not 
References for this thesis. To avoid confusion between sections of the same name between this thesis and 
this appendix, the major headings in this appendix are italicized. 
Abstract  
In addition to the treasures and data held by the Bodleian libraries that are in the process of being digitally 
preserved, there is an urgent need for unified, long-term preservation of University of Oxford records. 
Administrative, financial, medical, and personal records are increasing rapidly on a daily basis. Digital 
Safe, created by the BDLSS, has sought to solve this problem by outsourcing the data management 
technology to Arkivum and managing it locally. This will allow all 38 colleges and other various 
departments to have a single technology for secure storage. Priority has recently been placed on 
completing Digital Safe, which calls for a final review of its trustworthiness, sustainability, and 
infrastructure. Auditing a Dark Archive focused on conducting a comprehensive, informal audit for 
Digital Safe. TRAC was used as the guidelines for its comprehensiveness, but is not fully effective for a 
dark archive. This endeavor is challenging as there is no metric to evaluate a dark archive or a project 
approach, and the audit included the service as well as its technologies. 
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Introduction  
While traditionally it is looked to the library to manage the cultural content worth preserving and storing, 
there is an excess of data that is often overlooked and in desperate need of infrastructure and security. 
Student records, financial records, patient records, non-anonymized data, and other data with any 
personally identifiable information is considered high-security, high-priority, and increases every day. 
The University of Oxford does not yet provide a service for the storage of high-security information.  
Additionally, among the independent colleges, departments, and universities within the University of 
Oxford there is no shared infrastructure, technology platform, or methodology.  
Often this data has requirements to be maintained for a certain amount of time. Financial records, for 
example, might need to be kept for compliance reasons for a certain number of years before being 
permanently destroyed. Comparatively, student records may eventually be opened to the public for 
research, but as they contain information about still-living persons and their families, they must be stored 
without access for a longer period of time. This data may also consist of acquisitions of the library that 
does not yet have the funding to review and remove personally identifiable information. These materials 
require a short to long-term storage space with strict access management until they can be handled. The 
solution at the University of Oxford for this ever-increasing data is Digital Safe.  
Digital Safe Background 
Digital Safe was originally the Electronic Archives Pilot Project. Initiated in 2012, the project consists of 
two completed phases and a third phase currently on hold but still in development. The ultimate goal of 
Digital Safe is to “deliver a secure, long-term records archiving service for the University and Colleges 
operating on a cost recovery basis”38. The purpose is to have a single technology that is managed locally 
and customizable by the college that also is cost-effective and easily managed. 
Phase 1  
Phase 1 (2012-2013) focused on defining the scope of the project. The primary purpose was to determine 
if there was a need or want for a digital preservation service for the storage of administrative material. 
The project interviewed various staff members in the colleges, IT Services, the Oxford Colleges 
Librarians Group, Oxford Archivists Consortium, and other related groups, committees, and departments. 
Phase 1 established a desire for such a service and gathered some of the technical, security, and 
infrastructure requirements that these institutions might have. Phase 1 also verified that most of the 
University is relying on the library to provide a solution. More detailed information may be found in the 
Phase 1 Project Initiation Document. 
Phase 2 
Phase 2 (January 2013-June 2014) investigated service and infrastructure models for a long-term digital 
preservation service. The project team examined the infrastructure that the Bodleian Electronic Archives 
and Manuscripts (BEAM) currently uses, the infrastructure for ORA-Data, and services such as DataBank 
for possible reuse or outsourcing. BEAM infrastructure, developed in 2005, is held on a stand-alone 
server that has recently not been able to keep up with the increase in acquisitions and the preferred level 
of organization and security that the BEAM would prefer39. ORA-Data was found to not be compatible 
for the type and amount of security measure that would need to be implemented. Building an entirely new 
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infrastructure was also investigated but would not have been time or cost-efficient. DataBank was also 
ruled out for not including all of the aspects necessary for the project in one platform. 
Phase 2 determined that the users would likely be the following: College Archivists; University Archive; 
Central Administrative Records Management; Departmental Research Records Management; and 
Personal Material held by BEAM40. This should not limit the data that can be added. Given that these 
users may not be advanced technical users, the interface design needs to be user-friendly and technical 
support is necessary. The ultimate decision was to outsource the technologies and manage the service 
locally. The name also changed in Phase 2 from Electronic Archives Pilot Project to Digital Safe. The 
technologies chosen were Arkivum for long-term, high-security storage, and Archivematica for digital 
preservation activities. More detailed information can be found in the Phase 2 Project Initiation Document 
and in the Phase 2 End Project Report. A Digital Safe blog41 was also developed in 2013 by David 
Tomkins and provides public information on Phases 1 and 2. The blog will be continued in Phase 3.42 
Phase 3 
Phase 3 has been developed but has not yet received funding to continue. Funding is requested for three 
major activities. First, to further investigate and fully develop an ideal contract with the outsourced 
technologies. Second, to design and implement the business and service models within IT Services. 
Finally, to cover the start-up, training, and storage costs of one year of operating the service. Once the 
service has been deployed to early adopters, the project team will track user feedback and service function 
for one year before deciding to launch a service available to the entire University.43 The original goal was 
to launch the service for early adopters by September 2016, and while funding may extend this, the goal is 
to launch the service as soon as possible after funding is granted. More detailed information on the 
projected budget and project roles can be found in the Phase 3 Project Initiation Document. 
A successful Phase 3 will result in a universal technology and infrastructure for long-term, large-scale, 
high-security data produced and held by the University of Oxford. This service will have training built in 
and materials available between training sessions, will be customizable by each client, and is based on a 
cost-recovery model. The Oxford brand and the large number of clients that the University would be 
bringing to Arkivum is a motivation for Arkivum to work with Digital Safe and develop less expensive 
start-up and training fees.44 Additionally, Archivematica is a built-in tool in Arkivum. In signing with 
Arkivum the University would only be paying for a single Archivematica license fee rather than over 
forty individual fees. Finally, the success of Digital Safe would also ease the burden of data managers at 
the University of Oxford as the service would be user-friendly, the technology would be supported by 
their developers, and minimal stress will be put on the IT Services and the future Steering Committee by 
handling small issues and outsourcing larger issues. 
Technologies 
In brief, Arkivum is a “long-term, large-scale managed data storage”45 that provides high-security 
processing and storage with strict accessibility processes. They have two products that may be utilized by 
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Digital Safe: Arkivum/1+1 and Arkivum/100. Arkivum/1+146 has one digital copy of the data held in a 
secure location, and one physical copy held on LTO data tape held in Escrow at a separate location. 
Arkivum/10047 has two digital copies of the data held in two geographically separate, secure locations, 
and one physical copy held on LTO data tape held in Escrow at a third separate location. Arkivum/100 
also offers the 100% integrity guarantee by ensuring three copies are being managed and preserved. 
Arkivum services revolve around the number of pipes being used. Pipes are ingest workflows that can 
host multiple archives by one client and multiple clients. Each login can have customized workflows, 
though only one login can be active at one time.  Audit trails are available, and all of the data is only 
accessible by the administrator login via an encryption key. If the master encryption the data cannot be 
retrieved, even by University staff or IT Services, which ensures the security of the data.  More detailed 
information may be found in the Phase 3 PID48, Arkivum’s website49, and Section B of the informal 
TRAC Audit. 
Archivematica is an open source digital preservation workflow tool developed by Artefactual that has 
recently been built in to Arkivum.50 Arkivum specifically only “provides safe and secure data 
archiving,”51 not digital preservation activities. Archivematica can offer a customizable digital workflow 
tool, including SIP creation, normalization, AIP packaging, and DIP uploading. This is then ingested into 
Arkivum. More information can be found in Archivematica’s documentation52 and in the informal TRAC 
Audit. 
Audit Purpose 
Recently there has been an increased interest in the project resuming, both within the library and from 
members of the University. This calls for a review of the current goals of the project, its documentation, 
and the technologies chosen. The goal of the Oxford Illinois Digital Library Placement Program 
(OIDLPP) is to assist in promoting Phase 3 by informally auditing the project approach as a whole and 
the chosen technologies to ensure that they will produce a trustworthy dark archive. This audit will 
highlight the strengths of the project to assist in securing funding, as well as locating areas of 
improvement to focus on developing in Phase 3, simultaneously reviewing and scoping Digital Safe.  
Project Limitations 
It is important to note that this project was completed during a limited time frame, which leads to 
subsequent restrictions. First, the time spent on this project was roughly 3.5 weeks. This time consisted of 
understanding the project, reviewing documentation, understanding the technologies and their 
documentation, interviewing project team members and stakeholders, and learning how to use a 
repository metric efficiently. The time constraint also means that the project is not as detailed as is ideal, 
but it is comprehensive and easily built upon. Rather than performing and true, formal audit on Digital 
Safe, an informal audit was performed and acts as a guidance for organization and thorough investigation 
rather than a formal, published report.  
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Furthermore, the OIDLPP project goal was to audit an approach to a service that first, does not exist yet, 
and second, has limited user feedback and no examples to measure. This may be remedied after the early 
adopters have time to give feedback. Finally, there is no metric for evaluating a project approach, nor is 
there an updated, universally accepted metric for evaluating a dark archive. This is understandable given 
the early stages that digital preservation and storage are in, but does cause some difficulty in attempting to 
measure Digital Safe. 
Methodology: TRAC 
In consulting Michael Popham, Head of Digital Collection and Preservation Services for BDLSS; Neil 
Jefferies, Research & Development Project Manager for BDLSS and project leader for Digital Safe; and 
the Center for Research Libraries’ assessment tools, TRAC was chosen as the metric to compare to 
Digital Safe. Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification (TRAC) was released by OCLC in 2007, 
and is what the ISO 16363 standard (aka the Trusted Digital Repository Checklist) is based on.53 It is 
significantly more detailed than the Data Seal of Approval or the Ten Principles, but is less complicated 
than ISO 16363. This allows for a compromise in complexity.  
The word “repository” is TRAC’s choice of word to describe the collection of materials. There is some 
controversy surrounding this word, particularly in the United Kingdom, because a digital repository is by 
definition an open collection. Additionally, a dark archive tends to hold different content than a 
repository, have a different business model, and requires higher security. For the purposes of this project, 
the word repository should be replaced with dark archive and not acknowledged in the traditional 
definition in this report. 
TRAC Limitations 
As its name implies, TRAC is built for auditing repositories, not for dark archives or approaches to digital 
preservation services. TRAC is also meant to be used on a single repository. In the case of the University 
of Oxford, each college, department, institution, and so on, would have their own archive with different 
permissions, workflows, and policies. The chosen technologies, Arkivum and Archivematica, also have 
separate documentation that may overlap with each other or with Digital Safe policies, or may not apply 
to TRAC at all.  
TRAC also calls for accessibility and transparency. A dark archive by definition is not widely accessible. 
While Digital Safe may provide some information on the type of content that might be included, who has 
access and why, any more specific information is not appropriate. Each individual college will also likely 
not publish their workflows and policies added to the basic ones developed by Digital Safe.  
Purpose of this Document 
This document is a combination of the background and context of the Digital Safe project, the process of 
producing the audit, and the results of the informal TRAC audit. 
Vocabulary 
 Client: Client is the language chosen to indicate a member of the University of Oxford who is 
utilizing the Digital Safe service. It removes any assumption of who will be using the service, 
particularly if they fall outside of the primary users identified in Phase 1 (See section A3.1).  
 DS: refers to Digital Safe’s responsibilities as outlined in the informal audit 
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 Electronic Archives Pilot Project (EAPP): This is the original title of the project, which changed 
during Phase 2 to Digital Safe 
 NJ: refers to Neil Jefferies, project lead for Phase 3 of Digital Safe 
 ST: refers to Susan Thomas, Head of Archives & Modern Manuscripts and stakeholder in Digital 
Safe 
Rating System 
Nancy McGovern of MIT Libraries developed a TRAC review tool in Drupal that allows institutions to 
self-review themselves. The tool was built in 2013 but is currently only hosted on Archivematica and also 
requires a DRUPAL installation. This installation and the lack of documentation or examples of the tool 
omitted its use in the methodology. However, one of the features is a rating system for TRAC 
compliance, which is utilized in this informal audit. This system provides a straightforward review of 
each section, and is included in this audit. The rating system as described on Archivematica’s TRAC 
review tool page: 
 4 = fully compliant - the repository can demonstrate that has comprehensively addressed the 
requirement 
 3 = mostly compliant - the repository can demonstrate that it has mostly addressed the 
requirement and is on working on full compliance 
 2 = half compliant - the repository has partially addressed the requirement and has significant 
work remaining to fully address the requirement 
 1 = slightly compliant - the repository has something in place, but has a lot of work to do in 
addressing the requirement 
 0 = non-compliant or not started - the repository has not yet addressed the requirement or has not 
started the review of the requirement 
Audit Structure 
The audit follows TRAC Criteria structure. Each response includes the criteria, the response, and the 
example evidence provided by TRAC. The responsibilities of Digital Safe as a service, Arkivum as a 
storage platform, and Archivematica as a digital preservation workflow are all included. If they do not 
have a responsibility for the criteria it is acknowledged as such. TRAC can be repetitive, and the audit 
responses can be repetitive because the same answer may apply to several questions or are not yet fully 
developed. 
Audit Recommendations 
A brief review of the recommendations for Digital Safe as a result of this informal audit are as follows: 
Previously Identified Goals 
 Obtain funding (in progress) 
 Develop and cost and service model to be integrated into IT Services  
 Define contract specifications with Arkivum  
 Deploy service to early adopters  
Audit-Identified Goals 
 Secure University web space to host information about the service, including basic policy and 
purpose description, help guides and contacts, training material, and an access matrix (as outlined 
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in section C3.3) to provide transparency on use of the service as well as access to content. Also 
provide links to the Bodleian Library and IT Services 
 Continue updating the Wordpress blog with a link to the University web space 
 Determine a permanent Steering Committee or governance committee for the next phase of the 
project. If this is already in place unofficially, develop a formal policy on term length, 
responsibilities, and a process for member replacement. 
 Develop a written policy that defines the best practices for utilizing Archivematica and Arkivum, 
specifically in recommended digital preservation workflows and in what Arkivum product best 
suits the client’s needs. 
 Continue building on this, or a similarly constructed, informal audit. The purpose of this audit is 
meant to review and evaluate what level of completion and trustworthiness Digital Safe has 
obtained. Developing multiple versions that build on this pre-Phase 3 audit might be beneficial 
for tracking progress and highlighting existing or new issues. 
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Digital Safe Informal TRAC Audit 
A. Organizational Infrastructure 
Average Rating: 1.45/4 
A1. Governance & organizational viability 
A1.1 Repository has a mission statement that reflects a commitment to the long-term retention of, 
management of, and access to digital information. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: The original Electronic Archive Pilot Project’s mission statement is as follows: The Electronic 
Archive Pilot Project will establish the feasibility of a working electronic archive for the use of the whole 
of the Collegiate University. The archive will support the safe and secure storage of all classifications of 
non-public record data that individual departments, colleges and associated units are required to keep 
legally or would like to keep for historic reasons. The pilot project aims to develop a cost recovered 
service” (EAPP).  
The Digital Safe service itself as yet lacks a mission statement. It will likely draw on the phrase from the 
Phase 3 PID to “deliver a secure, long-term records archiving service for the University and Colleges 
operating on a cost recovery basis once in production,” (2).  
Arkivum: “Arkivum provides industry-leading big data preservation and archiving solutions to 
organisations in higher education, healthcare, life sciences, and digital heritage. These solutions assure the 
long-term value, trustworthiness and authenticity of data irrespective of whether it’s terabytes or 
petabytes being preserved, and irrespective of whether the retention period is years, decades, or a quarter 
of a century. Through active data management, chain of custody and ISO 27001 compliance processes, 
Arkivum’s unique technology provides rapid, low-latency access to archived data and provides an 
unrivalled 100% data integrity guarantee. Backed by indemnity insurance, this is our commitment to 
protect, curate and preserve data for the future and to eliminate the needless loss of information and 
knowledge. Arkivum works with partners to deliver integrated, scalable and flexible solutions for data 
discovery and sharing; publishing; file format preservation; and information portals” (Arkivum, About 
Us). 
Archivematica: “Archivematica is a free and open-source digital preservation system that is designed to 
maintain standards-based, long-term access to collections of digital objects. Archivematica is packaged 
with the web-based content management system AtoM for access to your digital objects,” (What is 
Archivematica).  
A1.2 Repository has an appropriate, formal succession plan, contingency plans, and/or a escrow 
arrangements in place in case the repository ceases to operate or the governing or funding 
institution substantially changes its scope. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe chose Arkivum in part due to its contingency plan and relies on Arkivum to maintain 
and implement this plan if necessary. 
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Arkivum: Arkivum provides several safety measures. For Arkivum/1+1, one copy is stored in a secure 
data center and one copy is saved on LTO data tape in Escrow. For Arkivum/100, two copies are stored in 
secure, geographically separate data centers and one copy is saved on LTO data tape in Escrow. The 
Escrow copy is the backup for any data loss or corruption. If there is any data loss in the data centers or if 
Arkivum Limited should cease to operate, the LTO tapes are delivered to the client. If there is complete 
data loss, Arkivum provides a “financial guarantee underwritten by an Information and Communication 
Technology Professional Liability Insurance Policy,” which provides coverage for direct loss relating to 
data loss (FAQ, 7). Arkivum also provides multiple client sites, so if one site is compromised the data 
may be retrieved at another site (FAQ, 22). For more information:  
 section A3.8 for more information on Arkivum/1+1 and Arkivum/100 
 section C3.2 for information on Arkivum’s physical storage locations 
 Stages of Archiving 
 Chain of Custody 
 Security Model 
 Arkivum’s FAQ document 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, which will be built into the 
contract between the University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by the security measures of 
Arkivum. 
Evidence: Succession plan(s); escrow plan(s); explicit and specific statement documenting the intent to 
ensure continuity of the repository, and the steps taken and to be taken to ensure continuity; formal 
documents describing exit strategies and contingency plans; depositor agreements. 
A2. Organizational structure & staffing 
A2.1 Repository has identified and established the duties that it needs to perform and has 
appointed staff with adequate skills and experience to fulfill these duties. 
Audit Rating: 1 
DS: The project team for Phase 3 of Digital Safe is established, but the ultimate short and long-term 
staffing duties have not yet been established. The plan is that the service will be built into the University 
of Oxford’s IT department. A business and service model is a priority for phase 3 of Digital Safe and will 
determine staffing needs and training. Ideally the Steering Committee on the Digital Safe project will also 
develop into a governance committee that will act as a checks and balances to ensure that local 
management is useful, that will review policy annually, and to ensure funding.  
Digital Safe relies on the technologies to maintain their own staffing. 
Arkivum: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to ensure their own staffing needs and is not responsible for 
Arkivum maintaining their services. According to Arkivum, “In addition to technical change in the 
archive system, managing staff transitions of those who run the system, for example support staff and 
administrators, is required” (Data Integrity). More information on their team may be found on their About 
Us page. 
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Archivematica: Archivematica is created and staffed by Artefactual Inc. More information can be found 
on their Team page. 
Evidence: A staffing plan; competency definitions; job description; development plans; plus evidence that 
the repository review and maintains these documents as requirements evolve. 
A2.2 Repository has the appropriate number of staff to support all functions and services. 
Audit Rating: 1 
See the response in section A2.1 for details. 
Evidence: Organizational charts; definitions of roles and responsibilities; comparison of staffing levels to 
commitments and estimates of required effort. 
A2.3 Repository has an active professional development program in place that provides staff with 
skills and expertise development opportunities. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Arkivum provides all virtual training. The current plan is to bring in Arkivum employees for training 
and a training course will be developed for staff here based on Arkivum’s resources (NJ Interview). There 
will also be basic tutorials for Archivematica on the tools available, though this training will be a broader, 
Oxford-level and the individual clients will determine their own specific workflow, especially in regards 
to their use of Archivematica. The training will then be added to the Bodleian Library’s current collection 
of training materials. The training materials will be reviewed and updated on a 4-5 year cycle by the 
governance committee. 
Arkivum: Arkivum provides all virtual training with courses being built into the start-up fees. Additional 
help and support is also available via email and phone. Contact information is as follows: “For initial 
support please contact your reseller where appropriate. Should this not be possible or you need to speak to 
Arkivum, then please call our support staff on +44 1249 400 001 or e-mail support@arkivum.com. 
Support services are provided weekdays, during the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 pm UK time. Outside of 
these times automated alerting systems are in operation, with escalation to a designated analyst” (FAQ, 
12). Additional information is found on their website. 
Archivematica: Archivematica’s manufacturer Artefactual provides training for Archivematica use online, 
onsite in workshops, and via VMs for classroom training (Training). These workshops are priced 
separately from the service, but there may be a discount included with the contract between the University 
of Oxford and Arkivum. Technical support is also an option for Archivematica clients (Maintenance 
Services), which is also priced separately and could be included in the contract. 
Support services may be accessed by phone at +1 604 527 2046 or via email at info@artefactual.com 
(Contact page).   
Evidence: Professional development plans and reports; training requirements and training budgets, 
documentation of training expenditures (amount per staff); performance goals and documentation of staff 
assignments and achievements, copies of certificates awarded. 
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A3. Procedural accountability & policy framework (documentation) 
A3.1 Repository has defined its designated community(ies) and associated knowledge base(s) and 
has publicly accessible definitions and policies in place to dictate how its preservation service 
requirements will be met. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: The key users for this service have been identified in Phase 1 as: College Archivists; University 
Archive; Central Administrative Records Management; Departmental Research Records Management; 
and Bodleian Electronic Archives and Manuscripts. These users have materials that require high-security 
and low-accessibility, including administrative records, student records, financial records, personal 
communication, medical reports, non-anonymized case studies, and other material that has personal, 
identifiable information. These users were identified after interviewing various colleges and departments 
on campus and determining a need for a universal storage system (PID, 4). Users are not limited to only 
these categories, however, as the service is open to all who want to use the service and are affiliated with 
the University of Oxford. 
Arkivum: In brief, Arkivum was developed for the long term, large-scale management, protection, and 
curation of data primarily from institutions based in Healthcare and NHS, Digital Heritage, Higher 
Education, and Life Sciences. This does not limit their scope, and more information can be found in their 
Solutions examples (see the Higher Education example), and in their FAQ document. 
Archivematica: Archivematica was developed to provide “archivists and librarians with limited technical 
and financial capacity the tools, methodology and confidence to begin preserving digital information 
today,” (Archivematica) which expands into the entire digital preservation community overall. 
Evidence: Mission statement; written definitions of the designated community(ies); documented policies; 
service-level agreements. 
A3.2 Repository has procedures and policies in place, and mechanisms for their review, update, and 
development as the repository grows and as technology and community practice evolves. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: The official governance for this service has not yet been developed. Ideally the Steering Committee 
on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance committee that will work in tandem with 
the staff in the IT department to review and update any general policies, training materials, and 
announcements and event information. Also see the response for section A2.1 for staffing information.  
Digital Safe relies on the technologies to remain updated on and implement any evolving best practices in 
the field. 
Arkivum: Arkivum has policies and automated processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, 
software, and hardware. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums. 
Arkivum has also identified software and hardware obsolescence to occur on a cycle of generally 3 to 5 
years, so Arkivum’s policy is that data is migrated to new media following the LTO roadmap. The LTO 
data tapes in Escrow are also migrated every 5 years. More detailed information on media upgrades can 
be found on their Data Integrity page. 
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Archivematica: In addition to being committed to maintaining standards-based tools for those interested 
in digital preservation tools, Archivematica also relies on their community to help steer the tool in the 
most useful direction. “We're constantly working with our community to improve the application, and all 
enhancements are bundled into our public releases. This means that whenever one person or institution 
contributes resources, the entire community benefits,” (Archivematica). 
Evidence: Written documentation in the form of policies, procedures, protocols, rules, manuals, 
handbooks, and workflows; specification of review cycle for documentation; documentation detailing 
review, update, and development mechanisms. If documentation is embedded in system logic, 
functionality should demonstrate the implementation of policies and procedures. 
A3.3 Repository maintains written policies that specify the nature of any legal permissions required 
to preserve digital content over time, and repository can demonstrate that these permissions have 
been acquired when needed. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Legal permissions will be the entire responsibility of the client. The content will likely comprise of 
files created by the client, e.g. student records, financial records, etc., and legal permissions are moot. 
Other material may be acquisitions to the Bodleian Library that have their own documentation and 
standards that are separate from this service. Each client may also have their own policies on permissions 
and permissions workflow that are independent of each other. See section A5 for more information on 
policy and permissions development. 
Arkivum: In regards to service agreements between Arkivum and clients, there will be a contract between 
individual clients and Arkivum that articulate the clients’ product choice, workflow preferences, and 
additional storage space options (NJ Interview). Furthermore, according to Arkivum “Our operations at 
all sites, including our business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information security standards,” (FAQ, 
19) and Arkivum is regularly audited externally to maintain ISO 27001 certification and welcomes client 
audits as well (FAQ, 10). These certifications enable Arkivum to legally store ingested content. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool, not a storage space. Both the 
workflow and the content are not accessible to users who are not specifically the client developing and 
using the workflow. 
Evidence: Deposit agreements; records schedule; digital preservation policies; records legislation and 
policies; service agreements. 
A3.4 Repository is committed to formal, periodic review and assessment to ensure responsiveness to 
technological developments and evolving requirements. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: The official governance for this service has not yet been developed. Ideally the Steering Committee 
on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance committee that will review the contracts 
and funding options annually (NJ Interview). Information on this governance, contact information, and 
any updates or announcements will be provided on University web space in the IT Services space that 
will also be linked to the Bodleian homepage. The number of individuals in the University of Oxford who 
will be using the service will likely lead to a self-supporting committee that will further discuss use and 
policies (ST Interview).  
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Arkivum: Arkivum policy is under regular review as they aim to maintain data integrity by regular 
integrity checks and data migrations. See section A3.2 for more information, as well as Arkivum’s long-
term Data Integrity page. Arkivum is also ISO 27001 certified and “conforms to the controls within ISO 
27002 to maintain its certifications against ISO 27001” (Security Model). 
Archivematica: Archivematica seeks input from their user community. “We're constantly working with 
our community to improve the application, and all enhancements are bundled into our public releases. 
This means that whenever one person or institution contributes resources, the entire community benefits,” 
(Archivematica). Archivematica is also committed to updated format policies as standards evolve (FPR 
section), which they maintain my monitoring and reacting to community discussions. See section B2.7 for 
more information on the FPR. 
See the technologies’ mission statements in section A1.1. 
Evidence: A self-assessment schedule, timetables for review and certification; results of self-assessment; 
evidence of implementation of review outcomes. 
A3.5 Repository has policies and procedures to ensure that feedback from producers and users is 
sought and addressed over time. 
Audit Rating: 1 
DS: This section is not fully developed because web space has not yet been devoted to Digital Safe. The 
service will be built into the University of Oxford’s IT department, and a business and service model is a 
priority for Phase 3 of Digital Safe. Web space will be devoted to Digital Safe in the IT Services space 
that will also be linked to the Bodleian homepage. Ideally the webpage would have contact information 
for the governance committee or other local managing team who can assist in troubleshooting smaller 
issues and directing to training and Arkivum and Archivematica help pages (NJ Interview). This audit 
recommends that contact information and a Help and Feedback section are included in the University web 
space for the long-term. 
Arkivum: According to Arkivum policy, “The security and audit model above has been developed in 
partnership with Arkivum customers who have confirmed that the model meets their regulatory 
requirements as part of a due-diligence/audit process that they have conducted on Arkivum. This includes 
due-diligence by customers in clinical and financial sectors where regulation is strict” (Chain of Custody). 
There is also contact information at the bottom of every page on Arkivum. 
Archivematica: Archivematica was originally a project use case for OAIS to “process analysis to 
synthesize the specific, concrete steps that must be carried out to comply with the OAIS functional model 
from Ingest to Access.” This project expanded beyond OAIS into its current state as an open-source 
digital preservation workflow tool based on user feedback (Intro page). Clients do have to navigate to the 
manufacturer page in order to contact Artefactual for assistance.  See A3.4 for more information on their 
communication with their user community. 
Evidence: A policy that requires a feedback mechanism; a procedure that addresses how the repository 
seeks, captures, and documents responses to feedback; documentation of workflow for feedback (i.e., how 
feedback is used and managed); quality assurance records. 
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A3.6 Repository has a documented history of the changes to its operations, procedures, software, 
and hardware that, where appropriate, is linked to relevant preservation strategies and describes 
potential effects on preserving digital content. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Digital Safe will update any announcements and training material for the service, and the local 
governance committee will not have any documentation that will need regularly updated due to the 
sensitive information and privacy of the dark archives Digital Safe is providing. Digital Safe relies on 
Arkivum and Archivematica to handle obsolescence, migration, data integrity, and generating any new 
training materials. 
Arkivum: Arkivum regularly updates its materials, see section A3.2 and Arkivum’s long-term Data 
Integrity page. 
Archivematica: Archivematica has detailed Documentation of their tool on their website. See section 
A3.5 for information on their community. 
Evidence: Policies, procedures, and results of changes that affect all levels of the repository: objects, 
aggregations of objects; object-level preservation metadata; repository’s records retention strategy 
document. 
A3.7 Repository commits to transparency and accountability in all actions supporting the operation 
and management of the repository, especially those that affect the preservation of digital content 
over time. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Digital Safe is a service dedicated to allowing University of Oxford institutions the ability to store 
their high-security records and materials in a dark archive that utilizes the same technology University-
wide. Because the purpose is to securely store material and not to offer easy accessibility, transparent 
access is not applicable to this service. Though it does not yet exist, this audit recommends that 
University web space for Digital Safe is created to briefly describe the key users identified by phase 1 and 
briefly explain why accessibility is limited to the clients of the University. Other users outside of the 
University can utilize the platform and technologies, but without any benefits from accessing them via the 
University. 
Arkivum: Arkivum provides detailed Documentation on their website about their technology and 
processes on the Technical Overview page. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain their transparency 
and accountability and are not responsible if Arkivum does not. Access to materials will be strictly 
monitored. Individuals with the encryption keys, likely the Archivist or a similar position, will determine 
user access. These users will have Active Directory permissions that can be integrated into individual 
segments of the archive. All of the access is user-controlled, and these users will not be publishing their 
policies to anyone but their own staff. More information can be found in the FAQ on page 10. 
Archivematica: Archivematica has detailed Documentation of their tool on their website. Archivematica 
is a digital preservation workflow tool, not a storage space. Both the workflow and the content are not 
accessible to users who are not specifically the client developing and using the workflow. 
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Evidence: Comprehensive documentation that is readily accessible to stakeholders; unhindered access to 
content and associated information within repository. 
A3.8 Repository commits to defining, collecting, tracking, and providing, on demand, its 
information integrity measurements. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe is a service and bears no responsibility for materials being collected. Digital Safe also 
relies on Arkivum for all tracking, data integrity, and storage needs. 
Arkivum: In brief, Arkivum provides a workflow and safety measures for integrity. For Arkivum/1+1, 
one copy is stored in a secure data center and one copy is saved on LTO data tape in Escrow. For 
Arkivum/100, two copies are stored in secure, geographically separate data centers and one copy is saved 
on LTO data tape in Escrow. The files will retain their original file names. Checksums are used to ensure 
data is correct and complete after migration and during storage. In the case of network errors, the 
workflow ensures that the event (e.g. a transfer) and its progress is tracked, and any result that is not 
deemed successful is automatically repeated or queued until the network problem is solved. Safety checks 
are provided to clients to ensure nothing is deleted until the ingest process is completed. More 
information on Arkivum’s workflow and policies can be found on their Maintaining Data Integrity page. 
Arkivum also followed the LTO roadmap for storage obsolescence and aims to prevent data loss by 
determining what LTO generation their system is and introducing new generations well in advance to any 
system failure. Escrow copies are also migrated every five years to prevent data loss. More information 
on their workflow and policies can be found on Arkivum’s long-term Data Integrity.  
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum, and the content is only accessible by the client importing it. Archivematica is integrated with 
Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, which will be built into the contract between the University and 
Arkivum, and is therefore protected by the security measures of Arkivum.  
Evidence: An implemented registry system; a definition of the repository’s integrity measurements; 
documentation of the procedures and mechanisms for integrity measurements; an audit system for 
collecting, tracking, and presenting integrity measurements; procedures for responding to results of 
integrity measurements that indicate digital content is at risk; policy and workflow documentation. 
A3.9 Repository commits to a regular schedule of self-assessment and certification and, if certified, 
commits to notifying certifying bodies of operational changes that will change or nullify its 
certification status. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Digital Safe does not require certification as it is a service provided by the University via an 
outsourced service. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain its ISO 27001 certification and regular 
audit checks of data, methods, technology, and physical locations certification and recognizes a breach in 
contract if Arkivum does not maintain certification.  
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Digital Safe will update the University web space with any new general policies, training material, and 
news and announcements. 
Arkivum: Arkivum is ISO 27001 certified and “conforms to the controls within ISO 27002 to maintain its 
certifications against ISO 27001” (Security Model). Additionally, “The data centres used by Arkivum are 
Tier 2 or Tier 3 and are ISO 27001 certified or have FACT accreditation. They are inspected by Arkivum 
on a regular basis and have also been inspected by our ISO 27001 auditor” (Security Model). Other 
audited sections include the production system access, building access, and logical access to data. For 
more information, see Arkivum’s Security Model page. The Escrow copy is the backup for any data loss 
or corruption. If there is any data loss in the data centers or if Arkivum Limited should cease to operate, 
the LTO tapes are delivered to the client. 
Should Archivematica cease to exist, the contract between the University and Arkivum will need to be 
reviewed. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool and not a storage service, and in the 
event of Archivematica ceasing to operate, there would be no chance of data loss. If Archivematica 
requires an update, more information can be found in their Installing from packages section. 
Evidence: Completed, dated audit checklists from self-assessment or objective audit; certificates awarded 
for certification; presence in a certification register (when available); timetable or budget allocation for 
future certification. 
A4. Financial sustainability 
A4.1 Repository has short- and long-term business planning processes in place to sustain the 
repository over time. 
Audit rating: 1 
DS: This section has not yet been developed. A cost model is a priority for phase 3 (PID, 2) and will 
determine the start-up costs only. The success of phase 3 will determine and long-term cost model based 
on the contract between the University of Oxford and Arkivum, and the support from the University for 
the service.  
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The projected expense report for Phase 3 includes the following factors (Phase 3 PID, 12) but does omit 
any information on the actual budget for the project for the sake of confidentiality: 
Expense type  
1. IT Services internal staff  
2. Non-IT Services staff  
3. Hardware, software, training and equipment / 
storage 
(Archivum)  
 
4. Advertising, consumables and room bookings  
Total project cost  
0.5% charge for PMO  
Contingency at 8.5% (according to Monte Carlo 
Simulation) 
 
Total project costs, including PMO and 
contingency 
 
Forecast on-going charges, per year  
Table 1 Projected Expense report outlining expense types for Phase 3 
As based on the NSMS example, this service will be based on the cost recovery model. According to the 
Phase 3 PID, “The cost recovery solution will encompass the recovery of; all third-party charges, the local 
FTE resource needed to manage and maintain this service, and any local costs towards the infrastructure 
and power needed to run this service” (12).  
Arkivum: Arkivum does not publish their financial reports, business plans, or blank contracts. However, 
Arkivum has several well-known institutions as clients, including the Museum of Modern Art, University 
of Westminster, and the Oxford Molecular Diagnostics Centre, among many others noted in case studies 
on their website that have been successful. Their Solutions tab offers several reports and case studies in 
various fields, such as Higher Education, that are evidence of success. 
Archivematica: Archivematica does not publish their financial reports or business plans. Archivematica is 
an open-source tool and therefore does not charge clients. However, they provide paid services, including 
storage, training, technical support, all noted on their Services page. In the long-term, they have had 
several successful clients list on their Clients page. 
Evidence: Operating plans; financial reports; budgets; financial audit reports; annual financial reports; 
financial forecasts; business plans; audit procedures and calendars; evidence of comparable institutions; 
exposure of business plan to scenarios. 
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A4.2 Repository has in place processes to review and adjust business plans at least annually. 
Audit Rating: 1 
DS: The official governance for this service has not yet been developed. Ideally the Steering Committee 
on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance committee that will review the contracts 
and funding options annually See section A3.4 for more information. 
Arkivum: Arkivum policy is under regular review as they aim to maintain data integrity by regular 
integrity checks and data migrations. See section A3.2 and A3.4 for more information, as well as 
Arkivum’s Data Integrity page. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is continuously evolving as standards develop and evolve, and relies on 
their community to help steer the tool in the most useful direction. “We're constantly working with our 
community to improve the application, and all enhancements are bundled into our public releases. This 
means that whenever one person or institution contributes resources, the entire community benefits,” 
(Archivematica). 
Evidence: Business plans, audit planning (e.g., scope, schedule, process, and requirements) and results; 
financial forecasts; recent audits and evidence of impact on repository operating procedures. 
A4.3 Repository’s financial practices and procedures are transparent, compliant with relevant 
accounting standards and practices, and audited by third parties in accordance with territorial 
legal requirements. 
Audit Rating: 1 
DS: Funding has not yet been secured. Start-up funding is a priority for Phase 3 (PID, 2). Ideally the 
Steering Committee on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance committee that will 
review the contracts and funding options annually. See section A3.4 and A4.1 for more information. 
Arkivum: Arkivum does not publish their financial reports, business plans, or blank contracts. The 
relationship between the client and Arkivum will be dictated by a contract. Given the number of clients 
the University would bring to Arkivum there may be a discount for Arkivum and Archivematica service. 
The benefits to this service will be outlined in the policies for University clients. 
Archivematica: Archivematica does not publish their financial reports or business plans. Archivematica is 
an open-source tool and therefore does not charge clients. However, they provide paid services, including 
storage, training, technical support, all noted on their Services page.  
Evidence: Demonstrated dissemination requirements for business planning and practices; citations to 
and/or examples of accounting and audit requirements, standards, and practice; evidence of financial 
audits already taking place. 
A4.4 Repository has ongoing commitment to analyze and report on risk, benefit, investment, and 
expenditure (including assets, licenses, and liabilities). 
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Audit Rating: 1 
DS: Funding has not yet been secured for the short or long-term. Start-up funding is a priority for Phase 3 
(PID, 2). Ideally the Steering Committee on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance 
committee that will review the contracts and funding options annually. See section A3.4 and A4.1 for 
more information. 
Arkivum: As they are a private business, Arkivum does not publish their financial reports, business plans, 
or blank contracts.  
Archivematica: Archivematica does not publish their financial reports or business plans. 
Evidence: Risk management documents that identify perceived and potential threats and planned or 
implemented responses (a risk register); technology infrastructure investment planning documents; 
cost/benefit analyses; financial investment documents and portfolios; requirements for and examples of 
licenses, contracts, and asset management; evidence of revision based on risk. 
A4.5 Repository commits to monitoring for and bridging gaps in funding. 
Audit Rating: 0 
DS: Funding has not yet been secured for the short or long-term. Start-up funding is a priority for Phase 3 
(PID, 2). Ideally the Steering Committee on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance 
committee that will review the contracts and funding options annually. See section A3.4 for more 
information. 
Arkivum: Arkivum relies on Digital Safe service to monetarily commit to the agreed upon contract. 
Archivematica: Archivum relies on Digital Safe service to monetarily commit to the agreed upon 
contract. 
Evidence: Fiscal and fiduciary policies, procedures, protocols, requirements; budgets and financial 
analysis documents; fiscal calendars; business plan(s); any evidence of active monitoring and 
preparedness. 
A5. Contracts, licenses, & liabilities 
Audit Rating: 0 
This entire section cannot be audited as no contracts or liabilities exist yet. A priority of Phase 3 of Digital 
Safe will be in finalizing the contract with Arkivum and in determining any preservation rights and 
copyrights. Services that are part of the library may come under the Heritage Institution exception for the 
right to change objects and make copies, which would occur in the regular migration of data in Arkivum 
and in any Archivematica workflow the data is pushed through. Though much of the material may be 
produced by the clients at the University (e.g. financial records, etc.), some of BEAM’s content may 
apply to the exception. 
A5.1 If repository manages, preserves, and/or provides access to digital materials on behalf of 
another organization, it has and maintains appropriate contracts or deposit agreements. 
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Evidence: Deposit agreements; policies on third-party deposit arrangements; contracts; definitions of 
service levels; Web archiving policies; procedure for reviewing and maintaining agreements, contracts, 
and licenses. 
A5.2 Repository contracts or deposit agreements must specify and transfer all necessary 
preservation rights, and those rights transferred must be documented. 
Evidence: Contracts, deposit agreements; specification(s) of rights transferred for different types of 
digital content (if applicable); policy statement on requisite preservation rights. 
A5.3 Repository has specified all appropriate aspects of acquisition, maintenance, access, and 
withdrawal in written agreements with depositors and other relevant parties. 
Evidence: Submission agreements/deposit agreements/deeds of gift; written standard operating 
procedures. 
A5.4 Repository tracks and manages intellectual property rights and restrictions on use of 
repository content as required by deposit agreement, contract, or license. 
Evidence: A policy statement that defines and specifies the repository’s requirements and process for 
managing intellectual property rights; depositor agreements; samples of agreements and other 
documents that specify and address intellectual property rights; demonstrable way to monitor intellectual 
property; results from monitoring. 
A5.5 If repository ingests digital content with unclear ownership/rights, policies are in place to 
address liability and challenges to those rights. 
Evidence: A definition of rights; citations for relevant laws and requirements; policy on responding to 
challenges; documented track record for responding to challenges in ways that do not inhibit 
preservation; examples of legal advice sought and received. 
  
B. Digital Object Management 
Average Rating: 3.5/4 
B1. Ingest: acquisition of content 
B1.1 Repository identifies properties it will preserve for digital objects. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: The metadata fields that Digital Safe recommends the clients’ preserve are: Title, Description, 
Creator(s), ID Type, ID Value, Retention review date, Retention rationale, Resource type, Technical 
description(s), Covering date(s), Finding aid(s), Rights & Licensing information (ICTF powerpoint). It is 
ultimately the client’s decision what properties are preserved. 
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Arkivum: Arkivum only requires a file for anything to be ingested. Arkivum has no responsibility for 
anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to upload any additional information. 
Arkivum can ingest any file format and will maintain a copy of the original file alongside a normalized 
file. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is an open-source workflow tool that can be integrated with Arkivum via 
Arkivum’s A-Stor, and which will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum. To see 
more about the integration of Arkivum with Archivematica, see their Storage Services page.  
Archivematica allows users to do various archival activities, including adding metadata in Dublin Core, 
adding rights in PREMIS, data normalization, AIP storage, DIP storage, communication with other tools 
(e.g. Archivist’s Toolkit, ArchiveSpace, Arkivum), among many other options that can be explored in 
Archivematica’s Documentation.  
A SIP begins as a transfer. “In Archivematica, Transfer is the process of transforming any set of digital 
objects and/or directories into a SIP. Transformation may include appraisal, arrangement, description and 
identification of donor restricted, private or confidential contents. The Transfer tab prepares your content 
for preservation in Archivematica” (Transfer). A transfer can be created with submission documentation, 
existing checksums, or an existing METS structmap. The transfer will be processed through several 
micro-services, as described in the Transfer process. This is then ingested into Archivematica after the 
green light is given to the client. 
The client will be able to develop their own workflow and to define their own preserved properties based 
on their individual policies. Digital Safe can recommend best practices, though ultimately the decision of 
what and how to archive information will be determined by the client. 
Evidence:  Mission statement; submission agreements/deposit agreements/deeds of gift; workflow and 
policy documents, including written definition of properties as agreed in the deposit agreement/deed of 
gift; written processing procedures; documentation of properties to be preserved. 
B1.2 Repository clearly specifies the information that needs to be associated with digital material at 
the time of its deposit (i.e., SIP). 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe can recommend best practices but cannot dictate a client’s policies. Recommendation for 
clients will be available on the Digital Safe website once it is developed. See section B1.1 for more 
information. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum has no responsibility for anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to 
upload any additional information. If the client chooses to use the integrated Archivematica tool they may 
also employ digital preservation practices. See section B1.1 for more information. 
Archivematica: Archivematica enables the client to create or submit a transfer that will then be made a 
SIP. More details can be found in their documentation on the Create a SIP page and Transfer page. This 
includes arranging SIPs, adding metadata, adding PREMIS rights, normalizing, and transcribing SIPs 
using the Tesseract OCR tool (Ingest). See section B1.1 for more information. 
Evidence:  Transfer requirements; producer-archive agreements. 
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B1.3 Repository has mechanisms to authenticate the source of all materials. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Authentication will be the entire responsibility of the client. The content will likely comprise of files 
created by the client, e.g. student records, financial records, etc., and legal permissions are moot. Other 
material may be acquisitions to the Bodleian Library that have their own documentation and standards 
that are separate from this service. Each client may also have their own policies on permissions and 
permissions workflows that are independent of each other. 
Arkivum: In regards to service agreements between Arkivum and clients, there will be a contract between 
individual clients and Arkivum that articulate the clients’ product choice, workflow preferences, and 
additional storage space options. Furthermore, according to Arkivum “Our operations at all sites, 
including our business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information security standards,” (FAQ, 19) and 
Arkivum is regularly audited externally to maintain ISO 27001 certification and welcomes client audits as 
well (FAQ, 10). These certifications enable Arkivum to legally hold ingested content. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool and not a storage space, and has no 
responsibility regarding the content authentication. 
Evidence:  Submission agreements/deposit agreements/deeds of gift; workflow documents; evidence of 
appropriate technological measures; logs from procedures and authentications. 
B1.4 Repository’s ingest process verifies each submitted object (i.e., SIP) for completeness and 
correctness as specified in B1.2. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client to submit and on Arkivum to retain and retrieve complete and correct 
files. 
Arkivum: Checksums are used to verify that each file is correct and complete. For Arkivum/100 there is 
also the added security of the checksums generated by Arkivum being compared to the client’s 
checksums, though this is not included in the Arkivum/1+1 product. The multiple copies of data and 
active data verification via annual data integrity checks complete the workflow to ensure that the data is 
correct. See Arkivum’s archiving process for more information (Stage 2, Archiving Process). 
Clients are also notified at what stage their data is at during ingestion using a “traffic light system” where 
Red indicates that the client copy must not be deleted; Amber indicates that the ingested files are at the 
Arkivum data centers; and Green indicates that the ingested files are replicated and protected in the 
prescribed data center(s) and in escrow and that the client file can be deleted. See the FAQ for more 
information (FAQ, 17). 
Archivematica: The completion of all processes in Archivematica are indicated by color and text. Green 
indicates that a process has been completed successfully, and red indicates that the process has not been 
completed successfully. A client can search for content when by its name. Archivematica’s naming 
system will retain the original name of the transfer unless a new name has been assigned to the SIP upon 
creation. This name will be combined with a Universal Unique Identifier that is generated and assigned 
during SIP formation (AIP Structure). 
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Evidence:  Appropriate policy documents and system log files from system performing ingest procedure; 
formal or informal “acquisitions register” of files received during the transfer and ingest process; 
workflow, documentation of standard operating procedures, detailed procedures; definition of 
completeness and correctness, probably incorporated in policy documents. 
B1.5 Repository obtains sufficient physical control over the digital objects to preserve them. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe is a service and therefore has no responsibility for the control of the content uploaded to 
Arkivum. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain and implement their storage policies. The service 
can recommend best practices and assist in troubleshooting. 
Arkivum: Arkivum maintains high security both digital and physically. According to their FAQ 
documentation. “All copies of customer data are held in secure UK storage locations. Storage facilities 
are manned at all hours and access is strictly restricted to a list of named, trained and vetted members of 
the Arkivum Operations team. Our operations at all sites, including our business offices, is certified to 
ISO 27001 information security standards…escrow. In addition to ISO27001 certification and industry 
best practice for security, our customer base includes people using our service to store personal data 
including voice call recordings and medical treatment records. They have audited our service and satisfied 
themselves that our service is secure and meets their regulatory and legislative obligations” (FAQ, 19). 
Data is also encrypted once it leaves the client’s network and passes through a secure VPN before 
entering a data center. The Escrow copy is located based on the contract between the client and Arkivum 
(FAQ, 5). For more information, see the FAQ documentation. 
The client also has access to the data during the ingest process. According to their documentation, the 
client can “go in and get the files back with the same name and path that they used when they originally 
provided the data” (Technical Overview). 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool and not a storage service. 
Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, which will be built into the contract 
between the University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by the security measures of Arkivum. 
Once the data is through the workflow it is transferred to Arkivum storage space and is fully under their 
security. 
Evidence:  Submission agreements/deposit agreements/deeds of gift; workflow documents; system log 
files from the system performing ingest procedures; logs of files captured during Web harvesting. 
B1.6 Repository provides producer/depositor with appropriate responses at predefined points 
during the ingest processes. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to notify the clients of progress and ingest impletion.  
Arkivum: Clients are notified at what stage their data is at during ingestion using a “traffic light system” 
where Red indicates that the client copy must not be deleted; Amber indicates that the ingested files are at 
the Arkivum data centers; and Green indicates that the ingested files are replicated and protected in the 
prescribed data center(s) and in escrow and that the client file can be deleted. See the FAQ for more 
information (FAQ, 17). 
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Archivematica: The completion of all processes in Archivematica are indicated by color and text. Green 
indicates that a process has been completed successfully, and red indicates that the process has not been 
completed successfully (AIP Structure).  
Evidence:  Submission agreements/deposit agreements/deeds of gift; workflow documentation; standard 
operating procedures; evidence of “reporting back.” 
B1.7 Repository can demonstrate when preservation responsibility is formally accepted for the 
contents of the submitted data objects (i.e., SIPs). 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to notify the clients of progress and ingest completion. As the service 
is not yet active, there are no examples to test this process. 
Arkivum: Arkivum provides a “Green light” upon a successful ingest completion that indicates the 
ingested files are replicated and protected in the prescribed data center(s) and in escrow and that the client 
file can be deleted. See the FAQ for more information (FAQ, 17) or the archiving process page (Stage 6, 
Archiving Process). 
Archivematica: See the response for section B1.6 for information on process completion. 
Evidence:  Submission agreements/deposit agreements/deeds of gift; confirmation receipt sent back to 
producer. 
B1.8 Repository has contemporaneous records of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (Ingest: content acquisition). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe does not bear any responsibility for logging actions of content. Digital Safe does the use 
of audit trails recommend to clients, though the use of audit trails is determined by the client. 
Arkivum: Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and specified by the client 
upon contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable XML format through Arkivum 
REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are also accessible in human readable 
PDF/A format through the Arkivum Service web interface or through an API call. Audit trails in PDF/A 
format can be signed if necessary to show that they were generated by Arkivum Service.” More detailed 
information concerning audit trails can be found at their Audit Trails page.  
Archivematica: Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more 
information about Archivematica’s fixity program. The client has complete control over the workflow 
process and can monitor at what stage the content is in as it moves through the workflow and once a client 
has established their digital preservation workflow, this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP 
also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information 
(AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Written documentation of decisions and/or action taken; preservation metadata logged, 
stored, and linked to pertinent digital objects. 
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B2. Ingest: creation of the archival package 
B2.1 Repository has an identifiable, written definition for each AIP or class of information 
preserved by the repository. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and Archivematica to create AIPs, and on Archivematica to store and 
retrieve AIPs. 
Arkivum: The AIP is determined by the client as they choose what archival processes are a part of their 
workflow. Arkivum is designed to hold AIPs. “The persistent file/folder mechanism within the Arkivum 
service offers excellent support for the storage of AIPs. The file will retain its original filename, and 
checksums are provided for incorporation in the Preservation Description Information (PDI) for the AIP. 
The service follows the OAIS model for Archive Storage through use of replication, fixity monitoring and 
repair, disaster recovery, migration, and tiered storage to deliver a specified level of performance, 
availability and integrity of storage” (Integration with Other Systems).  
Archivematica: If the client decides to utilize the Archivematica tool they may choose to create and 
package an AIP. The client must determine the processing configuration, which can be left at 
Archivematica’s default setting, or can be created by the client. See Archivematica’s Processing 
Configuration documentation for more details.   
After configuring the process as desired, the SIP can be normalized and stored in an AIP. “After 
normalization is approved, the SIP runs through a number of micro-services, including processing of the 
submission documentation, generation of the METS file, indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging 
of the AIP,” which is packaged according to Bagit specifications (AIP Storage). Detailed information on 
the structure of the AIP can be found in Archivematica’s AIP Structure documentation. The client may 
review the AIP and proceed to storing the AIP.  
AIP reingest is also an option if the client wishes to add information (e.g. metadata and data 
normalization) after the SIP process, which can be found in their AIP Reingest documentation.  
Evidence:  Documentation identifying each class of AIP and describing how each is implemented within 
the repository. Implementations may, for example, involve some combination of files, databases, and/or 
documents. 
B2.2 Repository has a definition of each AIP (or class) that is adequate to fit long-term preservation 
needs. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and Archivematica to create AIPs, and on Archivematica to store and 
retrieve AIPs. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum has no responsibility for anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to 
upload any additional information. If the client chooses to use the integrated Archivematica tool they may 
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also employ digital preservation practices. See section B1.1 for more information on metadata, and 
section A1.2 for information on their storage process and security measures. 
Archivematica: If the client chooses to use the Archivematica tool and creates a SIP, the data can also be 
normalized for AIP packaging. There are five options for normalization. For more detailed information, 
see:  
 section B2.1  
 section B2.3 
 Archivematica’s AIP Storage 
 Archivematica’s Normalization process 
 Archivematica’s Preservation Planning strategies  
Evidence:  Documentation that relates the AIP component’s contents to the related preservation needs of 
the repository, with enough detail for the repository's providers and consumers to be confident that the 
significant properties of AIPs will be preserved. 
B2.3 Repository has a description of how AIPs are constructed from SIPs.  
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and Archivematica to create AIPs, and on Archivematica to store and 
retrieve AIPs. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum has no responsibility for anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to 
upload any additional information. If the client chooses to use the integrated Archivematica tool they may 
also employ digital preservation practices. See section B1.1 for more information. 
Archivematica: If the client chooses to use the Archivematica tool and creates a transfer and a SIP, the 
data can also be normalized for AIP packaging. “After normalization is approved, the SIP runs through a 
number of micro-services, including processing of the submission documentation, generation of the 
METS file, indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging of the AIP,” which is packaged according to 
Bagit specifications The AIP and any additional METS and PREMIS files can be downloaded during this 
stage if needed. For more detailed information, see section B2.1, B2.2, and Archivematica’s AIP Storage 
documentation.  
Evidence:  Process description documents; documentation of SIP relationship to AIP; clear 
documentation of how AIPs are derived from SIPs; documentation of standard/process against which 
normalization occurs; documentation of normalization outcome and how outcome is different from SIP. 
B2.4 Repository can demonstrate that all submitted objects (i.e., SIPs) are either accepted as whole 
or part of an eventual archival object (i.e., AIP), or otherwise disposed of in a recorded fashion. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and Archivematica to create AIPs, and on Archivematica to store and 
retrieve AIPs. 
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Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum has no responsibility for anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to 
upload any additional information. If the client chooses to use the integrated Archivematica tool they may 
also employ digital preservation practices. See section B1.1 for more information. 
Archivematica: Once the SIP has been created, reviewed, and saved, the normalization process occurs. 
The client can review and accept or reject the SIP during the normalization stage, as well as review and 
accept or reject the normalization. “After normalization is approved, the SIP runs through a number of 
micro-services, including processing of the submission documentation, generation of the METS file, 
indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging of the AIP,” which is packaged according to Bagit 
specifications. For more detailed information, see section B1.2, B2.1, B2.2, and Archivematica’s AIP 
Storage documentation. 
Evidence:  System processing files; disposal records; donor or depositor agreements/deeds of gift; 
provenance tracking system; system log files. 
B2.5 Repository has and uses a naming convention that generates visible, persistent, unique 
identifiers for all archived objects (i.e., AIPs). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and the technologies to create and organize identifiers for all archived 
objects. 
Arkivum: The uploaded files will retain their original file names. Checksums are used to ensure data is 
correct and complete after migration and during storage (Stage 2, Archiving Process). Other naming 
systems may be generated by Archivematica. 
Archivematica: Archivematica’s naming system will retain the original name of the transfer unless a new 
name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation. This name will be combined with a Universal Unique 
Identifier that is generated and assigned during SIP formation. For more detailed information on this and 
the structure of the AIP, see the AIP Structure page.  
Evidence:  Documentation describing naming convention and physical evidence of its application (e.g., 
logs). 
B2.6 If unique identifiers are associated with SIPs before ingest, the repository preserves the 
identifiers in a way that maintains a persistent association with the resultant archived object (e.g., 
AIP). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and the technologies to create and organize identifiers for all archived 
objects. 
Arkivum: The uploaded files will retain their original file names. Checksums are used to ensure data is 
correct and complete after migration and during storage (Stage 2, Archiving Process). Other naming 
systems may be generated by Archivematica. 
93 
 
Archivematica: Archivematica’s naming system will automatically retain the original name of the transfer 
unless a new name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation. This name will be combined with a 
Universal Unique Identifier that is generated and assigned during SIP formation. For more detailed 
information on this and the structure of the AIP, see the AIP Structure page. Ultimately it is the decision 
of the client to retain the original name or generate a new one upon SIP creation. 
Evidence:  Workflow documents and evidence of traceability (e.g., SIP identifier embedded in AIP, 
mapping table of SIP IDs to AIPs). 
B2.7 Repository demonstrates that it has access to necessary tools and resources to establish 
authoritative Representation Information of the digital objects it contains. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client and the technologies to create and organize metadata for all archived 
objects. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Additionally, “the main challenge in [Arkivum’s] view is with discipline specific data formats, e.g. data 
collected from laboratory equipment, environmental sensor data, numerical simulations etc. Here bespoke 
or proprietary formats are often used. Whether these formats are at risk or not depends on whether the 
institution that has created the data, or will use data, has the necessary skills and tools to read the data and 
can maintain this capability. This can vary hugely between institutions even for the same data format,” 
(FAQ, 23). If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica can determine file formats and 
normalize. 
Archivematica: Archivematica contains a Format Policy Registry (FPR) that contains the default format 
policies and is maintained by Artefactual Systems, Inc (which as of July, 2016 does not have a public 
interface yet. See B2.8 for more information). This system also allows for clients to define their format 
policies in a local FPR that is accessible via the FPR server maintained by Artefactual. Archivematica is 
also committed to updated format policies as standards evolve; “A format policy indicates the actions, 
tools and settings to apply to a digital object of a particular format (e.g. conversion to preservation format, 
conversion to access format, extraction of package formats). Format policies will change over time as 
local and community standards, practices and tools evolve” (FPR section). For additional information on 
the FPR and configuring a local FPR, see the Preservation Planning page, and the full FPR page.  
Evidence: "Evidence: Subscription or access to such registries; association of unique identifiers to 
registries of Representation Information (including format registries); Viewable records in local 
registries (with persistent links to digital objects); database records that include Representation 
Information and a persistent link to relevant digital objects. 
B2.8 Repository records/registers Representation Information (including formats) ingested. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to document the Representation Information for digital objects. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum can ingest any file format, but does not record their representation information. If the client 
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chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica can determine file formats and normalize using their 
Format Policy Registry, as well as creating SIPs and AIPs for record this process.  
Archivematica: Archivematica contains a Format Policy Registry (FPR) that contains the default format 
policies and is maintained by Artefactual Systems, Inc. The latest version, FPR 1.4, does not have a 
public interface yet. There is a Public Roadmap wiki page outlining the development planning for a 
public interface. For clients who “expect to be writing/altering commands, implementing new tools, etc.,” 
the FPR main page provides detailed directs on configuring and editing FPR policies.   
Evidence:  Viewable records in local format registry (with persistent links to digital objects); local 
metadata registry(ies); database records that include Representation Information and a persistent link to 
relevant digital objects. 
B2.9 Repository has documented processes for acquiring preservation metadata (i.e., PDI) for its 
associated Content Information and acquires preservation metadata in accordance with the 
documented processes. The repository must maintain viewable documentation on how the 
repository acquires and manages Preservation Description Information (PDI). 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe bears no responsibility for metadata acquisition or preservation and relies on the client to 
provide their own metadata, Archivematica to process the meta, and on Arkivum to store the metadata. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). If the 
client chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica can ingest metadata and also has the option to 
generate metadata using Dublin Core standards. 
Though Arkivum is not responsible for any digital preservation documentation, once the content has been 
imported into Arkivum, Arkivum does offer audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and 
specified by the client upon contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable XML 
format through Arkivum REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are also 
accessible in human readable PDF/A format through the Arkivum Service web interface or through an 
API call. Audit trails in PDF/A format can be signed if necessary to show that they were generated by 
Arkivum Service.” More detailed information can be found on their Audit Trails page.  
Archivematica: The client controls what metadata, if any, is ingested. Once a transfer has been created 
and processed into a SIP in Archivematica the client may also import their own metadata (Import 
Metadata), or they may create their metadata in in Archivematica using Dublin Core standards (Add 
Metadata). This can occur before or after the normalization process. The client can also add PREMIS 
rights (PREMIS Rights). After normalization and during AIP storage, the AIP may also be downloaded. 
The client has complete control over the workflow process and can monitor at what stage the content is in 
as it moves through the workflow and once a client has established their digital preservation workflow, 
this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, 
normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Viewable documentation on how the repository acquires and manages Preservation 
Description Information (PDI). 
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B2.10 Repository has a documented process for testing understandability of the information 
content and bringing the information content up to the agreed level of understandability. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: The technologies chosen for Digital Safe were researched by the project team in Phase 2, which 
consisted of Knowledge Engineers, University Archivists, Technical Consultants, and Senior Users from 
the University. The project team for Phase 3 will be tracking the early adopters use of the service, which 
will determine what recommendations Digital Safe provides for the clients. Digital Safe will provide 
training for the service and act as a local manager of the service, including providing updated training 
materials and regular training sessions (PID, 19). Arkivum or Archivematica may need to be consulted for 
complex issues. See section A2.3 for more information. 
Arkivum: In regards to imported content, Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital 
preservation (FAQ, 23). If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica has detailed 
instructions in their Documentation.  
Arkivum is dedicated to regularly reviewing evolving technology and policies and implementing them 
accordingly. Arkivum also relies on customer feedback and client audits, stating that, “The security and 
audit model above has been developed in partnership with Arkivum customers who have confirmed that 
the model meets their regulatory requirements as part of a due-diligence/audit process that they have 
conducted on Arkivum. This includes due-diligence by customers in clinical and financial sectors where 
regulation is strict” (Audit Trails). 
Access to Arkivum material after it has been processed by Archivematica is via an on-site gateway 
application, which requires little technical experience. More information on access to Arkivum can be 
found in their FAQ document, beginning on page 14 of Version 2.2. Arkivum may offer additional 
training and materials in their contract with the University of Oxford but will not ultimately be 
responsible for the clients’ understanding of Archivematica. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is open-source and provides generous documentation and instructions for 
every available option. See their Documentation page for more details. They also have various 
documentation on Error Handling and Error Reporting. See section A3.2 for information on their 
interaction with their user community. 
Evidence:  Retention of individuals with the discipline expertise; periodic assembly of designated or 
outside community members to evaluate and identify additional required metadata. 
B2.11 Repository verifies each AIP for completeness and correctness at the point it is generated. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to store and protect the AIP; on Archivematica to carry out the AIP 
generation and storage correctly and completely; and on the client for following due instructions on AIP 
generation and review. Digital Safe can offer recommendations but responsibility ultimately falls on the 
client. 
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Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). If the 
client chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica is responsible for carry out the AIP process 
completely and correctly.   
Once materials have been archived in Arkivum, Arkivum offers audit trails as a service, which will log 
any failures and successes. These must be turned on and specified by the client upon contract agreement. 
Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable XML format through Arkivum REST API calls, either on 
a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are also accessible in human readable PDF/A format through the 
Arkivum Service web interface or through an API call. Audit trails in PDF/A format can be signed if 
necessary to show that they were generated by Arkivum Service.” More detailed information can be 
found on their Audit Trails page. 
Archivematica: A SIP is generated from the transfer created by the client (see Transfer page) and then 
ultimately approved by the client. See section B1.1 for more information. Once a SIP has been created in 
Archivematica it “runs through a number of micro-services, including processing of the submission 
documentation, generation of the METS file, indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging of the AIP,” 
which is packaged according to Bagit specifications (Store AIP), after which the client may review and/or 
download the AIP and its contents. The client may then choose to remove or store the AIP after review. 
The completion of all processes in Archivematica are indicated by color and text. Green indicates that a 
process has been completed successfully, and red indicates that the process has not been completed 
successfully. 
Archivematica also utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. “Archivematica generates checksums upon 
transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those checksums before storing the AIP. It is also 
possible to include pre-existing checksums, which Archivematica will also verify. To check fixity of AIPs 
in storage, Artefactual has written a separate command-line app called Fixity (Archivematica FAQs).  
The client has complete control over the workflow process and can monitor at what stage the content is in 
as it moves through the workflow and once a client has established their digital preservation workflow, 
this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, 
normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Description of the procedure that verifies completeness and correctness; logs of the 
procedure. 
B2.12 Repository provides an independent mechanism for audit of the integrity of the repository 
collection/content. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkvium to maintain its ISO 27001 certification and regular audit checks of 
data, methods, technology, and physical locations, and recognizes a breach in contract if Arkivum does 
not maintain certification. 
Arkivum: Arkivum is ISO 27001 certified and “conforms to the controls within ISO 27002 to maintain its 
certifications against ISO 27001” (Security Model). Additionally, “The data centres used by Arkivum are 
Tier 2 or Tier 3 and are ISO 27001 certified or have FACT accreditation. They are inspected by Arkivum 
on a regular basis and have also been inspected by our ISO 27001 auditor” (Security Model). Other 
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audited sections include the production system access, building access, and logical access to data. For 
more information, see Arkivum’s security model page (Security Model). 
Additionally, Arkivum does not allow the editing of files once they are uploaded. “Arkivum provides an 
archiving service and an important feature is that once files are written to the 
archive then they become immutable. This is commonly known as WORM (Write Once Ready Many) 
and is a feature of many archive systems to ensure the integrity and authenticity of content. This means 
that once a file is written into our archive then it cannot be changed, for example edited to create a new 
version. If multiple versions of the same file need to be kept then they will need to be stored as separate 
files,” (FAQ, 22).  
Furthermore, checksums are used to verify that each file is correct and complete. For Arkivum/100 there 
is also the added security of the checksums generated by Arkivum being compared to the client’s 
checksums, though this is not included in the Arkivum/1+1 product. The multiple copies of data and 
active data verification via annual data integrity checks complete the workflow to ensure that the data is 
correct. See Arkivum’s archiving process for more information (Stage 2, Archiving Process). 
Finally, Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and specified by the client upon 
contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable XML format through Arkivum 
REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are also accessible in human readable 
PDF/A format through the Arkivum Service web interface or through an API call. Audit trails in PDF/A 
format can be signed if necessary to show that they were generated by Arkivum Service.” More detailed 
information can be found on their Audit Trails page.  
Archivematica: Archivematica utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. “Archivematica generates 
checksums upon transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those checksums before storing the 
AIP. It is also possible to include pre-existing checksums which Archivematica will also verify. To check 
fixity of AIPs in storage, Artefactual has written a separate command-line app called Fixity 
(Archivematica FAQs). Clients and other organizations may also conduct a software audit on 
Archivematica.  
The client has complete control over the workflow process and can monitor at what stage the content is in 
as it moves through the workflow and once a client has established their digital preservation workflow, 
this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, 
normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). 
Once content leaves Archivematica after client approval and is imported into Arkivum, Archivematica no 
longer bears responsibility to perform fixity checks. 
All: See section B2.1-B2.6 for additional information. 
Evidence:  Documentation provided for B2.1 through B2.6; documented agreements negotiated between 
the producer and the repository (see B 1.1-B1.9); logs of material received and associated action 
(receipt, action, etc.) dates; logs of periodic checks. 
B2.13 Repository has contemporaneous records of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (AIP creation). 
Audit Rating: 4 
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DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkvium to maintain its ISO 27001 certification and regular audit checks of 
data, methods, technology, and physical locations, and recognizes a breach in contract if Arkivum does 
not maintain certification. Digital Safe can recommend best practices to clients, but ultimately the client 
chooses to use audit trails on their data. 
Arkivum: Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and specified by the client 
upon contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable XML format through Arkivum 
REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are also accessible in human readable 
PDF/A format through the Arkivum Service web interface or through an API call. Audit trails in PDF/A 
format can be signed if necessary to show that they were generated by Arkivum Service.” More detailed 
information can be found on their Audit Trails page.  
Archivematica: Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more 
information about Archivematica’s fixity program. The client has complete control over the workflow 
process and can monitor at what stage the content is in as it moves through the workflow and once a client 
has established their digital preservation workflow, this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP 
also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information 
(AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Written documentation of decisions and/or action taken; preservation metadata logged, 
stored, and linked to pertinent digital objects. 
B3. Preservation planning 
B3.1 Repository has documented preservation strategies. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe has bears no responsibility for the choice in preservation strategies of the client. Digital 
Safe can recommend best practices for using Arkivum and Archivematica, but ultimately it is the 
responsibility of the client. 
Arkivum: Arkivum follows the LTO roadmap for storage obsolescence and aims to prevent data loss by 
determining what LTO generation their system is and introducing new generations well in advance to any 
system failure. Escrow copies are also migrated every five years to prevent data loss. More information 
on their workflow and policies can be found on Arkivum’s short term Maintaining Data Integrity page 
and long-term Data Integrity page. Also see section A3.8 for more information. 
In regards to the digital preservation strategies, Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not 
digital preservation (FAQ, 23). If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica for digital preservation 
strategies, Archivematica is responsible for providing documentation. 
Archivematica: Archivematica provides detailed documentation on installation, configuration, and use of 
this tool, found on their Documentation page. It is important to note that the Preservation Planning page is 
advice for users on how to construct and/or handle their own preservation policies and not a reflection of 
Archivematica’s, or Digital Safe’s, policies.  
Evidence:  Documentation identifying each preservation issue and the strategy for dealing with that issue. 
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B3.2 Repository has mechanisms in place for monitoring and notification when Representation 
Information (including formats) approaches obsolescence or is no longer viable. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to maintain their certification and updated format 
registries accordingly.  
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23), and is 
therefore only concerned with hardware, software, and data obsolescence. Arkivum can ingest any file 
format, but does not record their representation information. If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica, 
Archivematica can determine file formats and normalize using their Format Policy Registry, as well as 
creating SIPs and AIPs for record this process. See B3.1 for more information. Arkivum relies on 
Archivematica to adhere to any format registry updates. 
Archivematica: Archivematica contains a Format Policy Registry (FPR) that contains the default format 
policies and is maintained by Artefactual Systems, Inc (which as of July, 2016 does not have a public 
interface yet. See B2.8 for more information). This system also allows for clients to define their format 
policies in a local FPR that is accessible via the FPR server maintained by Artefactual. Archivematica is 
also committed to updated format policies as standards evolve; “A format policy indicates the actions, 
tools and settings to apply to a digital object of a particular format (e.g. conversion to preservation format, 
conversion to access format, extraction of package formats). Format policies will change over time as 
local and community standards, practices and tools evolve” (FPR section). For additional information on 
the FPR and configuring a local FPR, see the Preservation Planning page, and the full FPR page.  
Evidence:  Subscription to a format registry service; subscription to a technology watch service; 
percentage of at least one staff member dedicated to monitoring technological obsolescence issues. 
B3.3 Repository has mechanisms to change its preservation plans as a result of its monitoring 
activities. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe bears no responsibility for Arkivum and Archivematica to update their preservation 
mechanisms and plans. Digital Safe will update any new material for training, best practices 
recommendations, and announcements as needed. 
Arkivum: Arkivum developed an automatic chain of custody system that prevents storage hardware and 
software obsolescence. Arkivum follows the LTO roadmap for storage obsolescence and aims to prevent 
data loss by determining what LTO generation their system is and introducing new generations well in 
advance to any system failure. Escrow copies are also migrated every five years to prevent data loss, 
which “includes using new drives when new generations of media are introduced into the system, which 
ensures that the media/drive combination is never near to end of life.” More information on their 
workflow and policies can be found on Arkivum’s short term Maintaining Data Integrity page and long-
term Data Integrity page. Also see section A3.8 for more information.  
Archivematica: See response for section B3.2 for information on their Format Policy Registry and their 
recommendations for preservation planning. Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool and 
not a storage service, and in the event of Archivematica ceasing to operate, there would be no chance of 
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data loss. If Archivematica requires an update, more information can be found in their Installing from 
packages section.  
Evidence:  Preservation planning policies tied to formal or information technology watch(es); 
preservation planning or processes that are timed to shorter intervals (e.g., not more than five years); 
proof of frequent preservation planning/policy updates. 
B3.4 Repository can provide evidence of the effectiveness of its preservation planning. 
Audit Rating: 2 
Digital Safe: Digital Safe is currently in the planning stages. The goals of Phase 3 aim to develop an 
agreement with Arkivum, design a business model with IT Services, and cover up-front costs for the 
service (PID, 2). The service does not yet exist in the ideal form that the Digital Safe Steering Committee 
is aiming to accomplish, so there is not yet the means for evidencing the effectiveness of the model. This 
will be measured once Phase 3 has been implemented and the beta service has been deployed to early 
adopters. 
Arkivum: Arkivum is a storage platform that does not provide digital preservation activities. In regards to 
long-term storage success, Arkivum has several well-known institutions as clients, including the Museum 
of Modern Art, University of Westminster, and the Oxford Molecular Diagnostics Centre, among many 
others noted in case studies on their website that have been successful. Their Solutions tab offers several 
reports and case studies in various fields, such as Higher Education, that are evidence of success. 
Archivematica: First, Archivematica is open-source and provides generous documentation and 
instructions for every available option. See their Documentation page for more details. See section A3.2 
and A4.2 for information on their interaction with their user community, on which they rely to ensure that 
the product is effective and efficient. This interaction has led to extensive documentation, including in 
Error Handling and Error Reporting. They also monitor their user community to stay current on their 
Format Policy Registry (FPR section). For additional information on the FPR and configuring a local 
FPR, see the Preservation Planning page, and the full FPR page. 
Evidence:  Collection of appropriate preservation metadata; proof of usability of randomly selected 
digital objects held within the system; demonstrable track record for retaining usable digital objects over 
time. 
B4. Archival storage & preservation/maintenance of AIPs  
B4.1 Repository employs documented preservation strategies. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe chose the Arkivum and Archivematica solution because of their ability to preserve, 
normalize, and store any file format. See sections B2.1, B2.7, and B2.8 for more information. Digital Safe 
relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to employ their documented preservation strategies.  
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). The 
AIP is determined by the client as they choose what archival processes are a part of their workflow using 
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Archivematica. If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica will be responsible for 
employing their documented preservation strategies.  
Arkivum is designed to hold AIPs. “The persistent file/folder mechanism within the Arkivum service 
offers excellent support for the storage of AIPs. The file will retain its original filename, and checksums 
are provided for incorporation in the Preservation Description Information (PDI) for the AIP. The service 
follows the OAIS model for Archive Storage through use of replication, fixity monitoring and repair, 
disaster recovery, migration, and tiered storage to deliver a specified level of performance, availability 
and integrity of storage” (Integration with Other Systems).  
Archivematica: Archivematica: If the client decides to utilize the Archivematica tool they may choose to 
store an AIP. The client must determine the processing configuration, which can be left at 
Archivematica’s default setting, or can be created by the client. See Archivematica’s Processing 
Configuration documentation for more details. See section B2.1, B2.2, and B2.3 for more information. 
Evidence:  Documentation of strategies and their appropriateness to repository objects; evidence of 
application (e.g., in preservation metadata); see B3.3. 
B4.2 Repository implements/responds to strategies for archival object (i.e., AIP) storage and 
migration. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe chose the Arkivum and Archivematica solution because of their ability to preserve, 
normalize, and store any file format. See sections B2.1, B2.7, and B2.8 for more information. Digital Safe 
relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to employ their documented preservation strategies. Digital Safe 
will update any new material for training, best practices recommendations, and announcements as needed. 
Archivematica is an optional tool and it is the responsibility of the client to utilize Archivematica’s AIP 
generation and storage. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). The 
AIP is determined by the client as they choose what archival processes are a part of their workflow using 
Archivematica. If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica will be responsible for 
employing their documented preservation strategies.  
Arkivum is designed to hold AIPs. “The persistent file/folder mechanism within the Arkivum service 
offers excellent support for the storage of AIPs. The file will retain its original filename, and checksums 
are provided for incorporation in the Preservation Description Information (PDI) for the AIP. The service 
follows the OAIS model for Archive Storage through use of replication, fixity monitoring and repair, 
disaster recovery, migration, and tiered storage to deliver a specified level of performance, availability 
and integrity of storage” (Integration with Other Systems). See section A3.2 for more information on 
certification to safely store AIPs. 
Archivematica: If the client decides to utilize the Archivematica tool they may choose to store an AIP. 
The client must determine the processing configuration, which can be left at Archivematica’s default 
setting, or can be created by the client. See Archivematica’s Processing Configuration documentation for 
more details.   
After configuring the process as desired, the SIP can be normalized and stored in an AIP. “After 
normalization is approved, the SIP runs through a number of micro-services, including processing of the 
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submission documentation, generation of the METS file, indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging 
of the AIP,” which is packaged according to Bagit specifications (AIP Storage). Detailed information on 
the structure of the AIP can be found in Archivematica’s AIP Structure documentation. The client may 
review the AIP and proceed to storing the AIP. See section B2.2 and B2.3 for more information on AIP 
packaging and storage. 
The content is then moved to the storage facility of the clients’ choice, in this case Arkivum, via A-stor. 
Archivematica relies on their Format Policy Registry to develop their workflow tool, and are committed 
to updated format policies as standards evolve. For additional information on the FPR and configuring a 
local FPR, see the Preservation Planning page, and the full FPR page.  
Evidence:  Institutional technology and standards watch; demonstration of objects on which a 
preservation strategy has been performed; demonstration of appropriate preservation metadata for 
digital objects. 
B4.3 Repository preserves the Content Information of archival objects (i.e., AIPs). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client to provide the archival object, Archivematica to preserve and package 
the archival object, and Arkivum to store and maintain the archival object. Deletion of any archival 
objects or their associated content information is at the discretion of the client. The client will rely on 
Arkivum and Archivematica for instructions on how to delete files. 
Arkivum: First, any original client files are only deleted after receiving the “Green” light form Arkivum. 
Clients are notified at what stage their data is at during ingestion using a “traffic light system” where Red 
indicates that the client copy must not be deleted; Amber indicates that the ingested files are at the 
Arkivum data centers; and Green indicates that the ingested files are replicated and protected in the 
prescribed data center(s) and in escrow and that the client file can be deleted. See the FAQ for more 
information (FAQ, 17). 
Data may be deleted from Arkivum after one year of storage. This is managed by the client’s 
administration following a retention review or as required by the contract. There are four levels to 
removing data from Arkivum. First the key encryption is deleted so the data cannot be read. Second, the 
file is deleted to remove references to the file, making the file difficult to retrieve. Third, the data is 
securely erased from the storage media by overwriting so that the data cannot be recovered. Finally, the 
storage media is physically destroyed. For more detailed information, see the FAQ page 16.  
Any unwanted data that has, for example, a set amount of time to be kept before permanent deletion, is 
removed at the behest of the client. The AES key is purged, the encrypted data removed from the media, 
and the tapes are securely erased and taken out of service (FAQ, 10). Conversely, data that has been 
accidentally deleted can be recovered via the physical LTO data tape held in Escrow if the administration 
contact Arkivum immediately following the deletion. This will require the master encryption key and will 
cause a delay in the data being returned to the client (FAQ, 17). 
Clients cannot delete data that they are viewing as the security system only allows administration to 
request deletion. The deletion must be approved by the administrator and carried out through the 
administrative web interface. Any attempt to delete is recorded and can be tracked to a user’s Active 
Directory. (FAQ, 12). 
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Archivematica: AIPs may be deleted in Archivematica before and after they have been packaged. A user 
may choose to remove a SIP or AIP if they wish to start over. Once an AIP has been created and 
packaged, the deletion begins with a request in Archivematica. The client must enter a reason for deletion. 
The request is sent to the administrator and if it is approved, the data is removed. If the administrator does 
not approve, the AIP will remain in Archivematica. For more information, see the Deleting an AIP 
section.  
Once the content has moved to Arkivum, Archivematica does not keep the files unless they are 
specifically saved there temporarily. For more information on storage, see their Storage Services page.   
Evidence:  Policy documents specifying treatment of AIPs and whether they may ever be deleted; ability 
to demonstrate the chain of AIPs for any particular digital object or group of objects ingested; workflow 
procedure documentation. 
B4.4 Repository actively monitors integrity of archival objects (i.e., AIPs). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain its ISO 27001 certification and regular audit checks of 
data, methods, technology, and physical locations certification and recognizes a breach in contract if 
Arkivum does not maintain certification. Digital Safe can also recommend best practices to clients in 
regards to utilizing Arkivum’s audit trails, but it is ultimately up to the user to turn the audit trails on. 
Arkivum: Arkivum has policies and automated processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, 
software, and hardware. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test. Arkivum has also 
identified software and hardware obsolescence to occur on a cycle of generally 3 to 5 years, so Arkivum’s 
policy is that data is migrated to new media following the LTO roadmap. The LTO data tapes in Escrow 
are also migrated every 5 years. More detailed information on media upgrades can be found on their Data 
Integrity page. 
If the client chooses to utilize them, Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and 
specified by the client upon contract agreement. Any integrity check would be logged in the audit trail 
and accessible to the client at any time. For more information on audit trails, see section B1.8 and 
Arkivum’s Audit Trails page. 
Archivematica: Archivematica also utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. “Archivematica generates 
checksums upon transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those checksums before storing the 
AIP. It is also possible to include pre-existing checksums, which Archivematica will also verify. To check 
fixity of AIPs in storage, Artefactual has written a separate command-line app called Fixity 
(Archivematica FAQs).  
The client has complete control over the workflow process and can monitor at what stage the content is in 
as it moves through the workflow and once a client has established their digital preservation workflow, 
this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, 
normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). 
The client has complete control over the workflow process and can monitor at what stage the content is in 
as it moves through the workflow. See the response for section B1.6 for information on process 
completion. 
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Evidence:  Logs of fixity checks (e.g., checksums); documentation of how AIPs and Fixity information are 
kept separate. 
B4.5 Repository has contemporaneous records of actions and administration processes that are 
relevant to preservation (Archival Storage). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe does not bear any responsibility for logging actions of content. Digital Safe does 
recommend the use of audit trails to clients, though the use of audit trails is determined by the client. 
Arkivum: Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and specified by the client 
upon contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable XML format through Arkivum 
REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are also accessible in human readable 
PDF/A format through the Arkivum Service web interface or through an API call. Audit trails in PDF/A 
format can be signed if necessary to show that they were generated by Arkivum Service.” More detailed 
information concerning audit trails can be found at their Audit Trails page.  
Archivematica: Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more 
information about Archivematica’s fixity program. The client has complete control over the workflow 
process and can monitor at what stage the content is in as it moves through the workflow and once a client 
has established their digital preservation workflow, this will be recorded in their own policies. The AIP 
also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information 
(AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Written documentation of decisions and/or action taken; preservation metadata logged, 
stored, and linked to pertinent digital objects. 
B5. Information management 
B5.1 Repository articulates minimum metadata requirements to enable the designated 
community(ies) to discover and identify material of interest. 
Audit Rating: 4 
See the answer for section B1.1 for detail on metadata properties and how they are handled, and section 
A3.1 for information on the identified user communities. 
DS: Retrieving data is only accessible by the client. Digital Safe relies on the client to maintain the 
filenames they ingest for easy retrieval. Should the client wish to allow others to access materials, the 
client should describe the naming system. This may occur if, for example, a researcher is granted 
permission by the client to browse material not yet public. 
Arkivum: Arkivum maintains the original filename and identifies the file internally for integrity checks by 
checksums. Clients retrieving information will search using their original file names. 
Archivematica: Archivematica’s naming system will retain the original name of the transfer unless a new 
name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation. This name will be combined with a Universal Unique 
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Identifier that is generated and assigned during SIP formation. For more detailed information on this and 
the structure of the AIP, see the AIP Structure page.  
Evidence: Descriptive metadata. 
B5.2 Repository captures or creates minimum descriptive metadata and ensures that it is associated 
with the archived object (i.e., AIP). 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe is not responsible for metadata creation. See section B1.1 for Digital Safe’s 
recommendation on metadata preservation. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica for 
associating any descriptive metadata with the digital object. 
Arkivum: The AIP is determined by the client as they choose what archival processes are a part of their 
workflow. If the client has chosen to package an AIP, Arkivum is designed to hold AIPs. “The persistent 
file/folder mechanism within the Arkivum service offers excellent support for the storage of AIPs. The 
file will retain its original filename, and checksums are provided for incorporation in the Preservation 
Description Information (PDI) for the AIP. The service follows the OAIS model for Archive Storage 
through use of replication, fixity monitoring and repair, disaster recovery, migration, and tiered storage to 
deliver a specified level of performance, availability and integrity of storage” (Integration with Other 
Systems). If the client does not have any associated files, the digital object will be identified by its 
original filename and its checksum. 
Archivematica: If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica and to create an AIP, “after normalization is 
approved, the SIP runs through a number of micro-services, including processing of the submission 
documentation, generation of the METS file, indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging of the AIP,” 
which is packaged according to Bagit specifications (AIP Storage). The AIP also contains a /data/logs 
folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). More 
detailed information on the structure of the AIP can be found in Archivematica’s AIP Structure 
documentation. This package of the digital object and its associated files is what is ingested into 
Arkivum. 
Evidence:  Descriptive metadata; persistent identifier/locator associated with AIP; system documentation 
and technical architecture; depositor agreements; metadata policy documentation, incorporating details 
of metadata requirements and a statement describing where responsibility for its procurement falls; 
process workflow documentation. 
B5.3 Repository can demonstrate that referential integrity is created between all archived objects 
(i.e., AIPs) and associated descriptive information. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe is not responsible for metadata creation. See section B1.1 for Digital Safe’s 
recommendation on metadata preservation. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica for 
associating any descriptive metadata with the digital object. Digital Safe does not yet have a best practices 
policy in place. 
Arkivum: Arkivum is designed to hold AIPs but not to create them. “The persistent file/folder mechanism 
within the Arkivum service offers excellent support for the storage of AIPs. The file will retain its original 
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filename, and checksums are provided for incorporation in the Preservation Description Information 
(PDI) for the AIP. The service follows the OAIS model for Archive Storage through use of replication, 
fixity monitoring and repair, disaster recovery, migration, and tiered storage to deliver a specified level of 
performance, availability and integrity of storage” (Integration with Other Systems).  
Archivematica: If the client chooses to utilize Archivematica and to create an AIP it is packaged 
according to Bagit specifications (AIP Storage). Detailed information on the structure of the AIP can be 
found in Archivematica’s AIP Structure documentation. The filename of the AIP is created using the 
original name of the transfer, unless a new name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation, and then 
combined with a Universal Unique Identifier that is generated and assigned during SIP formation. The 
directory and the METS file carry the UUID, and the object and thumbnail (if necessary). The AIP also 
contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP 
Structure). More detailed information on the structure of the AIP can be found in Archivematica’s AIP 
Structure documentation. 
Evidence:  Descriptive metadata; persistent identifier/locator associated with AIP; documented 
relationship between AIP and metadata; system documentation and technical architecture; process 
workflow documentation. 
B5.4 Repository can demonstrate that referential integrity is maintained between all archived 
objects (i.e., AIPs) and associated descriptive information. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica for associating any descriptive metadata with the 
digital object. Digital Safe does not yet have a best practices policy in place. 
Arkivum: See section A3.2 for the response to integrity monitoring, and section B1.8 and B4.5 for the 
response to audit trails. If the client chooses to turn on the audit trails, this will log any changes in 
integrity, but does not track the creation of referential integrity. 
Archivematica: See section B5.3 for the response to creating referential integrity and how it is 
maintained.  
Evidence:  Log detailing ongoing monitoring/checking of referential integrity, especially following 
repair/modification of AIP; legacy descriptive metadata; persistence of identifier/locator; documented 
relationship between AIP and metadata; system documentation and technical architecture; process 
workflow documentation. 
B6. Access management 
B6.1 Repository documents and communicates to its designated community(ies) what access and 
delivery options are available. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Though it does not yet exist, it is recommended that University web space for Digital Safe is created 
to briefly describe the key users identified by phase 1 and briefly explain why accessibility is limited to 
the clients of the University. See section A3.1 and A3.4 for detailed information on Digital Safe’s 
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identified key users. Ideally this web space would also provide brief information on the funding of the 
Digital Safe service.  
Access parameters will be the responsibility of the client. These parameters should be outlined by the 
client in their own policy, but is not the responsibility of Digital Safe. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to 
maintain its security. 
Arkivum: Access to materials will be strictly monitored. Individuals with the encryption keys, for 
example the college Archivist or a similar position, are the only individuals with access to any ingested 
content, and will determine additional user access. These users will have Active Directory permissions 
that can be integrated into individual segments of the archive. More information can be found in the 
Arkivum FAQ document on page 10. Should the client wish to allow others to access materials, the client 
will set access parameters. This may occur if, for example, a researcher is granted permission by the client 
to browse material not yet public.  
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool, not a storage space. Both the 
workflow and the content are not accessible to users who are not specifically the client developing and 
using the workflow. 
Evidence:  Public versions of access policies; delivery policies; fee policies. 
B6.2 Repository has implemented a policy for recording all access actions (includes requests, orders 
etc.) that meet the requirements of the repository and information producers/depositors. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe conducted user studies in Phase 2 on various technologies, including Arkivum and the 
beta interface developed for Digital Safe, but not since the integration of Arkivum and Archivematica. 
The first year of early adopters testing the service, user feedback will be the basis of any improvements to 
the service and if the service launches for the entire University. Digital Safe has not developed an official 
policy on access actions. It is recommended that contact information and a Help and Feedback section are 
included in the University web space for the long-term. 
See section B6.1 for more information on clients determining access parameters. 
Arkivum: See section B6.1 for information on the access policy for Arkivum. See section B1.8 and B4.5 
for the response to audit trails. If the client chooses to turn on the audit trails, this will log any access 
actions. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool, not a storage space. Both the 
workflow and the content are not accessible to users who are not specifically the client developing and 
using the workflow.  
Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more information about 
Archivematica’s fixity program. The client has complete control over the workflow process and can 
monitor at what stage the content is in as it moves through the workflow. The AIP also contains a 
/data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure).  
Evidence:  Access policies; use statements. 
108 
 
B6.3 Repository ensures that agreements applicable to access conditions are adhered to. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe will evaluate all user feedback and make changes as is reasonable and possible to create 
an archive space that fits their access needs. The policy for Digital Safe relies on the client to utilize audit 
trails, which are recommended by Digital Safe, and to set their own access parameters. Digital Safe also 
relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to maintain their security measures. 
Arkivum: See section B1.8 for information on Audit Trails, which will track all handling of the content. 
Clients cannot delete data that they are viewing as the security system only allows administration to 
request deletion or to alter a file. The deletion must be approved by the administrator and carried out 
through the administrative web interface. Any attempt to delete or alter is recorded and can be tracked to 
a user’s Active Directory (FAQ, 12). See section B4.3 for more information for tracking deletion and 
other unauthorized activities. 
Archivematica: Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more 
information about Archivematica’s fixity program. The client has complete control over access to the 
workflow and the workflow process and can monitor at what stage the content is in as it moves through 
the workflow and once a client has established their digital preservation workflow, this will be recorded 
in their own policies. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware 
scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Access policies; logs of user access and user denials; access system mechanisms that prevent 
unauthorized actions (such as save, print, etc.); user compliance agreements. 
B6.4 Repository has documented and implemented access policies (authorization rules, 
authentication requirements) consistent with deposit agreements for stored objects. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Digital Safe does not monitor the deposited content, but will need to determine any preservation 
rights and copyrights and dictate them in the contract with Arkivum. These details have not yet been 
established and will be a priority during Phase 3. See section A5 for more information. Digital Safe relies 
on the client to have the appropriate permissions for any content that was not generated by them, BEAM 
for example, and will adhere to their permissions policies in the Arkivum contract. 
Arkivum: See section B1.8 for information on Audit Trails, which will track all handling of the content. 
“Access to files through the filesystem exposed by the Arkivum service appliance on the customer site is 
controlled through file permissions and Active Directory” (Security Model) and the Active Directory is 
tracked by audit trails. 
Archivematica: Only the client has access to manipulating and using the workflow. The AIP contains a 
/data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure) 
which will log any access actions. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, 
which will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by 
the security measures of Arkivum. To see more about the integration of Arkivum with Archivematica, see 
their Storage Services page.  
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Evidence:  Access validation mechanisms within system; documentation of authentication and validation 
procedures. 
B6.5 Repository access management system fully implements access policy. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client to set their security parameters and on Arkivum to maintain those 
parameters. 
Arkivum: See section B1.8 for information on Audit Trails, which will track all handling of the content. 
“Access to files through the filesystem exposed by the Arkivum service appliance on the customer site is 
controlled through file permissions and Active Directory” (Security Model) and the Active Directory is 
tracked by audit trails. Anyone provided with an authorized Active Directory by the administrator may 
access. Unauthorized users will be denied access into Digital Safe, and even they have access to the 
system, they will also need an authorized Active Directory to access the files. “Access to files through the 
filesystem exposed by the Arkivum service appliance on the customer site is controlled through file 
permissions and Active Directory” (Security Model). Any attempt to delete is also recorded and can be 
tracked to a user’s Active Directory. (FAQ, 12). 
Archivematica: Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more 
information about Archivematica’s fixity program. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with 
transfers, normalization, malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). Archivematica is 
integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, which will be built into the contract between the 
University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by the security measures of Arkivum. To see more 
about the integration of Arkivum with Archivematica, see their Storage Services page.  
Evidence:  Logs and audit trails of access requests; information about user capabilities (authentication 
matrices); explicit tests of some types of access. 
B6.6 Repository logs all access management failures, and staff review inappropriate “access denial” 
incidents. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe does not monitor access management or review unauthorized incidents. The client is 
responsible for monitoring their access management and addressing any unauthorized incidents. Digital 
Safe relies on the technologies to notify the clients of any access management failures. 
Arkivum: See section B1.8 for information on Audit Trails, which will track all handling of the content. 
Clients cannot delete data that they are viewing as the security system only allows administration to 
request deletion. The deletion must be approved by the administrator and carried out through the 
administrative web interface. Any attempt to delete is recorded and can be tracked to a user’s Active 
Directory. (FAQ, 12). Arkivum notifies the administrator. 
Archivematica: Alterations may occur during the workflow process, but deletions begin with a request 
through Archivematica. The client must enter a reason for deletion. The request is sent to the 
administrator and if it is approved, the data is removed. If the administrator does not approve, the AIP 
will remain in Archivematica. For more information, see the Deleting an AIP section. The client is 
responsible for acting on these notifications and may change access permissions. 
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Archivematica utilizes fixity checks on files before AIP storage. See B2.11 for more information about 
Archivematica’s fixity program. The AIP also contains a /data/logs folder with transfers, normalization, 
malware scan, and extraction information (AIP Structure). 
Evidence:  Access logs; capability of system to use automated analysis/monitoring tools and generate 
problem/error messages; notes of reviews undertaken or action taken as result of reviews. 
B6.7 Repository can demonstrate that the process that generates the requested digital object(s) (i.e., 
DIP) is completed in relation to the request. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the technologies to produce the correct and complete DIP. As the service is not 
yet active, there are no examples to test this process. It may also be possible that the client has not chosen 
to create a DIP and is accessing the original file or the AIP. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum can store a DIP but does not create DIPs. Arkivum will retrieve the DIP is the same format and 
state that it was in upon ingestion. This can be monitored by checksums. 
Archivematica: If the client chooses to create a DIP, they indicate it during the normalization process and 
the access copies used to create it are also created during normalization (Normalization process). DIPs 
may be part of the AIP, or can be uploaded separately to Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor. For more 
information on storage, see their Storage Services page.  For more information on DIP storage, see their 
Store DIP section. 
Evidence:  System design documents; work instructions (if DIPs involve manual processing); process 
walkthroughs; logs of orders and DIP production; test accesses to verify delivery of appropriate digital 
objects. 
B6.8 Repository can demonstrate that the process that generates the requested digital object(s) (i.e., 
DIP) is correct in relation to the request. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client to set and monitor the access parameters, and on the technologies to 
produce the correct and complete DIP. As the service is not yet active, there are no examples to test this 
process. It may also be possible that the client has not chosen to create a DIP and is accessing the original 
file or the AIP. 
Arkivum: Arkivum “provides safe and secure data archiving,” not digital preservation (FAQ, 23). 
Arkivum can store a DIP but does not create DIPs. Arkivum will retrieve the DIP is the same format and 
state that it was in upon ingestion. This can be monitored by checksums.  
Archivematica: If the client chooses to create a DIP, the DIP is generated directly from the AIP and will 
have the same UUID associated with it. DIPs may be part of the AIP, or can be uploaded separately to 
Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor. For more information on storage, see their Storage Services page.  For 
more information on DIP storage, see their Store DIP section. 
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Evidence:  System design documents; work instructions (if DIPs involve manual processing); process 
walkthroughs; logs of orders and DIP production. 
B6.9 Repository demonstrates that all access requests result in a response of acceptance or 
rejection. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the client to set and monitor the access parameters, and on the technologies to 
maintain their security measures. As the service is not yet active, there are no examples to test this 
process. It may also be possible that the client has not chosen to create a DIP and is accessing the original 
file or the AIP. 
Arkivum: Anyone with an authorized Active Directory may access. Unauthorized users will be denied 
access into Digital Safe, and even they have access to the system, they will also need an authorized Active 
Directory to access the files. “Access to files through the filesystem exposed by the Arkivum service 
appliance on the customer site is controlled through file permissions and Active Directory” (Security 
Model). As long as the client is accessing Arkivum during their scheduled time they will have access to 
all of their files. 
Archivematica: The completion of all processes in Archivematica are indicated by color and text. Green 
indicates that a process has been completed successfully, and red indicates that the process has not been 
completed successfully. Access is determined by the client; all actions must be authorized by the 
administrator, and the administrator is notified of any unauthorized activity. 
Evidence:  System design documents; work instructions (if DIPs involve manual processing); process 
walkthroughs; logs of orders and DIP production. 
B6.10 Repository enables the dissemination of authentic copies of the original or objects traceable 
to originals. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe is a service for the long-term storage high-security data that will not be disseminated in 
the near future or ever. Student records and research data may be released in the far future, but other data 
may never be publicly accessible as it may be permanently deleted. Digital Safe relies on the client to 
upload authentic material and to set and manage their access parameters. Digital Safe will also provide 
training and general best-practice policies, but relies on the technologies to retrieve the correct and 
complete file. 
As the service is not yet active, there are no examples to test this process. It may also be possible that the 
client has not chosen to create a DIP and is accessing the original file or the AIP. 
Arkivum: Arkivum ensures that all of the ingested files are correct and complete upon retrieval. Akrivum 
has policies and automated processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, software, and 
hardware to prevent data corruption or loss. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test 
using checksums. Arkivum has also identified software and hardware obsolescence to occur on a cycle of 
generally 3 to 5 years, so Arkivum’s policy is that data is migrated to new media following the LTO 
roadmap. The LTO data tapes in Escrow are also migrated every 5 years. More detailed information on 
media upgrades can be found on their Data Integrity page. See section B1.4 for additional information. 
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Arkivum maintains high security both digital and physically, and access to this content will be minimal. 
See section B1.5 for detailed information on the security measures. 
Archivematica: Archivematica’s naming system will retain the original name of the transfer unless a new 
name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation. This name will be combined with a Universal Unique 
Identifier that is generated and assigned during SIP formation. For more detailed information on this and 
the structure of the AIP, see the AIP Structure page. The Archivematica directory is searched by this 
name. 
Archivematica also interacts with their user community for providing a product that suits their needs. See 
A3.4 for more information on their communication with their user community, or view their user forum. 
Evidence:  System design documents; work instructions (if DIPs involve manual processing); process 
walkthroughs; production of a sample authenticated copy; documentation of community requirements for 
authentication. 
C. Technologies, Technical Infrastructure, & Security 
Average Rating: 3.1/4 
C1. System Infrastructure 
C1.1 Repository functions on well-supported operating systems and other core infrastructural 
software. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum for maintaining its operating systems. Digital Safe as a service will be 
available via the web page and on the client’s local operating system. 
Arkivum: Arkivum and its applications can be used from most common operating systems (FAQ, 18). 
Additional technical support is available for unique operating systems. Updates are automatically 
provided to clients as they develop and are applied by simple mouse click (FAQ, 11). If there is a fault or 
failure on the client’s side, “a new system can be configured and archived data will still be available 
(FAQ, 12).  
Archivematica: Archivematica’s system “packages a customized Xubuntu environment as a virtual 
appliance, making it possible to run on top of any consumer-grade hardware and operating system” 
(Single install page). It is also possible to update Archivematica after installation. See their Installing 
from packages section for detailed information. 
Evidence:  Software inventory; system documentation; support contracts; use of strongly community 
supported software (i.e., Apache). 
C1.2 Repository ensures that it has adequate hardware and software support for backup 
functionality sufficient for the repository’s services and for the data held, e.g., metadata associated 
with access controls, repository main content. 
Audit Rating: 3 
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DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain and carry out its back up procedures. 
Arkivum: For file backup, Arkivum has policies and automated processes in place for running integrity 
checks on the data, software, and hardware. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test 
based on checksums. For hardware and software support, Arkivum follows the LTO roadmap for storage 
obsolescence and aims to prevent data loss by determining what LTO generation their system is and 
introducing new generations well in advance to any system failure. Escrow copies are also migrated every 
five years to prevent data loss. More information on their workflow and policies can be found on 
Arkivum’s short term Maintaining Data Integrity page and long-term Data Integrity page. Also see 
section A3.8 for more information. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum. If necessary, Data can be backed up and temporarily stored using MySQL. More detailed 
instructions can be found in their Data back-up section. 
Evidence:  Documentation of what is being backed up and how often; audit log/inventory of backups; 
validation of completed backups; disaster recovery plan—policy and documentation; “firedrills”—testing 
of backups; support contracts for hardware and software for backup mechanisms. 
C1.3 Repository manages the number and location of copies of all digital objects. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain the copies of digital objects. As the service is not yet 
active, there are no examples to test this process. 
Arkivum: For Arkivum/1+1, one copy is stored in a secure data center and one copy is saved on LTO data 
tape in Escrow. For Arkivum/100, two copies are stored in secure, geographically separate data centers 
and one copy is saved on LTO data tape in Escrow. Arkivum maintains high security both digital and 
physically. According to their FAQ documentation. “All copies of customer data are held in secure UK 
storage locations. Storage facilities are manned at all hours and access is strictly restricted to a list of 
named, trained and vetted members of the Arkivum Operations team. Our operations at all sites, including 
our business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information security standard.” In addition to ISO27001 
certification and industry best practice for security, our customer base includes people using our service to 
store personal data including voice call recordings and medical treatment records. They have audited our 
service and satisfied themselves that our service is secure and meets their regulatory and legislative 
obligations” (FAQ, 19). Data is also encrypted once it leaves the client’s network and passes through a 
secure VPN before entering a data center. The Escrow copy is located based on the contract between the 
client and Arkivum (FAQ, 5). For more information, see the FAQ documentation and section B1.5. The 
data is also retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums (long-term Data Integrity). 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum. Archivematica also utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. “Archivematica generates 
checksums upon transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those checksums before storing the 
AIP. It is also possible to include pre-existing checksums, which Archivematica will also verify. To check 
fixity of AIPs in storage, Artefactual has written a separate command-line app called Fixity 
(Archivematica FAQs).  
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Evidence:  random retrieval tests; system test; location register/log of digital objects compared to the 
expected number and location of copies of particular objects. 
C1.4 Repository has mechanisms in place to ensure any/multiple copies of digital objects are 
synchronized. 
Audit Rating: 4 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain synchronized copies. As the service is not yet active, there 
are no examples to test this process. 
Arkivum: The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums (long-term Data 
Integrity). Any corruption or loss is automatically repaired and immediately makes a copy of the correct 
object to replace the corrupted object. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum. If necessary, Data can be backed up and temporarily stored using MySQL. More detailed 
instructions can be found in their Data back-up section. 
Evidence:  Workflows; system analysis of how long it takes for copies to synchronize; 
procedures/documentation of operating procedures related to updates and copy synchronization; 
procedures/documentation related to whether changes lead to the creation of new copies and how those 
copies are propagated and/or linked to previous versions. 
C1.5 Repository has effective mechanisms to detect bit corruption or loss. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to manage bit loss and corruption. As the service is not yet active, 
there are no examples to test this process. 
Arkivum: The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums and preventative 
data migrations. See section A3.2 for more information, as well as Arkivum’s long-term Data Integrity 
page. “Each copy has its integrity actively monitored and managed and any corruption or loss is 
automatically repaired to make the system self-healing” (Overview).  
Archivemetica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum. Clients are notified of any failed actions and are responsible for managing these issues. 
Archivematica also utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. “Archivematica generates checksums upon 
transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those checksums before storing the AIP. It is also 
possible to include pre-existing checksums, which Archivematica will also verify. To check fixity of AIPs 
in storage, Artefactual has written a separate command-line app called Fixity (Archivematica FAQs). 
Evidence:  Documents that specify bit error detection and correction mechanisms used; risk analysis; 
error reports; threat analyses. 
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C1.6 Repository reports to its administration all incidents of data corruption or loss, and steps 
taken to repair/replace corrupt or lost data. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to notify and handle any incidents of data loss or 
corruptions. As the service is not yet active, there are no examples to test this process. 
Arkivum: The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums and preventative 
data migrations. See section A3.2 for more information, as well as Arkivum’s long-term Data Integrity 
page. “Each copy has its integrity actively monitored and managed and any corruption or loss is 
automatically repaired to make the system self-healing” (Overview).  
Archivematica: See the response for section C1.5. 
Evidence:  Preservation metadata (e.g., PDI) records; comparison of error logs to reports to 
administration; escalation procedures related to data loss. 
C1.7 Repository has defined processes for storage media and/or hardware change (e.g., refreshing, 
migration). 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on Arkivum to maintain its policies on hardware. 
Arkivum: Arkivum follows the LTO roadmap for storage obsolescence and aims to prevent data loss by 
determining what LTO generation their system is and introducing new generations well in advance to any 
system failure, and plan to migrate every 3-5 years. Escrow copies are also migrated every five years to 
prevent data loss. More information on their workflow and policies can be found on Arkivum’s short term 
Maintaining Data Integrity page and long-term Data Integrity page. Also see section A3.8 for more 
information. 
Archivematica: See the response for section C1.5. 
Evidence:  Documentation of processes; policies related to hardware support, maintenance, and 
replacement; documentation of hardware manufacturers’ expected support life cycles. 
C1.8 Repository has a documented change management process that identifies changes to critical 
processes that potentially affect the repository’s ability to comply with its mandatory 
responsibilities. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe relies on the technologies to maintain their ISO certification and to update and 
implement their policies. Digital Safe as a service will remain active and give due notice of any 
maintenance issues or other cessations in operation that will affect the clients and their data. 
Arkivum: See section C1.7 and A3.8 for information on LTO roadmap use. Furthermore, according to 
Arkivum “Our operations at all sites, including our business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information 
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security standards,” (FAQ, 19) and Arkivum is regularly audited externally to maintain ISO 27001 
certification and welcomes client audits as well (FAQ, 10). Every change is monitored and tested bi-
annually.  
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool. For Digital Safe, content is not 
stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete before it is stored in 
Arkivum. For policy and digital preservation activities, Archivematica is committed to updated format 
policies as standards evolve; “A format policy indicates the actions, tools and settings to apply to a digital 
object of a particular format (e.g. conversion to preservation format, conversion to access format, 
extraction of package formats). Format policies will change over time as local and community standards, 
practices and tools evolve” (FPR section). For additional information on the FPR and configuring a local 
FPR, see the Preservation Planning page, and the full FPR page. 
Evidence:  Documentation of change management process; comparison of logs of actual system changes 
to processes versus associated analyses of their impact and criticality. 
C1.9 Repository has a process for testing the effect of critical changes to the system. 
Audit Rating: 3 
See the response for C1.8. As the service is not yet active, there are no examples to test this process. 
Evidence:  Documented testing procedures; documentation of results from prior tests and proof of 
changes made as a result of tests. 
C1.10 Repository has a process to react to the availability of new software security updates based 
on a risk-benefit assessment. 
Audit Rating: 3 
See the response for C1.8. As the service is not yet active, there are no examples to test this process. 
Evidence:  Risk register (list of all patches available and risk documentation analysis); evidence of 
update processes (e.g., server update manager daemon); documentation related to the update 
installations. 
C2. Appropriate technologies 
C2.1 Repository has hardware technologies appropriate to the services it provides to its designated 
community(ies) and has procedures in place to receive and monitor notifications, and evaluate 
when hardware technology changes are needed. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: During Phase 1 of the Digital Safe identified a distinct need in the community for a long-term, high-
security storage space for sensitive content. See section “Phases 1&2” on page 3 of this document for 
more information on Phase 1, and section A3.1 for information on the identified key users. Digital Safe 
clients will rely on Arkivum and Archivematica for information on hardware updates and changes.  
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Arkivum: Arkivum and its applications can be used from most common operating systems (FAQ, 18), 
with technical support for installation available. Updates are automatically provided to clients via A-Stor 
as they develop and are applied by simple mouse click (FAQ, 11). “hardware appliances have been 
designed to offer industry standard fault resilience and come with a three year, four hour, on-site 
warranty. During this time, failed parts will be replaced under this warranty. Should the system undergo 
total failure or be destroyed (such as in a fire), a new system can be configured and archived data will still 
be available,” (FAQ, 12) once the client has contacted Arkivum about the issues.  
Archivematica: Archivematica’s system “packages a customized Xubuntu environment as a virtual 
appliance, making it possible to run on top of any consumer-grade hardware and operating system” and 
only requires a single installation to run (Single install page). It is also possible to update Archivematica 
after installation. See their Installing from packages section for detailed information. 
Evidence:  Technology watch; documentation of procedures; designated community profiles; user needs 
evaluation; hardware inventory. 
C2.2 Repository has software technologies appropriate to the services it provides to its designated 
community(ies) and has procedures in place to receive and monitor notifications, and evaluate 
when software technology changes are needed. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: During Phase 1 of the Digital Safe identified a distinct need in the community for a long-term, high-
security storage space for sensitive content. See section “Phases 1&2” on page 3 of this document for 
more information on Phase 1, and section A3.1 for information on the identified key users. Digital Safe 
clients will rely on Arkivum and Archivematica for information on software updates and changes. See 
section C2.1 as the procedures still apply to software changes. 
Arkivum: See section C2.1 as the procedures still apply to software changes. 
Archivematica: See section C2.1 as the procedures still apply to software changes. 
Evidence:  Technology watch; documentation of procedures; designated community profiles; user needs 
evaluation; software inventory. 
C3. Security 
C3.1 Repository maintains a systematic analysis of such factors as data, systems, personnel, 
physical plant, and security needs. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: During Phase 1 Digital Safe’s project team interviewed various staff members in the colleges, IT 
Services, the Oxford Colleges Librarians Group, Oxford Archivists Consortium, and other related groups, 
committees, and departments. These interviews gathered some of the technical, security, and 
infrastructure requirements that these institutions might have, and chose the technologies accordingly. 
Digital Safe relies on Arkivum maintain and implement its security model. 
118 
 
Arkivum: Arkivum’s procedures, hardware, and locations are all certified to ISO 27001 standards and are 
audited every six months. “[Arkivum’s] secure storage locations are based in highly secure facilities, with 
our operations at all sites certified to ISO 27001 standards. Our locations are manned at all hours and 
access is strictly restricted to a list of named, trained and vetted members of the Arkivum Operations 
team. Each site is protected by best of breed firewall technology ensuring that our locations are protected 
from the latest advanced evasion techniques utilised by sophisticated hackers and intelligence 
organisations” (FAQ, 8).  
Data is secured based on “the ability to separately encrypt each file stored in our service. Only encrypted 
data is ever stored in [Arkivum’s] service. Each file is encrypted with a unique symmetric key using 
AES256 encryption. The symmetric key for the file is then encrypted using a public key from a public-
private key pair using RSA2048 encryption. Both AES256 and RSA2048 are industry standard 
encryption algorithms and widely used in high security applications, e.g. electronic commerce and for 
sensitive government information,” (FAQ, 9). For more information, see their FAQ documentation and 
their Security Model page. See section A1.2 for additional information. 
Archivematica: Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool to which only the client has access. 
For Digital Safe, content is not stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to 
complete before it is stored in Arkivum. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, 
which will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by 
the security measures of Arkivum. 
Evidence:  ISO 17799 certification; documentation describing analysis and risk assessments undertaken 
and their outputs; logs from environmental recorders; confirmation of successful staff vetting. 
C3.2 Repository has implemented controls to adequately address each of the defined security needs. 
Audit Rating: 3 
DS: Digital Safe chose Arkivum in part due to its security model and contingency plan. Digital Safe relies 
on Arkivum maintain and implement its security model. 
Arkivum: Arkivum contains a strict chain-of-custody system, audit trails, and a highly detailed security 
model. “The security and audit model has been developed in partnership with Arkivum customers who 
have confirmed that the model meets their regulatory requirements as part of a due-diligence/audit 
process that they have conducted on Arkivum. This includes due-diligence by customers in clinical and 
financial sectors where regulation is strict,” (Chain of Custody). Many Arkivum clients have strict 
compliance policies and government documents and require an even higher level of security. They also 
adhere to UK Government Information Levels; “IL2 and IL3 are UK Government Information Levels. 
These define the sensitivity of the data stored and the security procedures and processes that need to be 
followed when transmitting and storing this data. Arkivum currently has ISO27001 certified processes in 
place, which will meet the requirements set out for various Information Levels,” (FAQ, 10). For more 
information, see Arkivum’s FAQ document, their Chain of Custody page and their Security Model page. 
Archivematica: See section C3.1 for the response regarding security needs. 
Evidence:  ISO 17799 certification; system control list; risk, threat, or control analyses; addition of 
controls based on ongoing risk detection and assessment. 
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C3.3 Repository staff have delineated roles, responsibilities, and authorizations related to 
implementing changes within the system. 
Audit Rating: 2 
DS: Digital Safe currently has a project team and their roles described in its Phase 3 PID. These 
individuals will design the service and have access to its private policies, but will have no access to any 
ingested content. Currently the project roles consist of: Project Sponsor, Senior User, Senior Supplier, 
Programme Manager, and Project Manager. The Steering Group will oversee the project board. The 
project board consists of the Senior Supplier, Programme Manager, Project Sponsors, and Senior Users. 
The Project Manager reports to the Project Board, and oversees the Project Roles. Project roles consist of 
IT Services, NSMS, and any other third parties (Phase 3 PID, 15-16). 
Access to the dark archives held via Digital Safe is strict and has four different levels. 
1. Clients, affiliated with the University of Oxford, who use the Digital Safe service (see section 
A3.1 for information on the identified key users for Digital Safe) 
a. Have control over the master encryption key  
b. Can view data, view metadata, manipulate data, delete data, export data, and retrieve 
escrow copies, alter digital preservation workflows, among other activities. 
c. Can determine access for other personnel and users 
2. Users, perhaps researchers or auditors 
a. Can view data that is specified by the client 
b. Cannot manipulate, delete, copy, download, export, or otherwise retrieve data or access 
digital preservation workflows 
3. Arkivum employees 
a. Can maintain servers, software, and hardware 
b. Cannot access data or digital preservation workflows 
4. University of Oxford IT Services 
a. Can assist in determining digital preservation workflows 
b. Can assist in troubleshooting local error and issues 
c. Can maintain Digital Safe website 
d. Cannot access data or digital preservation workflows 
Arkivum: Arkivum employees do not have access to any client data. Additionally, “there is no direct 
customer access to data in the Arkivum data centres, e.g. through a web interface or cloud API. This 
ensures all ingest and access is properly managed through Arkivum appliances,” (Authentication and 
Access). For more information, see Arkivum’s FAQ document, their Chain of Custody page and their 
Security Model page. 
Archivematica: Archivematica employees do not have access to any client data. See section C3.1 for the 
response regarding additional security permissions. 
Evidence:  ISO 17799 certification; organizational chart; system authorization documentation. 
C3.4 Repository has suitable written disaster preparedness and recovery plan(s), including at least 
one off-site backup of all preserved information together with an off-site copy of the recovery 
plan(s). 
Audit Rating: 4 
120 
 
DS: Digital Safe chose Arkivum in part due to its contingency plan and relies on Arkivum to maintain 
and implement this plan if necessary. 
Arkivum: Arkivum provides a workflow and safety measures for integrity. For Arkivum/1+1, one copy is 
stored in a secure data center and one copy is saved on LTO data tape in Escrow. For Arkivum/100, two 
copies are stored in secure, geographically separate data centers and one copy is saved on LTO data tape 
in Escrow. The Escrow copy is the backup for any data loss or corruption. If the digital copies are 
corrupted or the clients need to remove content, the LTO tapes are delivered to the client. If there is 
complete data loss, Arkivum provides a “financial guarantee underwritten by an Information and 
Communication Technology Professional Liability Insurance Policy,” which provides coverage for direct 
loss relating to data loss (FAQ, 7). Arkivum also provides multiple client sites, so if one site is 
compromised the data may be retrieved at another site (FAQ, 22). For more information:  
 section A3.8 for more information on Arkivum/1+1 and Arkivum/100 
 section C3.2 for information on Arkivum’s physical storage locations 
 Stages of Archiving 
 Chain of Custody 
 Security Model 
 Arkivum’s FAQ document 
Archivematica: See section C3.1 for the response regarding security needs. 
Evidence:  ISO 17799 certification; disaster and recovery plans; information about and proof of at least 
one off-site copy of preserved information; service continuity plan; documentation linking roles with 
activities; local geological, geographical, or meteorological data or threat assessments. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Commentary on Governance and Infrastructure 
This section of policy building and planning requires the most attention during Phase 3. More information 
on what does exist is available in the Phase 3 PID and in the Informal TRAC Audit, and a brief 
description of the major improvement areas follows.    
General Policy 
As the project is still in development, the governance for the service is not yet in place. As Digital Safe is 
a service and not a repository itself there is no mission statement, and the project goals have altered 
through each phase. The primary Phase 3 goal is “to deliver a secure, long-term records archiving service 
for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis,”54 and any mission statement will 
likely draw from this idea. There is no additional policy formally produced that describes the current state 
and goals of the project outside of the Project Initiation Document. However, once Phase 3 commences 
the blog will be regularly updated and University web space will be developed for such policies. These 
will be further explored in the contract between the University and Arkivum.  
Both of the technologies provide extensive documentation that is available on their websites. 
Structure and Staffing 
Currently there is a project group and Steering Committee. The hope is that the Steering Committee will 
continue, or develop into a similar governance committee55, for the purpose of reviewing the contracts, 
funding, and any updates from IT Services and the technologies as needed. IT Services play a vital role in 
Digital Safe, as the ultimate goal is to develop and business and service model so that Digital Safe will be 
integrated with IT Services. This model will better determine staffing needs and training. IT Services will 
update the University web space for Digital Safe and assist in training, troubleshooting, and 
communicating with the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee will review and update the service 
as needed. Because the technologies are outsourced there is little technical training needed to maintain the 
interface, and the University can rely on Arkivum and Archivematica for maintaining their product.  
Arkivum provides training virtually, on-site, and in workshops. The plan is to bring Arkivum in for 
training and to use and develop their training materials to do local training in the University. These 
materials will be broad, as it is up to the client to determine how much they want out of the service, and 
will be added to the Bodleian Library’s current collection of training materials.56 These materials will 
then be reviewed an updated on a 4-5 year cycle by the governance committee.57 Both Arkivum and 
Archivematica have support services available during the week and on weekends for emergencies. 
Documentation and Policy 
It is recommended by this audit of Digital Safe to provide University web space to this project articulating 
the key users, basic policy, and contact information. The nature of a dark archive is not transparency and 
                                                          
54 Digital Safe Phase 3 PID, page 2 
55 NJ interview 
56 Training materials 
57 NJ Interview 
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much information cannot be made public, however as a service provided to the University, general 
information and documentation is necessary.  
Phase 2 determined that the key users for this service have been identified as: College Archivists; 
University Archive; Central Administrative Records Management; Departmental Research Records 
Management; and Bodleian Electronic Archives and Manuscripts.58 These users have materials that 
require high-security and low-accessibility, including administrative records, student records, financial 
records, personal communication, medical reports, non-anonymized case studies, and other material that 
has personal, identifiable information. Users are not limited to only these categories, however, as the 
service is open to all who want to use the service and are affiliated with the University of Oxford. 
As described above, policies have not yet been developed. The Steering Committee is currently directing 
the project, but much of the policy will be directed by the contract agreements between the University and 
Arkivum before they can be documented. Policies for the technologies, however, are well-detailed and 
located on their respective websites.59 60 It is also recommended that the Steering Committee review the 
policies, contracts, and funding security annually after this project is launched. 
Legal permissions will largely be the responsibility of the client as much of the content will be produced 
by the client. Other materials that have been acquisitioned by the library may require additional policy 
measurements, but this is also primarily up to the library and BEAM to maintain. The contract between 
the University and Arkivum may need to determine if there is a need to build in a deposit agreement 
concerning the permissions for migration copies. It should be noted that Arkivum employees do not have 
access to any material as it is only accessible with an encryption key held by the client.  
Outside of Digital Safe, the technologies have extensive documentation and are responsible for 
maintaining their certification and upholding their own policies. Arkivum has automated annual data 
integrity checks, five-year hardware and software migration, and developed an LTO road map to prevent 
technology and data obsolescence. More information is on their website. Arkivum also maintains ISO 
27001 certification, is audited every six months, and welcomes client audits. 
Financial Sustainability 
Digital Safe does not have a full cost model developed for the long-term. Phase 3 has outlined the short-
term business plan that includes University staff training, Arkivum training costs, start-up costs, 1 year of 
Arkivum service and storage space, and 1 year of maintenance fees. All are outlined in the Phase 3 PID. 
Developing this model is a priority for Phase 3 and will ultimately determine what funding is provided 
after the first year of service to maintain the website and any license and storage fees.  
Once the service is launched and the clients choose the service they prefer, they will be responsible for 
paying. Phase 3 will help determine the payment method agreed upon between the University and 
Arkivum. If Arkivum handles the billing, they do direct invoicing for each client. If the University 
handles the billing it will be managed as a library service, similarly to the process for handling services 
like catalog use, access to electronic journals, and IT Services. 
The Steering Committee will review and secure funding once it is determined if Phase 3 has been 
successful. 
                                                          
58 Digital Safe Phase 3 PID, page 4 
59 Arkivum website 
60 Archivematica documentation 
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Contracts, Licenses, & Liabilities 
Digital Safe and Arkivum have been contact since 2014 and are still in discussion over contract 
specifications. Once funding has been secured for Phase 3, this will be developed on a beta level for the 
first year of early adopters, and then re-evaluated after the first year is completed.  
As discussed in section A5, deposit agreements and copyright issues will need to be evaluated to ensure 
legal inclusion of any acquisitioned material that might be included, such as from BEAM. A5 was not 
completed in this audit because there is no existing documentation yet. See section A5 for the review of 
this section. 
Appendix B: Commentary on Digital Object Management 
Object management is the most complete section of Digital Safe’s development. Details on the practices 
and procedures described in Arkivum and Archivematica can be found in Section B of the Informal 
TRAC Audit and on the technologies’ websites in their documentation.  
Content Acquisition 
All materials that are ingested into Arkivum will be provided by the client. Digital Safe will not be 
providing any content, only suggesting the type of content that might be ingested. Digital Safe also has 
recommendations on what metadata properties might be preserved, file format choices, and digital 
preservation workflow activities, but the content is strictly the responsibility of the client. Arkivum only 
requires a file to ingest, and depending on the complexity of the digital preservation workflow the client 
chooses, it can also ingest additional associated files.  
Digital Preservation Workflows 
Archivematica offers a customizable workflow tool to clients wanting to digitally preserve in addition to 
secure storage. Should the client require an OAIS model, Archivematica can create SIPs, normalize data, 
package AIPs, and normalize data, among other activities. A wide spectrum of processes is available, but 
ultimately up to the client to choose. Digital Safe may also be able to offer recommendations on best 
practices. 
Storage 
Arkivum offers multi-location, high-security storage within their own data centers and at an additional 
Escrow location. During the ingest process, the client can follow the process of ingest and is given a green 
light once the data is fully ingested and secure so that the client may delete their own copies. Arkivum 
also offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned on and specified by the client upon contract 
agreement. Audit trails will log every event affecting the content, such as an integrity check or migration, 
and the employee, time, reason, and any changes made. More information can be found on Arkivum’s 
Audit Trails page61.  
Appendix C: Commentary on Technology, Technologies Infrastructure, and Security 
This section has been largely handled by the technologies and is fairly compliant with TRAC guidelines. 
Once all three entities (Digital Safe, Arkivum, and Archivematica) have been integrated it will be easier 
to test the function of the entire system. 
                                                          
61 Arkivum Audit Trails 
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Operating Systems 
Arkivum and Archivematica were chosen because they built for institutions without the technical abilities 
or funding to develop their own infrastructure for digital preservation and storage, particularly with needs 
for high-security and low-access. Their systems can be operated from standard operating systems and do 
not require high levels of technical ability, fitting the needs of potential users identified in Phase 1. 
Security 
Although a mock interface has been created, the system combining Digital Safe, Arkivum, and 
Archivematica has not yet been completed. Once the service is deployed to early adopters, the security 
will be tested and become more concrete. 
The technologies, infrastructure, and security for Digital Safe are largely provided by and well-
documented by Arkivum. The service that the University will receive will vary based on client choices 
and any specific agreements made between the University and Arkivum, and by the client and Arkivum.  
 
References  
 
Archivematica. Program documentation. Archivematica 1.5. Vers. 1.5. Artefactual Systems, Inc.,  
2015. Web. <https://www.archivematica.org/en/docs/archivematica-1.5/>. 
 
This documentation covers their digital preservation service. 
 
Archivematica. Program documentation. Archivematica Storage Service documentation. Vers.  
0.8. Artefactual Systems, Inc., 2015. Web. < https://www.archivematica.org/en/docs/storage-
service-0.8/>. 
 
This documentation covers their storage service documentation, which contains information on 
how to store within Arkivum. 
 
Archivematica. Program documentation. Format Policy Registry (FPR). Vers. 1.1.0. Artefactual  
Systems, Inc., 2015. Web. < https://www.archivematica.org/en/docs/fpr/>. 
 
This documentation covers their current Format Policy Registry, which is routinely updated. 
 
“Arkivum.” Arkivum. Arkivum Limited, 2016. Web. <http://arkivum.com/>. 
 
Arkivum’s documentation is spread across several pages that are all linked from this page. 
Individual pages are specifically included in the text, and can all be accessed here. 
 
Arkivum. Program documentation. Frequently Asked Questions – Arkivum. Vers. 2.2. Arkivum  
Limited, 27 Feb. 2014. Web. <http://arkivum.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Arkivum-
Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf>.  
 
Arkivum also produced documentation in PDF format that is available in one comprehensive 
document. 
 
"Digital Preservation Metrics." Center for Research Libraries. Enriching Research. Expanding  
125 
 
Possibilities. Since 1949. Center for Research Libraries, n.d. Web. 25 July 2016. 
<https://www.crl.edu/archiving-preservation/digital-archives/metrics>. 
 
The Center for Research Libraries contains information on the metrics used to measure the 
trustworthiness of digital repositories. This information helped dictate what metric was used for 
this informal audit. 
 
Jefferies, Neil. "Background on Digital Safe." Personal interview. Weston Library. 19 July 2016. 
 
Neil Jefferies was informally interviewed by the creator of this document in order to answer 
specific questions on Arkivum’s contract with the University of Oxford, the status of Phase 3, and 
other information that was not publicly available or known by other previous team members. This 
was not recorded and the notes are not publicly available. Contact Neil Jefferies for more 
information. 
 
Jefferies, Neil, Brian Hicks, and Sam Rendell. Digital Safe: Project Initiation Documentation.  
Rep. Vol. 0.7. N.p. 26 Feb. 2016. Print. 
 
The Phase 3 Project Initiation Documentation was the primary documentation for understanding 
Digital Safe as a service separate from the chosen technologies. It is not publicly available. 
Contact Neil Jefferies for more information. 
 
Jefferies, Neil, and David Tomkins. Digital Safe: Archiving Digital Records for the Long Term.  
Bodleian Digital Library, 10 July 2014. Web. 
<https://digitalsafe.wordpress.com/2014/08/18/digital-safe-presented-at-the-ictf-conference-10-
july-2014/>. 
 
Neil Jefferies and David Tomkins presented Phase 1 and 2 of Digital Safe at the ICTF Conference 
in 2014. Information from this presentation were included in this informal audit, and images were 
utilized and cited in presentation related to this document. 
 
Lawson, Sarah. Electronic Archive Pilot Project Phase 2. Rep. Vol. 1.0. N.p. 9 Feb. 2013. Print. 
 
The Phase 2 Project Initiation Documentation was the primary documentation for understanding 
the history and trajectory of Digital Safe as it has developed. It is not publicly available. 
 
McGovern, Nancy Y. TRAC Review in Drupal. MIT Libraries, 2013. Web. 
<http://ils.unc.edu/digccurr/curategear2013-talks/mcgovern-curategear2013.pdf>.  
  
Nancy McGovern developed a tool for self-review using TRAC. Unfortunately, the original 
website is down or no longer exists, but it is hosted on Archivematica under Preservation 
Planning, and one of the original presentations for this tool is still available. This tool was not 
used, but the rating system for compliance was implemented in the informal audit. 
 
Stanbridge, Nik. “New Digital Preservation Solution from Arkivum, Shaped to Grow with Your  
Data.” Arkivum. Arkivum Limited, 21 Jan. 2016. Web. <http://arkivum.com/blog/perpetua-
digital-preservation/>. 
 
This article references the launch of the Arkivum and Archivematica integration, which is what 
Digital Safe will be using as their storage platform and digital preservation workflow. 
 
126 
 
Thomas, Susan. “Digital Safe and BEAM.” Personal interview. Weston Library. 19 July 2016. 
 
Susan Thomas was informally interviewed by the creator of this document in order to answer 
specific questions on the current status of BEAM, to retrieve some background information on 
Digital Safe, and to review BEAM’s current needs from the Digital Safe service. This was not 
recorded and the notes are not publicly available.   
 
Tomkins, David. "An Electronic Archive Pilot Project at the University of Oxford." Web blog  
post. Digital Safe. Wordpress, 2013. Web. <https://digitalsafe.wordpress.com>. 
 
David Tomkins was the project manager for Phase 2 of Digital Safe and developed a Wordpress 
blog to publicly track the progress of Digital Safe. This provided several meeting notes and 
presentations with information on Phases 1 and 2 of Digital Safe. Though Phase 3 is not yet 
included on the blog, Neil Jefferies confirmed that once Phase 3 begins the blog will resume 
providing updates. 
 
Trusted Repository Archiving Checklist (TRAC). Documentation. Vers. 1.0. The Center for  
Research Libraries, 2007. Web. 
<https://www.crl.edu/sites/default/files/d6/attachments/pages/trac_0.pdf>. 
 
The official criteria and checklist for TRAC is the foundation of this audit, and the criteria are 
copied directly from this document. 
 
Various EAPP documents provided by David Tomkins. 
 
As the project manager for Phase 2, David Tomkins provided his documents from Phase 2 for 
establishing a context for that phase. These documents are not publicly available. 
 
  
127 
 
Appendix C: DSA Assessment of Digital Safe – Full Version 
This is the full version of the results from comparing Digital Safe to DSA Guidelines. These responses 
include a more complete description of how Digital Safe strategies fit in with DSA Guidelines and act as 
a reference to any points made in the Discussion section.  
0. Context 
Repository type: Institutional repository, (Other: Dark archive) 
Brief Description of the Repository’s Designated Community: 
The key users for this service have been identified in the Electronic Archives Pilot Project (renamed 
Digital Safe) Phase 1 as: College Archivists; University Archive; Central Administrative Records 
Management; Departmental Research Records Management; and Bodleian Electronic Archives and 
Manuscripts. This community is part of the larger University of Oxford community. These users have 
materials that require high-security and low-accessibility, including administrative records, student 
records, financial records, personal communication, medical reports, non-anonymized case studies, and 
other material that has personal, identifiable information. These users were identified after interviewing 
various colleges and departments on campus and determining a need for a universal storage system 
(Jefferies, Hicks, & Rendell, 2016) and are internally documented with letters of support from various 
colleges. Users are not limited to only these categories, however, as the service is open to all who want to 
use the service and are affiliated with the University of Oxford. 
Level of Curation Performed 
E. Content distributed as deposited  
F. B. Basic curation – e.g., brief checking, addition of basic metadata or documentation  
G. Enhanced curation – e.g., conversion to new formats, enhancement of documentation  
H. Data-level curation – as in C above, but with additional editing of deposited data for accuracy 
Digital Safe as a service is being designed to provide a wide range of digital preservation activities that 
suit the needs of the Designated Communities. The lowest possible level of curation ingested by Digital 
Safe will fall under “A. Content distributed as deposited.” As discussed in Requirement 7. Data integrity 
and authenticity and in Requirement 8. Appraisal, the storage platform Arkivum can ingest any file and 
will disseminate the file in the exact same condition it was in upon ingestion. Additional digital 
preservation workflows are customized by the client, who will also determine the relevance and 
authenticity of any content they opt to store in Digital Safe. 
Outsource Partners 
Arkivum is a proposed contractual partner that will provide the means of digital storage in the form of 
ingest pipes for users of the Digital Safe service. According to their website, “Our operations at all sites, 
including our business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information security standards” (Arkivum Ltd., 
2014). Arkivum is also audited every six months and welcomes client audits (Arkivum Ltd., 2014).  In 
regards to service agreements between Arkivum and clients, there will be a basic contract between the 
University of Oxford and Arkivum, and individual client preferences will build upon that contract and 
articulate the clients’ product choice, workflow preferences, and additional storage space options 
(Jefferies, N., Personal communication, 2016, July 19). 
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Archivematica is a proposed contractual partner that is built into Arkivum and will provide the digital 
preservation workflows for users of the Digital Safe service. Ideally the University of Oxford will be able 
to purchase one license for Archivematica via their contract with Arkivum, rather than each individual 
client purchasing a license (Jefferies, N., Personal communication, 2016, July 19), though these 
discussion with Arkivum are ongoing. 
1. Mission/Scope 
Statement of Compliance: 2 The scope has been determined by the designated community but the 
mission statement is still in development as the project evolves. The chosen technologies have fully 
developed and implemented mission statements. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The original Electronic Archive Pilot Project’s mission statement is as follows: “The Electronic Archive 
Pilot Project will establish the feasibility of a working electronic archive for the use of the whole of the 
Collegiate University. The archive will support the safe and secure storage of all classifications of non-
public record data that individual departments, colleges and associated units are required to keep legally 
or would like to keep for historic reasons. The pilot project aims to develop a cost recovered service” 
(Wilson, J., 2012). The Digital Safe service itself is developing a mission statement. It will likely draw on 
the phrase from the Phase 3 Project Initiation Document to “deliver a secure, long-term records archiving 
service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis once in production.” This 
document is not publicly available. Both Arkivum and Archivematica have additional mission statements 
found in Arkivum’s “About Us”62 section and Archivematica’s “What is Archivematica”63 page. 
2. Licenses 
Statement of Compliance: 1 This section is designed in theory and implementation has begun, and is the 
focus of the next project phase. 
Self-assessment statement: 
This entire section relies on a fully developed contract with Arkivum. A priority of Phase 3 of Digital 
Safe is finalizing the contract with Arkivum and in determining any preservation rights and copyrights. In 
regards to transferring control of data from a client to Arkivum, any services that are part of the library 
may come under the Heritage Institution exception for the right to change objects and make copies, which 
would occur in the regular migration of data in Arkivum and in any Archivematica workflow the data is 
pushed through. Though much of the material may be produced by the clients at the University (e.g. 
financial records, etc.), some of BEAM’s content may apply to the exception (Jefferies, N., Personal 
communication, 2016, July 19). 
3. Continuity of access 
Statement of Compliance: 2 This is a theoretical concept that will be developed should Digital Safe 
regain funding. As an Outsource Partner, Arkivum will be responsible for maintaining continuity of 
access as per their mission statement. 
                                                          
62 Arkivum “About US”” http://arkivum.com/about-us/  
63 “What is Archivematica:” https://www.archivematica.org/en/docs/archivematica-1.5/user-
manual/overview/intro/#intro  
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Self-assessment statement: 
As any future contract with Arkivum will dictate, Digital Safe will rely on the technologies to remain 
updated on and implement any evolving best practices in the field. Arkivum has policies and automated 
processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, software, and hardware. The data is retrieved 
annually and given an integrity test based on checksums. Arkivum has also identified software and 
hardware obsolescence to occur on a cycle of generally 3 to 5 years, so Arkivum’s policy is that data is 
migrated to new media following the LTO roadmap. The LTO data tapes in Escrow are also migrated 
every 5 years. More detailed information on media upgrades can be found on their Data Integrity page. In 
addition to being committed to maintaining standards-based tools for those interested in digital 
preservation tools, Archivematica also relies on their community to help steer the tool in the most useful 
direction. 
Digital Safe is a service and therefore their only responsibility is to maintain the service and contracts 
with technologies, and has no influence on the amount of time the data is held. Ultimately those using the 
Digital Safe service are responsible for maintaining their encryption key, restricting or releasing access to 
materials, and providing their own funding to ensure their space and digital preservation workflows are 
maintained.  
There is no formal documentation on policies in place for changes in circumstances from Digital Safe. 
Ideally the Steering Committee will develop these policies in Phase 3 and eventually transfer 
responsibility to technical support, and this will also likely be dictated in the responsibilities of Digital 
Safe in their contract with Arkivum. 
4. Confidentiality/Ethics 
Statement of Compliance: 2 As per the goal of Digital Safe to “deliver a secure, long-term records 
archiving service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis once in production,” 
Digital Safe will store confidential information and will need to consider their documentation carefully. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe will need to be a dark archive because its purpose is to store confidential information. First, 
Digital Safe has four different levels of access described in their Phase 3 Project Initiation Document that 
also corresponds to features offered by Arkivum.  
1. Clients, affiliated with the University of Oxford, who use the Digital Safe service (see section 0. 
Context for information on specific designated communities):  
a. Have control over the master encryption key  
b. Can view data, view metadata, manipulate data, delete data, export data, and retrieve 
escrow copies, alter digital preservation workflows, among other activities. 
c. Can determine access for other personnel and users  
2. Users, perhaps researchers or auditors  
a. Can view data that is specified by the client  
b. Cannot manipulate, delete, copy, download, export, or otherwise retrieve data or access 
digital preservation workflows  
3. Arkivum employees  
a. Can maintain servers, software, and hardware 
b. Cannot access data or digital preservation workflows  
4. University of Oxford IT Services  
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a. Can assist in determining digital preservation workflows  
b. Can assist in troubleshooting local error and issues  
c. Can maintain Digital Safe website  
d. Cannot access data or digital preservation workflows 
Arkivum employees do not have access to any client data. Additionally, “there is no direct customer 
access to data in the Arkivum data centres, e.g. through a web interface or cloud API. This ensures all 
ingest and access is properly managed through Arkivum appliances” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014) Arkivum is 
build on ingest pipes that are matched with an encryption key that is unique to each client. Without the 
encryption key there is no access to any of the data in its original form or a copy. The encryption key is 
controlled solely by the client. Arkivum does not have public documentation on measures in place if 
disclosure of data occurs. Arkivum does, however, have a detailed contingency plan described in 
Requirement 16 (Arkivum Ltd.). Many Arkivum clients have strict compliance policies and government 
documents and require an even higher level of security. Arkivum adheres to UK Government Information 
Levels; “IL2 and IL3 are UK Government Information Levels. These define the sensitivity of the data 
stored and the security procedures and processes that need to be followed when transmitting and storing 
this data” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool to which only the client has access. For Digital 
Safe, content is not stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete 
before it is stored in Arkivum. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, which 
will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by the 
security measures of Arkivum. 
5. Organizational infrastructure 
Statement of Compliance: 2 As Digital Safe project team members investigate contracts with Arkivum 
they are also in the process of developing a stable organization infrastructure. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe is currently in the process of acquiring funding for Phase 3. There is a cost model and 
projected expense report developed. The projected expense report includes: IT Services internal staff, 
Non-IT Services staff, Hardware, software, training and equipment/storage (Arkivum), and included a 
.5% charge for Prime Minister’s Office charge, an 85% charge for contingency per the Monte Carlo 
Simulation, and a forecast on on-going charges per year (Jefferies, et al., 2016). 
The project team for Phase 3 of Digital Safe is established, but the ultimate short and long-term staffing 
duties will rely on the contract with Arkivum and collaboration with the IT department. The plan is that 
the service will be built into the University of Oxford’s IT department. Further, a business and service 
model is a priority for Phase 3 of Digital Safe and will determine staffing needs and training. Ideally the 
Steering Committee on the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance committee that will 
act as a checks and balances to ensure that local management is useful, that will review policy annually, 
and to ensure funding (Jefferies, N., Personal communication, 2016, July 19).  
Digital Safe will on the technologies to maintain their own staffing. According to Arkivum, “In addition 
to technical change in the archive system, managing staff transitions of those who run the system, for 
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example support staff and administrators, is required”64 Archivematica is created and staffed by 
Artefactual Inc. 
The official governance for this service has not yet been developed. Ideally the Steering Committee on 
the Digital Safe project will also develop into a governance committee that will work in tandem with the 
staff in the IT department to review and update any general policies, training materials, and 
announcements and event information. Because the client will ultimately choose how much space to 
purchase and what data is ingested, it is their responsibility to respond to any announcements or updates 
in training or standards. 
Digital Safe will update any announcements and training material for the service, and the local 
governance committee will have little public documentation aside from the aspects described above that 
will need regularly updated due to the sensitive information and privacy of the dark archives Digital Safe 
is providing. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to handle obsolescence, migration, data 
integrity, and generating any new training materials (Jefferies, N., Personal communication, 2016, July 
19). 
Arkivum does not publish their financial reports, business plans, or blank contracts. However, Arkivum 
has several well-known institutions as clients, including the Museum of Modern Art, University of 
Westminster, and the Oxford Molecular Diagnostics Centre, among many others noted in case studies on 
their website that have been successful. Their Solutions tab offers several reports and case studies in 
various fields, such as Higher Education, that are evidence of success. Archivematica: Archivematica 
does not publish their financial reports or business plans. Archivematica is an open-source tool and 
therefore does not charge clients. However, they provide paid services, including storage, training, 
technical support, all noted on their Services65 page. In the long-term, they have had several successful 
clients list on their Clients66 page. 
6. Expert guidance 
Statement of Compliance: 3 The decision to outsource the technologies for Digital Safe indicates that 
the project team wants the expertise of established digital preservation organizations, with which contract 
development is ongoing. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe is the result of feedback collected during Phase 1 and will be built based on designated 
community needs. In the future, the Digital Safe service will be built into the University of Oxford’s IT 
department. Ideally the webpage would have contact information for the governance committee or other 
local managing team who can assist in troubleshooting smaller issues and directing to training and 
Arkivum and Archivematica help pages (NJ Interview). As previously noted, once the Steering 
Committee transfers Digital Safe control over to IT, IT will then be responsible for keeping training 
materials updated and notifying clients. Digital Safe relies on Arkivum and Archivematica to maintain 
Arkivum also seeks feedback from their users. According to their policy, “The security and audit model 
above has been developed in partnership with Arkivum customers who have confirmed that the model 
meets their regulatory requirements as part of a due-diligence/audit process that they have conducted on 
Arkivum. This includes due-diligence by customers in clinical and financial sectors where regulation is 
                                                          
64 Arkivum “Data Integrity:” http://arkivum.com/data_integrity/  
65 Archivematica Service:s https://www.artefactual.com/services/  
66 Artefactual Systems’ Clients: https://www.artefactual.com/clients/  
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strict.”67 Expertise sources for Arkivum are not in public documentation, but their transparent and detailed 
descriptions of their preservation workflows and storage methods, additional case studies68 on their 
website, and list of current clients offered under the Industries tab on their website offer community 
support and proof of successful methods. 
Archivematica was originally a project use case for OAIS to “process analysis to synthesize the specific, 
concrete steps that must be carried out to comply with the OAIS functional model from Ingest to Access.” 
This project expanded beyond OAIS into its current state as an open-source digital preservation workflow 
tool based on user feedback (Artefactual Inc.). Clients do have to navigate to the manufacturer page to 
contact Artefactual for assistance.  
7. Data integrity and authenticity 
Statement of Compliance: 3 Arkivum and Archivematica both maintain detailed documentation, which 
will be absorbed into Digital Safe documentation by the contract between Arkivum and Digital Safe. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe is a service. Authentication of the original data. will be the entire responsibility of the client. 
The content will likely comprise of files created by the client, e.g. student records, financial records, etc., 
and legal permissions are moot. Other material may be acquisitions to the Bodleian Library that have their 
own documentation and standards that are separate from this service. Each client may also have their own 
policies on permissions and permissions workflows that are independent of each other.  
In regards to service agreements between Arkivum and clients, there will be a contract between individual 
clients and Arkivum that articulate the clients’ product choice, workflow preferences, and additional 
storage space options. Furthermore, according to Arkivum “Our operations at all sites, including our 
business offices, is certified to ISO 27001 information security standards” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014), and 
Arkivum is regularly audited externally to maintain ISO 27001 certification. These certifications enable 
Arkivum to legally hold ingested content. Arkivum offers audit trails as a service. These must be turned 
on and specified by the client upon contract agreement. Audit trails are “accessible in machine-readable 
XML format through Arkivum REST API calls, either on a per-file or per-folder basis. Audit trails are 
also accessible in human readable PDF/A format through the Arkivum Service web interface or through 
an API call. Audit trails in PDF/A format can be signed if necessary to show that they were generated by 
Arkivum Service” (Artefactual Systems Inc.). 
Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool and not a storage space, and has no responsibility 
regarding the content authentication. Archivematica also utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. 
“Archivematica generates checksums upon transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those 
checksums before storing the AIP. It is also possible to include pre-existing checksums, which 
Archivematica will also verify. To check fixity of AIPs in storage, Artefactual has written a separate 
command-line app called Fixity (Artefactual Systems Inc.). 
8. Appraisal 
                                                          
67 Arkivum Chain of Custody: http://arkivum.com/chain-custody-audit-trails/  
68 Arkivum Case Studies: http://arkivum.com/resources/#  
133 
 
Statement of Compliance: 3 Digital Safe as a service is planned to offer both basic and extensive digital 
preservation activities in addition to storage, though the specific workflows are the responsibility of the 
client. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The Designated Communities that was identified after interviewing various colleges and departments on 
campus determined a need for a universal storage system (Jefferies, et al., 2016). The service is open to 
all who want to use the service and are affiliated with the University of Oxford. Therefore, the Designated 
Communities determine what information is included and will have their own documentation dictating the 
appropriate data. Digital Safe, Arkivum, and Archivematica have no influence over what data is 
considered appropriate by the Designated Communities. 
Arkivum can ingest any file format, but does not record their representation information. If the client 
chooses to utilize Archivematica, Archivematica can determine file formats and normalize using their 
Format Policy Registry, as well as creating SIPs and AIPs for record this process. 
9. Documented storage procedures 
Statement of Compliance: 3 Arkivum’s long term-preservation strategies are publicly documented and 
will be absorbed into Digital Safe documentation upon the completion of a contract. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe will rely on the technologies for storage and documented storage procedures as is outlined in 
their future contract. 
Arkivum’s documentation is publicly available on their website and specific client preferences are 
dictated in the final contract. Each file is encrypted with a unique symmetric key using AES256 
encryption. The symmetric key for the file is then encrypted using a public key from a public-private key 
pair using RSA2048 encryption. Both AES256 and RSA2048 are industry standard encryption algorithms 
and widely used in high security applications, e.g. electronic commerce and for sensitive government 
information” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). The encryption key is controlled solely by the client. Many Arkivum 
clients have strict compliance policies and government documents and require an even higher level of 
security. Arkivum adheres to UK Government Information Levels by maintaining ISO 27001 certification 
and can maintain IL2 and IL3 UK Government Information Levels. “These define the sensitivity of the 
data stored and the security procedures and processes that need to be followed when transmitting and 
storing this data” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014).   
Arkivum has policies and automated processes in place for running integrity checks on the data, software, 
and hardware. The data is retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums. Arkivum has 
also identified software and hardware obsolescence to occur on a cycle of generally 3 to 5 years, so 
Arkivum’s policy is that data is migrated to new media following the LTO roadmap. The LTO data tapes 
in Escrow are also migrated every 5 years.69 
Arkivum maintains at least two copies of the data, one in a secure data center and one on LTO data tape 
held in Escrow. The Escrow copy is the backup for any data loss or corruption. If the digital copies are 
corrupted or the clients need to remove content, the LTO tapes are delivered to the client. If there is 
complete data loss, Arkivum provides a “financial guarantee underwritten by an Information and 
                                                          
69 Arkivum Data Integrity: http://arkivum.com/data_integrity/  
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Communication Technology Professional Liability Insurance Policy,” which provides coverage for direct 
loss relating to data loss (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Arkivum also provides multiple client sites, so if one site 
is compromised the data may be retrieved at another site (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Archivematica is the digital preservation workflow that occurs before ingest into Arkivum storage and 
therefore does not have data back-up. Clients are notified of any failed actions and are responsible for 
managing these issues. Archivematica also utilizes fixity checks before AIP storage. “Archivematica 
generates checksums upon transfer of objects into the system, and will verify those checksums before 
storing the AIP. It is also possible to include pre-existing checksums, which Archivematica will also 
verify (Artefactual Systems Inc.). 
10. Preservation plan 
Statement of Compliance: 2 Arkivum’s long term-preservation strategies are publicly documented and 
Archivematica’s options are publicly documented, and individuals contracts between clients and Arkivum 
will dictate specific preservation plans. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The preservation plan for each user of the service Digital Safe will be unique to their context. They will 
specify their preferences for storage and transfer custody to Arkivum in the contract with Arkivum, and 
they will design their own digital preservation workflow in Archivematica based on recommendations 
from both Digital Safe and Archivematica. They will determine their own preservation level and length of 
time the data is to be held, and communicate with Arkivum directly. Arkivum follows a strict chain of 
custody that allows for minimal contact with client data. According to their chain of custody, “The 
starting point for data authenticity is the chain of custody established with the customer to ensure data has 
been correctly copied into the service. Once ingested, files become read only and cannot be updated or 
overwritten. Deletion of files is through a strictly controlled process that requires a request to be made to 
Arkivum. The default is that once a file is in the service then it remains in the service and does not change 
when it is within the service.”70 Any access to ingested data is restricted to individuals with the encryption 
key.  
Digital preservation activities are solely the responsibility of the client, who will design them using 
Archivematica. Archivematica allows users to do various archival activities, including adding metadata in 
Dublin Core, adding rights in PREMIS, data normalization, AIP storage, DIP storage, communication 
with other tools (e.g. Archivist’s Toolkit, ArchiveSpace, Arkivum), among other options. A SIP begins as 
a transfer. “In Archivematica, Transfer is the process of transforming any set of digital objects and/or 
directories into a SIP. Transformation may include appraisal, arrangement, description and identification 
of donor restricted, private or confidential contents.”71 A transfer can be created with submission 
documentation, existing checksums, or an existing METS structmap. The transfer will be processed 
through several micro-services, as described in the Transfer process. This is then ingested into 
Archivematica after the green light is given to the client. The completion of all processes in 
Archivematica are indicated by color and text. Green indicates that a process has been completed 
successfully, and red indicates that the process has not been completed successfully. A client can search 
for content when by its name. Archivematica’s naming system will retain the original name of the transfer 
                                                          
70 Arkivum Chain of Custody: http://arkivum.com/chain-custody-audit-trails/  
71 Archivematica Transfer: https://www.archivematica.org/en/docs/archivematica-1.5/user-
manual/transfer/transfer/#transfer-checksums  
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unless a new name has been assigned to the SIP upon creation. This name will be combined with a 
Universal Unique Identifier that is generated and assigned during SIP formation (AIP Structure). 
11. Data quality 
Statement of Compliance: 2 Arkivum and Archivematica maintain best practices, and Digital Safe 
intends to provide recommendations, but it will be the responsibility of the client to determine what level 
of quality their data maintains. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The metadata fields that Digital Safe recommends the clients’ preserve are: Title, Description, Creator(s), 
ID Type, ID Value, Retention review date, Retention rationale, Resource type, Technical description(s), 
Covering date(s), Finding aid(s), Rights & Licensing information (Jefferies & Tomkins, 2014). It is 
ultimately the client’s decision what properties are preserved. 
Arkivum only requires a file for anything to be ingested. Arkivum has no responsibility for anything 
additional included in the ingest and relies on the client to upload any additional information. Arkivum 
can ingest any file format and will maintain a copy of the original file alongside a normalized file.  
12. Workflows 
Statement of Compliance: 1 While extensive documentation for Arkivum is well-established, the 
integration into Digital Safe documentation is still in progress and are a major focus for Phase 3. 
Self-assessment statement: 
The ongoing nature of Digital Safe means that documentation of processes is also developing. The current 
documentation consists primarily of: meetings minutes from the Steering Committee and the Oxford 
Colleges Librarians Group; Project Initiation Documents; letters of support from various Oxford 
Colleges; Programme and Project Highlight Reports; conference presentation materials; Project Request 
Forms; Request for Change forms; End Project Reports; and various newsletters and copies of email 
communications. Project member Neil Jefferies has began developing a contract with Arkivum, though 
this is not yet available (Jeferies, N. Personal communication, 2016, July 19). Contracts with Arkivum 
will also help Digital Safe to establish documentation on deposits, security, and best practices for digital 
preservation workflow.  
Digital Safe has also established a Designated Community and a corresponding access matrix, seen in 
detail in Requirement 4. Confidentiality/Ethics, which will guide documentation evolution. 
Arkivum and Archivematica both maintain extensive documentation that is publicly available. See the 
response to Requirement 9. Documented storage procedures for more specific information.  
13. Data discovery and identification 
Statement of Compliance: 2 The Designated Communities will only have access to their own data, for 
which they will have provided the identifier that will be maintained by Arkivum. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Arkivum is designed to hold AIPs. “The persistent file/folder mechanism within the Arkivum service 
offers excellent support for the storage of AIPs. The file will retain its original filename, and checksums 
are provided for incorporation in the Preservation Description Information (PDI) for the AIP. The service 
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follows the OAIS model for Archive Storage through use of replication, fixity monitoring and repair, 
disaster recovery, migration, and tiered storage to deliver a specified level of performance, availability 
and integrity of storage.”72 If the client decides to utilize the Archivematica tool they may choose to 
create and package an AIP. The client must determine the processing configuration, which can be left at 
Archivematica’s default setting, or can be created by the client. 
After configuring the process as desired, the SIP can be normalized and stored in an AIP. “After 
normalization is approved, the SIP runs through a number of micro-services, including processing of the 
submission documentation, generation of the METS file, indexing, generation of the DIP and packaging 
of the AIP,” which is packaged according to Bagit specifications (Artefactual Systems Inc.). AIP reingest 
is also an option if the client wishes to add information (e.g. metadata and data normalization) after the 
SIP process. 
14. Data reuse 
Statement of Compliance: 1 While documentation for Arkivum is well-established, the projected Digital 
Safe Designated Communities complicate the process of establishing licenses with vendors. 
Self-assessment statement: 
Digital Safe is designed to hold confidential data with high access restrictions. The Digital Safe Steering 
Committee has opted to utilize Arkivum as the storage technology and will rely on Arkivum to implement 
their responsibilities in data reuse that is outlined in their contract.  
Ideally, Digital Safe will offer best practices based on recommendations from their Outsource Partners 
and other experts in the BDLSS based on Designated Community needs. Based on feedback from the 
Designated Communities, the metadata fields that Digital Safe recommends the clients’ preserve are: 
Title, Description, Creator(s), ID Type, ID Value, Retention review date, Retention rationale, Resource 
type, Technical description(s), Covering date(s), Finding aid(s), Rights & Licensing information (Jefferies 
& Tomkins, 2014). It is ultimately the client’s decision what properties are preserved. 
Arkivum’s full mission statement outlines its service: “Arkivum provides industry-leading big data 
preservation and archiving solutions to organisations in higher education, healthcare, life sciences, and 
digital heritage. These solutions assure the long-term value, trustworthiness and authenticity of data 
irrespective of whether it’s terabytes or petabytes being preserved, and irrespective of whether the 
retention period is years, decades, or a quarter of a century. Through active data management, chain of 
custody and ISO 27001 compliance processes, Arkivum’s unique technology provides rapid, low-latency 
access to archived data and provides an unrivalled 100% data integrity guarantee. Backed by indemnity 
insurance, this is our commitment to protect, curate and preserve data for the future and to eliminate the 
needless loss of information and knowledge. Arkivum works with partners to deliver integrated, scalable 
and flexible solutions for data discovery and sharing; publishing; file format preservation; and 
information portals” (Arkivum Ltd., 2015). Specifically, Arkivum only requires a file for anything to be 
ingested. Arkivum has no responsibility for anything additional included in the ingest and relies on the 
client to upload any additional information. Arkivum can ingest any file format and will maintain a copy 
of the original file alongside a normalized file.  
                                                          
72 Arkivum Integration with other systems: http://arkivum.com/integration-with-other-systems/  
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Digital preservation activities are solely the responsibility of the client, who will design them using 
Archivematica. Archivematica allows users to do various archival activities, including adding metadata in 
Dublin Core, which is also ingestible by Arkivum. 
15. Technical infrastructure 
Statement of Compliance: 2 Outsourcing the technologies allows Digital Safe to customize their 
infrastructure based on pre-existing infrastructure, rather than building their own, which is being 
developed between the project team and Arkivum. 
Self-assessment statement: 
During Phase 2 of the Digital Safe project, the team investigated service and infrastructure models that 
included BEAM and ORA-Data systems at the University of Oxford, and also investigated DataBank as 
an Outsource Partner. BEAM infrastructure, developed in 2005, is held on a stand-alone server that has 
recently not been able to keep up with the increase in acquisitions and the level of organization and 
security that the BEAM would prefer (Thomas, S. Personal communication, 2016, July 19). ORA-Data 
was found incompatible for the type and amount of security measure that would need to be implemented. 
Building an entirely new infrastructure was also investigated but would not have been time or cost-
efficient. DataBank was also ruled out for not including all the aspects necessary for the project in one 
platform, requiring additional outsourcing or increased time and money for the BDLSS. Additionally, 
given that the Designated Communities span across a range of departments, colleges, and expertise, the 
interface design will need to be user-friendly and technical support is necessary. This investigation lead 
the project team to opt for outsourcing storage to Arkivum, outsourcing optional digital preservation 
activities to Archivematica as a built-in tool in Arkivum, and create a local interface to be maintained 
long-term by the University IT Services. The process of considering multiple options and choosing 
Arkivum is evidence that Digital Safe is maintaining its mission statement to deliver a secure, long-term 
records archiving service for the University and Colleges operating on a cost recovery basis once in 
production” even in the development stages. This does not fulfill this infrastructure, but it establishes a 
record of effort to build stable technical infrastructure. 
Arkivum adheres to UK Government Information Levels by maintaining ISO 27001 “Information 
security standards” certification and can maintain IL2 and IL3 UK Government Information Levels. 
Should Digital Safe be built on a contract with Arkivum, it would allow Digital Safe to absorb their 
certification and partially fulfill this Requirement. Arkivum and its applications is also constructed to be 
used from most common operating systems (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Additional technical support is 
available for unique operating systems. Updates are automatically provided to clients as they develop and 
are applied by simple mouse click (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
16. Security 
Statement of Compliance: 3 The decision to outsource to Arkivum is heavily influenced by the security 
levels maintained by Arkivum, which will be absorbed into Digital Safe documentation upon the 
completion of a contract.  
Self-assessment statement: 
If Digital Safe were to establish a contract with Arkivum, security would largely be the responsibility of 
Arkivum. According to project member Neil Jefferies, a primary reason Arkivum is the choice for 
building Digital Safe is their contingency plan (Personal communication, 2016 July 19). First, he data is 
retrieved annually and given an integrity test based on checksums and preventative data migrations where 
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“each copy has its integrity actively monitored and managed and any corruption or loss is automatically 
repaired to make the system self-healing” (Arkivum Ltd.). Arkivum follows the LTO roadmap for storage 
obsolescence and aims to prevent data loss by determining what LTO generation their system is and 
introducing new generations well in advance to any system failure, and plan to migrate every 3-5 years. 
Escrow copies are also migrated every five years to prevent data loss.  
Arkivum’s procedures, hardware, and locations are all certified to ISO 27001 standards and are audited 
every six months. “[Arkivum’s] secure storage locations are based in highly secure facilities, with our 
operations at all sites certified to ISO 27001 standards. Our locations are manned at all hours and access 
is strictly restricted to a list of named, trained and vetted members of the Arkivum Operations team. Each 
site is protected by best of breed firewall technology ensuring that our locations are protected from the 
latest advanced evasion techniques utilised by sophisticated hackers and intelligence organisations” 
(Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Data is secured based on “the ability to separately encrypt each file stored in our 
service. Only encrypted data is ever stored in [Arkivum’s] service. Each file is encrypted with a unique 
symmetric key using AES256 encryption. The symmetric key for the file is then encrypted using a public 
key from a public-private key pair using RSA2048 encryption. Both AES256 and RSA2048 are industry 
standard encryption algorithms and widely used in high security applications, e.g. electronic commerce 
and for sensitive government information,” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014).  
Arkivum contains a strict chain-of-custody system, audit trails, and a highly detailed security model. “The 
security and audit model has been developed in partnership with Arkivum customers who have confirmed 
that the model meets their regulatory requirements as part of a due-diligence/audit process that they have 
conducted on Arkivum. This includes due-diligence by customers in clinical and financial sectors where 
regulation is strict” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Arkivum employees do not have access to any client data. Additionally, “there is no direct customer 
access to data in the Arkivum data centres, e.g. through a web interface or cloud API. This ensures all 
ingest and access is properly managed through Arkivum appliances” (Arkivum Ltd., 2014) which is 
reliant on client control of the encryption keys. 
Finally, Arkivum provides a workflow and safety measures for integrity. For Arkivum/1+1, one copy is 
stored in a secure data center and one copy is saved on LTO data tape in Escrow. For Arkivum/100, two 
copies are stored in secure, geographically separate data centers and one copy is saved on LTO data tape 
in Escrow. The Escrow copy is the backup for any data loss or corruption. If the digital copies are 
corrupted or the clients need to remove content, the LTO tapes are delivered to the client. If there is 
complete data loss, Arkivum provides a “financial guarantee underwritten by an Information and 
Communication Technology Professional Liability Insurance Policy,” which provides coverage for direct 
loss relating to data loss (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). Arkivum also provides multiple client sites, so if one site 
is compromised the data may be retrieved at another site (Arkivum Ltd., 2014). 
Archivematica is a digital preservation workflow tool to which only the client has access. For Digital 
Safe, content is not stored in Archivematica for longer than it takes the workflow process to complete 
before it is stored in Arkivum. Archivematica is integrated with Arkivum via Arkivum’s A-Stor, which 
will be built into the contract between the University and Arkivum, and is therefore protected by the 
security measures of Arkivum. 
 
 
